The Future of Cybertravel: Legal Implications of the Evasion of Geolocation

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The Future of Cybertravel:  
Legal Implications of the Evasion of Geolocation

Marketa Trimble*

Although the Internet is valued by many of its supporters particularly because it both defies and defeats physical borders, these important attributes are now being exposed to attempts by both governments and private entities to impose territorial limits through blocking or permitting access to content by Internet users based on their geographical location—a territorial partitioning of the Internet. One of these attempts is the recent Stop Online Piracy Act ("SOPA") proposal in the United States. This article, as opposed to earlier literature on the topic discussing the possible virtues and methods of erecting borders in cyberspace, focuses on

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an Internet activity that is designed to bypass the territorial partitioning of cyberspace and render any partitioning attempts ineffective. The activity—cybertravel, or the evasion of geolocation—permits users to access content on the Internet that is normally not available when they connect to the Internet from their geographical location. By utilizing an Internet protocol address that does not correspond to their physical location, but to a location from which access to the content is permitted, users can view or use content that is otherwise unavailable to them. Although cybertravel is not novel (some cybertravel tools have been available for a number of years), recently the tools allowing it have proliferated and become sufficiently user-friendly to allow even average Internet users to utilize them. Indeed, there is an increasing interest in cybertravel among the general Internet public as more and more website operators employ geolocation tools to limit access to content on their websites from certain countries or regions.

This article analyzes the current legal status of cybertravel and explores how the law may treat cybertravel in the future. The analysis of the current legal framework covers copyright as well as other legal doctrines and the laws of multiple countries, with a special emphasis on U.S. law. The future of the legal status of cybertravel will be strongly affected by the desire of countries and many Internet actors to erect borders on the Internet to facilitate compliance with territorially-defined regulation and enjoy the advantages of a territorially-partitioned cyberspace. This article makes an attempt to identify arguments for making or keeping certain types of cybertravel legal, and suggests legal, technological, and business solutions for any cybertravel that may be permitted.

INTRODUCTION .............................................................. 569
I. THE INTERNET AS A BORDERLESS MEDIUM .......... 575
II. GEOLOCATION TOOLS ........................................... 586
   A. Use of Geolocation Tools .............................. 586
   B. Operation of Geolocation Tools ................... 592
III. EVASION OF GEOLOCATION ............................... 599
INTRODUCTION

An important decision awaits countries and the international community at large: whether people should be free to break the territorial limits that governments and other entities attempt to impose on the Internet—whether Internet users should have the freedom to travel in cyberspace. Traveling in cyberspace, or “cybertravel,” allows Internet users to view the Internet as if they were in a location other than where they are physically present. Users cybertravel by altering the information that identifies the geographical location from which they are accessing the Internet on the device they use to connect to the Internet. Once they alter the information, they appear to the Internet world to be physically located in a different location. Through cybertravel, Internet users are able to view or use content on the Internet that they would otherwise not be permitted to access because of geolocation tools that block access to content based on the geographical location of a user.

While cybertravel is a network capability that many users appreciate, it frustrates the efforts of those who want geographical
borders to be created and maintained on the Internet so that Internet actors\(^1\) can comply with territorially-defined regulations or contractual obligations and enjoy certain advantages that result from a territorially-partitioned cyberspace—for example, the possibility of price differentiation in different markets or localized advertising. Whether cybertravel should or should not be legal is not a matter of abstract academic debate; it is an important question that has already appeared on legislative agendas.\(^2\) This article presents cybertravel and its forms, explains the various uses of cybertravel, and assesses its legality. It discusses whether there is a place for legal cybertravel on the Internet, and if there is a place, what legal, technological, and business solutions may facilitate that cybertravel. Current developments make the discussion of the legality of cybertravel particularly timely; because cybertravel could subvert these developments, it is important at this point to clarify what its status should be.

There is evidence of an increasing interest in the territorial partitioning of the Internet. Despite the various projections for the future of the Internet that predicted a specific type of regulation that would apply to and on a “borderless medium,”\(^3\) governments want to have the territorial scope of regulation and enforcement on the Internet mirror the territorial limits of the physical world.\(^4\) This governmental interest in borders on the Internet is shared by private parties; while governments seek ways to protect their

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\(^1\) The term “Internet actors” is used not only to describe Internet users but also to describe anyone who acts on the Internet: website operators, Internet service providers, etc. For an explanation of the terms “website operator” and “Internet service provider” as used in this article see infra notes 6 and 61 and the accompanying text.


\(^3\) See infra Part I. A difference may be drawn between the regulation of the medium (regulation of the Internet—e.g., who should be in charge of assigning addresses on the Internet) and the regulation of activities that occur on the medium (regulation on the Internet—e.g., consumer protection laws, tax laws, defamation laws that apply to conduct on the Internet). This article concerns any national regulation that is limited to a certain territory; such national regulation includes both types of regulation—regulation of the Internet (e.g., rules for Internet service providers) and regulation on the Internet (all national laws that may pertain to conduct on the Internet).

citizens from the influx of certain content,\(^5\) website operators\(^6\) search for workable solutions to partition cyberspace in order to both secure compliance with territorially-limited regulation and enforcement and take advantage of the partitioned cybermarket. To achieve the partitioning, entities on the Internet employ geolocation tools to localize Internet users and control the content that is available to the users based on their location. Increasingly, geolocation is not only a matter of voluntary adoption by Internet actors but also a matter of decree: governments and courts are beginning to mandate the use of geolocation tools as a valid means of achieving compliance with the laws of particular jurisdictions.\(^7\) It is likely that as geolocation use increases to limit access to certain content\(^8\) it will generate more interest in cybertravel,\(^9\) which will become widespread, undermine geolocation efforts, and

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\(^5\) See, e.g., infra note 56 (seizures of domain names in the United States); see also Country Profiles, OPENNET INITIATIVE, http://opennet.net/country-profiles (last visited Mar. 7, 2012) (numerous examples of countries ordering Internet service providers to block certain websites). For the term “Internet service provider” as used in this article see infra note 61 and the accompanying text.

\(^6\) The term “website operator” describes any entity that runs its own website. This term is to be distinguished from “Internet service provider.” See infra note 61 and accompanying text.

\(^7\) See infra notes 86–89 and accompanying text.

\(^8\) The 2010 Internet-Draft of the Geographic Location/Privacy (geopriv) group of the Internet Engineering Task Force has noted that “[a]s the accuracy of location information improves and the expense of calculating and obtaining it declines, the distribution and use of location information in Internet-based services will likely become increasingly pervasive.” Barnes et al., An Architecture for Location and Location Privacy in Internet Applications: Internet-Draft, Geopriv4 (Oct. 11, 2010), http://tools.ietf.org/pdf/draft-ietf-geopriv-arch-03.pdf; see also A. Mayrhofer & C. Spanring, A Uniform Resource Identifier for Geographic Locations (‘geo’ URI), INTERNET ENG’G TASK FORCE 4, (June 2010), http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc/rfc5870.txt.pdf (“Most web search engines use geographic information, and a vivid open source mapping community has brought an enormous momentum into location aware technology.”).

\(^9\) See Benjamin Edelman, Shortcomings and Challenges in the Restriction of Internet Retransmissions of Over-the-Air Television Content to Canadian Internet Users 9 (2001), available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/archived_content/people/edelman/pubs/jump-091701.pdf (expert memorandum attached to the National Association of Broadcasters’ submission to Industry Canada) (“The availability of exclusive high-value content protected by geographic analysis systems would be likely to encourage additional efforts at circumvention via proxy servers.”).
make territorially-limited regulation and enforcement on the Internet even more difficult.

The seminal question for regulating the use of cybertravel is whether it should be allowed at all, considering its potential to severely undermine the current trajectory of regulation and enforcement on the Internet. The most straightforward manner of addressing the potentially subversive effect of cybertravel is to make it illegal. Absent cybertravel, geolocation tools would face minimal or negligible obstacles and national regulation and enforcement on the Internet could emulate that of the physical world.

This article supports the survival of cybertravel with specific limitations. It argues that cybertravel should be equated to physical travel, and advocates that the legality of cybertravel should be protected for the same reasons for which we value the freedom of physical travel. The importance of physical travel, including international travel, which in the United States is underscored by constitutional protections,10 emanates from its benefits to society, not the least of which is the access to information about alternative views and practices.11 People who travel learn about views held by others and various solutions to social problems, regulation, and enforcement. Travel can inspire, teach, and facilitate an understanding of other societies, and assist in securing a peaceful co-existence of nations.12 In the near future, cybertravel will play a role very similar to that of physical travel as cyberspace becomes as partitioned as the physical world. Even if this partitioning is the result of the imposition of reasonable jurisdictional limits on the Internet, it is questionable whether the resulting borders should be less permeable than the borders of the physical world.

10 Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958); see infra Part IV.B.3.
11 Id. at 125–27 (quoting ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787 195–96 (University of Kansas Press 1956)). On the right to access to information, see infra Part IV.B.3.
12 Id. at 127 (quoting ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787 195–96 (University of Kansas Press 1956)).
This article analyzes cybertravel and its current status, and projects its future. Part I discusses the notion of the “borderlessness” of the Internet, its origins, development, and current state. Part II discusses one of the methods used today to defeat Internet borderlessness and allow the erection of borders; the method—arguably the preferred of the existing methods of the territorial partitioning of the Internet\(^{13}\)—relies on geolocation tools to partition cyberspace. Part II explains how geolocation tools work, who uses them and for what purposes. Part III focuses on the use of cybertravel as the evasion of geolocation. It reviews the various methods of cybertravel and provides examples of its uses. Part IV analyzes the legality of cybertravel as it exists today and proposes approaches that the law could take to cybertravel in the future; it also discusses possible technological and business solutions that may make cybertravel possible notwithstanding the developments that appear to preordain cybertravel’s illegality.

It should be noted that two topics are peripheral to the primary focus of this article.\(^{14}\) Although the article touches upon the two topics—anonymization and place-shifting services—they are not its primary focus. Although it may appear that the problem of achieving anonymity on the Internet (or anonymous Internet browsing) is related to the legal issues of cybertravel, anonymization is in fact neither a prerequisite for nor a consequence of the legalization of cybertravel. The relationship between the two phenomena is analyzed in Part IV,\(^{15}\) but this article provides no answers to questions about anonymization.

\(^{13}\) Another method of erecting borders on the Internet is the filtering imposed by Internet service providers. Internet service provider filtering prevents users from accessing content that has been blocked by the provider. The most controversial method consists of installing a filter on users’ hardware. See infra Part I (discussing methods of erecting borders on the Internet). For the definition of “Internet service provider” as used in this article, see infra note 61 and accompanying text.

\(^{14}\) In attempting to cover a broad scope of various legal issues that pertain to cybertravel, this article inevitably generalizes and omits in-depth analyses of some issues deserving separate detailed inquiries (e.g., issues of personal jurisdiction and the legal status of cache copies). Such inquiries are beyond the scope of this article.

\(^{15}\) On the relationship (or the absence thereof) of anonymization and cybertravel see infra Part IV.B.2.
Place-shifting services, which either retransmit television programs themselves (e.g., ivi in the United States,\textsuperscript{16} TV CatchUP in the United Kingdom,\textsuperscript{17} shiftTV in Germany,\textsuperscript{18} and ManekiTV in Japan),\textsuperscript{19} or enable users to share retransmission of television programs (e.g., Justin.tv\textsuperscript{20} and WorldTV),\textsuperscript{21} resemble cybertravel because they also secure access to content in places where the content is normally not available.\textsuperscript{22} Although recent legal disputes concerning these services\textsuperscript{23} may be the precursors to legal challenges to cybertravel, legal issues that concern place-shifting services do not coincide with but only overlap with the issues associated with cybertravel.\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{17} TCATCHUP, http://www.tvcatchup.com (last visited Nov. 19, 2011).
\textsuperscript{20} JUSTINTV, http://www.justin.tv (last visited Nov. 19, 2011). According to its CEO, Michael Seibel, Justin.tv “provide[s] a platform that empowers people to create and share live video online. Our site is the modern equivalent of the town square, but instead of standing on a soap box to be heard a user can broadcast his or her message to the world.”
\textsuperscript{22} For a reference to Slingbox, another non-cybertravel service that offers access to territorially-limited content, see infra note 259.
\textsuperscript{24} First, because of the manner in which the technology involved in cybertravel functions, as opposed to the manner in which place-shifting tools that are mentioned here function, cybertravel might not be viewed as a retransmission of content to a new (not originally intended) audience. Second, even if the differences in technology are considered irrelevant to an inquiry about the existence of liability for copyright infringement, not all legal issues relevant to cases of cybertravel would apply to place-shifting services. Although users do cybertravel to watch video content not available in
I. THE INTERNET AS A BORDERLESS MEDIUM

At its birth, the Internet was endowed with an architecture that sounded very appealing: the medium would be designed so that no one authority could assert complete control over it. This design idea shaped the creation of the Arpanet, the predecessor of the Internet, as a decentralized network that would become the basis of the structure of the Internet. This deliberate design led to a network that not only defied central control but also lacked borders for partitioning control territorially; one of the network’s defining features was the absence of any borders. Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, who has worked on the legal problems associated with the Internet’s borderlessness and issues of geolocation for a number of years, calls borderlessness “one of [the Internet’s]

their country or region, this is not the only purpose for which they cybertravel, and therefore limiting the present inquiry to this one aspect of cybertravel would most certainly not exhaust all the legal issues associated with cybertravel, and the limitation would render the legal analysis of cybertravel incomplete. See infra Part IV.A.2 for the discussion of various legal aspects concerning cybertravel. For the legal issues of the streaming of content on the Internet, see Maurizio Borghi, Chasing Copyright Infringement in the Streaming Landscape, 42 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMP. LAW 316 (2011).

25 The word “Internet” technically refers to only one of the network protocols; however, given the prevailing use of the protocol and the fact that it has been equated to the network itself, this paper talks only about the Internet. On the two current versions of the protocol see infra Part II.B.

26 See JACK L. GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET?: ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS WORLD 23 (Oxford University Press 2006) (“[T]he founders embraced a design that distrusted centralized control. In effect, they built strains of American libertarianism, and even 1960s idealism, into the universal language of the Internet.”); INSTRUCTIONAL DESIGN: SYSTEM STRATEGIES 167 (Bruce R. Ledford, Phillip J. Sleeman, eds.) (“Primarily because of the needs inherent in the cold war, it became obvious to the Military and Department of Defense that the ability to wage modern warfare had to be decentralized.”); see also Paul Baran, On Distributed Communications: I. Introduction to Distributed Communications Networks, RAND CORP. (Aug. 1964), http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_memoranda/2006/RM3420.pdf.

27 See generally JANET ABBATE, INVENTING THE INTERNET (MIT Press 2000) (discussing the creation and early days of the Internet); see also GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 26, at 22–23.

This Part discusses this feature of the Internet, its origins, its impact on the Internet and regulation of the Internet, and its current state and future.

Robert Taylor, a former Director of the Information Processing Techniques Office of the Advanced Research Project Agency, the agency that developed the Arpanet in the late 1960s, attributed the idea for the particular architecture of the Arpanet (that led to the borderlessness of the Internet) to Wesley Clark, an electrical engineer who worked for Washington University in St. Louis during that time. Taylor recalled that the decision to support Clark’s idea was related to Taylor’s own skepticism of central authority; his experience from the Vietnam War convinced him that any central authority should not be trusted, so he agreed with a plan to establish the network with no central control. In fact, however, the Department of Defense also had its own reasons for being interested in a decentralized architecture; such an architecture was more likely to withstand an enemy attack. Therefore, the distributed architecture of the network was not a matter of coincidence, nor was it dictated by technical necessity;
the particular architecture had significant political and strategic motivations.33

The technical design of the Internet has a critical impact on the power of governments to impose regulation and enforcement in the space.34 To regulate a territory, a government needs to exert its enforcement power in the territory, or have other governments wield this power on its behalf. The willingness—or lack thereof—of foreign governments to lend their support to enforcing one government’s regulations defines the limits of the power of that government to regulate. The problem in a borderless world is that if a government has the physical ability to enforce its will, for instance, because Internet servers are located in its territory,35 it ultimately regulates and enforces worldwide; other governments cannot push back,36 and the regulating and enforcing power of the one country thus extends to the world’s entire cyberspace.37 On the other hand, if a government cannot enforce its regulations because particular servers, server providers, website operators or
their assets are located outside of that government’s enforcement power, that government’s regulatory power is nonexistent unless the government manages to exert its power over Internet users residing in its territory or other actors located in its territory. Such actors may include service providers and payment processors, or anyone that facilitates the operations of the website operators.

When the Internet became a mass medium, the initial desire to have no central authority controlling the network was replaced by a realization that non-regulation in cyberspace might create more problems than the socially valuable opportunities that this architecture might offer. Some questioned whether the Internet was susceptible to any regulation at all. It is not surprising that the disadvantages of non-regulation on the Internet were identified by someone who personally observed the regulatory disarray in the post-communist countries. Lawrence Lessig, who was engaged as an advisor to these countries, suggested a need for governance on the Internet and posited that the regulation should be based on the “code”—the architecture of the Internet, the technical design that de facto regulates behavior on the Internet. The architecture would dictate to a large degree what the law could do, and be the “code,” not only in the technical sense, but to a certain degree also in the legal sense.

38 See Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 4, at 789–90 (describing a potential hurdle to interstate enforcement within the United States associated with the lack of physical borders on the Internet and therefore with the danger of territorially-unlimited prescriptive jurisdiction).

39 Targeting “related actors”—actors that are linked to providers of certain content—can raise concerns that are similar to those that are raised by filtering. See infra note 59 (describing the proposed Stop Online Piracy Act in the United States, which would target such related actors).

40 Lawrence Lessig, CODE, AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 3 (Basic Books 1999).

41 See Michael Geist, Cyberlaw 2.0, 44 B.C. L. REV. 323, 357 (2003) (“[T]he three principles of Cyberlaw 1.0 . . . are in fact tied together by one larger principle—that government would not, could not, and should not apply its traditional regulatory mechanisms to the Internet.”).

they would have to utilize its architecture—its “code” in the technical sense; at the same time, the architecture would protect the Internet from government imposition of laws inconsistent with the structure of the network.\footnote{\url{http://ssrn.com/abstract=1737630} (correctly pointing out that Lessig “does not equalise ‘law’ and ‘code,’” rather, he “defines ‘code’ as a form of co-action between software and hardware on the Internet constituting an \textit{architecture} of technology,” which “is a structure that conditions regulation on the Internet.”).} The solution to the problem of regulation on the Internet would have to be predicated on its architecture.

If conduct on the Internet should and could be regulated, the question then was who should regulate it. One school of thought declared that no one should regulate conduct on the Internet,\footnote{\textsc{Lawrence Lessig}, \textsc{Code: Version 2.0} Basic Books (2006) (“The claim for cyberspace was not just that governments would not regulate cyberspace—it was that government could not regulate cyberspace.”).} although the “no one” did not really mean a complete absence of regulation. Because the technical “code” is a significant regulatory tool, it is clear that the “no one” would be the Internet designers, who continue to shape the Internet and its de facto technical regulatory framework.\footnote{\textsc{John Perry Barlow}, \textit{Declaration of Cyberspace Independence}, \textsc{Elec. Frontier Found.} (Davos, Switzerland 1996), available at \url{https://projects.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html}.} Although Internet designers would always have an important role to play in the Internet’s future, including the Internet’s susceptibility to certain types of regulation, there seems to be no legitimate reason that they should dictate the full scope of the “code” in the legal sense.\footnote{\textsc{Graber}, \textit{supra} note 42, at 5 ("[T]he actor who reigns over the architecture of technology also defines the rights and constraints existing within this architecture.").} Despite their

\footnote{\textsc{Lessig}, \textit{supra} note 40, at 8 (There were advocates of an expert-centered approach: “We are at a stage in our history when we urgently need to make fundamental choices about values, but we should trust no institution of government to make such choices.”); \textsc{Goldsmith & Wu}, \textit{supra} note 26, at 30 (“Internet’s founding vision [was] of an open, noncommercial network run by selfless experts for the benefit of all.”). Of course, given many people’s disillusions with the choices of democratic governments perhaps it would be better to entrust regulation to independent experts; however, such an approach to shaping the “code” should have a democratic oversight unless we want to abandon democracy altogether. \textit{See also} \textsc{Graber}, \textit{supra} note 42, at 6 (discussing the need to subject to constitutional scrutiny not only governmental but also private actions manipulating Internet infrastructure).}
“parental claims,” Internet designers would not be the proper authority to make all the regulatory choices for life in cyberspace.47

Those who have agreed on the need to regulate in cyberspace have been divided between those who have predicted a special new type of regulation for the Internet,48 and those who have rejected any specificity for the medium and have insisted that the Internet be subject to the same regulations that apply to conduct occurring in other means of communication. The first group, the Internet exceptionalists, call for new bodies to be established to govern cyberspace.49 The second group, the Internet non-exceptionalists, have seen no reason to discuss who should govern cyberspace because in their view the Internet should be subject to existing regulation.50

With the increasing population of cyberspace and a growing spectrum of activities taking place on the Internet, the world did not wait for a resolution of the debate among the Internet

47 In fact, the “code” in the technical sense cannot serve as the only regulatory framework in cyberspace; there are limitations of the “code” in the technical sense and a need for it to be supported by other forms of regulation. See Barnes et al., supra note 8, at 6–7.

48 Goldsmith & Wu, supra note 26, at 25 (The options include “the internationalists’ view” that “territorial rule would need to be supplemented, and eventually replaced, by global governmental institutions.”). Another option is for the Internet community to govern itself independently of national governments. See Post, supra note 32, at 185 (“[I]t’s all just people in one place interacting and communicating with other people in other places. So why not begin by recognizing their right—perhaps even their inalienable right?—to govern themselves as they see fit?”).

49 David R. Johnson & David G. Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1367 (1996) (“This . . . distinct Cyberspace . . . needs and can create its own law and legal institutions.”).

50 See Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 4, at 827 (“The error is the belief that the Internet is a unique phenomenon that requires suspension of the normal principles that govern cross-border conduct.”); Goldsmith, supra note 35, at 1250 (“Cyberspace transactions are no different from ‘real-space’ transnational transactions. . . . There is no general normative argument that supports the immunization of cyberspace activities from territorial regulation. . . . Resolution of the choice-of-law problems presented by cyberspace transactions will be challenging, but no more challenging than similar problems raised in other transnational contexts.”); see also Post, supra note 32, at 166–67 (discussing exceptionalists’ versus non-exceptionalists’ views).
designers, the exceptionalists, and the non-exceptionalists. As Michael Geist observed in 2003, the innocent age of the Internet was replaced by the rule of “cyberlaw 2.0,” which confirmed the views and predictions of the non-exceptionalists, and “[brought] with it a shift from a borderless network to borderless law, from code that regulates to code that is regulated, and from self-regulation to government regulation.”  

51 History proved that the borderless network would not have to mean the end of governmental control or the end of regulation and enforcement, but that it would be transformed into a borderless regulation supported by unilateral and yet globally-reaching enforcement.  

Once governments began to engage in de facto global enforcement on the Internet, the borderlessness of the network no longer appeared to be an advantage, and the desirability of borders began to be re-evaluated. This development can be perceived as a logical result of the maturing of both the Internet and some of its advocates; or, a much less encouraging explanation suggests that the interest in raising borders on the Internet was one of the signs of the inevitable “Cycle” that Tim Wu has described in various industries and great inventions— the “Cycle” that turns amazing, groundbreaking inventions into the tools of vicious monopolies.

51 Geist, supra note 41, at 358.
52 Id. at 335–47 (Geist listed examples of “aggressive extra-territorial legislative approach” in the areas of copyright, domain names regulation, privacy, computer crime, and online gambling; see also Jack Goldsmith, The Internet and the Abiding Significance of Territorial Sovereignty, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 475, 483 (1998) (an earlier piece by Jack Goldsmith predicting cyberlaw 2.0)).
53 Tim Wu, The Master Switch: The Rise and Fall of Information Empires 6 (2010) (“Without exception, the brave new technologies of the twentieth century—free use of which was originally encouraged, for the sake of further invention and individual expression—eventually evolved into privately controlled industrial behemoths, the ‘old media’ giants of the twenty-first, through which the flow and nature of content would be strictly controlled for reasons of commerce.”).
54 Id. at 7 (“If the Internet, whose present openness has become a way of life, should prove as much subject to the Cycle as every other information network before it, the practical consequences will be staggering.”); see also Goldsmith & Wu, supra note 26, at 10 (“By 2005 Yahoo had come full circle. The darling of the Internet free speech movement had become an agent of thought control for the Chinese government. . . . The Yahoo story encapsulates the Internet’s transformation from a technology that resists territorial law to one that facilitates its enforcement.”).
And, counter-intuitively, raising borders may in fact assist such monopolies in asserting their power globally: while without borders those who hold monopolies in only some countries face competition on the Internet from foreign competitors, with borders the monopoly holders may fully occupy the space.

Although it may seem at first that raising Internet borders is inherently undesirable, the fact is that raising borders may be as liberating as it is limiting.\(^{55}\) The geographically unlimited regulation and enforcement of cyberlaw 2.0 has been liberating only when it is “our” laws that are being enforced; as soon as other countries enforce “their” laws that are contrary to our beliefs, we begin to look for ways to protect our own value system.\(^{56}\) We might not always agree with our government’s actions, but at least we have the option of influencing them. Having foreign governments imposing regulations on us that we cannot affect makes us reconsider the value of borders,\(^{57}\) and contemplate ending the borderlessness of the Internet.\(^{58}\)

\(^{55}\) Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 4, at 796–97 (discussing benefits of territorially-limited or geographically-defined regulations).


\(^{57}\) “[C]ontrary to what many expect, the geographically bordered Internet has many underappreciated virtues. . . . The bordered Internet accommodates real and important differences among peoples in different places, and makes the Internet a more effective and useful communication tool as a result.” Goldsmith & Wu, supra note 26, at viii.

\(^{58}\) It also transpired that businesses did not respond to cyberlaw 2.0 by moving their seats, servers and assets to jurisdictions with limited regulation and enforcement. The
There are three methods of imposing borders on the Internet: the first two methods rely on content filtering and the third relies on the actions of website operators.\(^{59}\) Content filters can be installed directly on a user’s hardware or applied at the level of Internet service providers—those who connect users to the Internet, such as cable companies, telephone companies, and wireless service providers.\(^{60}\) The first filtering method—hardware content filtering—is highly controversial; the second method—service provider content filtering—is applied not only by oppressive regimes but also by democratic countries,\(^{62}\) and certainly has merit when used to enforce decisions by courts or administrative agencies.\(^{63}\) However, unless it is based on a

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59 Not all enforcement of laws on the Internet relies on the territorial partitioning of the Internet. See, e.g., Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112\(^{th}\) Cong. § 102(c)(2)(C) (2011) (proposing to bar online payment providers from doing business with websites that breach the law). Such proposals raise a number of issues, including their potential extraterritorial effects.

60 See infra notes 320–22 and accompanying text (on filtering by service providers); see also Freedom on the Net: A Global Assessment of Internet and Digital Media 6–7 (Sanja Kelly & Sarah Cook eds., Freedom House, 2011).

61 The term “Internet service provider” as used here does not match the statutorily defined term “service provider.” See 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1) (2010) (defining “service provider” to cover a wider range of entities).


63 For instance, a court may order Internet service providers to block access to a website that does not comply with a court’s decision according to local regulations against pornography. It is more problematic if a government requests that service providers filter for pornography and block the content without any formal proceedings to establish the illegality of the particular content. See also Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. British Telecomms. PLC, [2011] EWHC (Ch) 2714 (Eng.) (for a decision in the context of copyright infringement); Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament
decision concerning particular individual content, no type of content filtering appears to be an acceptable means for achieving routine compliance with local laws and regulations; usually, these methods of filtering are viewed by the public with significant skepticism, if not outrage. Academics have argued that the two types of filtering should be prohibited as being contrary to the freedom of speech, and recently the Court of Justice of the European Union ruled that court-imposed, time-unlimited, general filtering violates the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights and other EU legislation.

The third method of raising borders on the Internet leaves the burden upon responsible website operators and requires that they take actions necessary to comply with territorially-defined obligations. This method has several advantages. First, it avoids the public outrage associated with governmental intrusions into Internet traffic and potential constitutional and human rights


64 See infra notes 319–22 and accompanying text; infra Part IV.B.3.

65 See Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v. Société Belge des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Éditeurs SCRL (SABAM), available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=115202&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=763036. The CJEU noted that the filtering at issue would violate the rights of not only Internet users—“their right to protection of their personal data and their freedom to receive or impart information,”—but also Internet service providers—“the freedom to conduct business.” Id. at ¶¶ 49, 50. The filtering was also held to be in breach of the EU E-Commerce Directive (Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market) and other related EU directives. Id. at ¶ 54; see case C-360/10, Belgische Vereinigung van Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers (SABAM) v. Netlog NV (2012); see also infra note 67.

66 See supra note 6 (defining the term “website operator” as used in this article).

challenges that can arise because the intrusions may have the character of censorship of speech.  

Second, the method relies on the parties who actually know the content of the website at any given moment and who should be able to assess their legal obligations in various territorial contexts. Third, the method does not challenge the status of Internet service providers as common carriers eligible for safe harbors that protect them from secondary liability. The safe harbors are based on the theory that common carriers are unaware of the content that they carry and are technically incapable of efficient monitoring of the content that would allow them to prevent direct infringements. If governments require and service providers execute the filtering of certain content, the common carrier status could be in jeopardy.

The third method of raising borders on the Internet through website operators is arguably preferable to the second method that relies on filtering by Internet service providers; website operators are better positioned to limit access to their websites to users from certain countries or block access to users from other countries. Website operators have utilized geolocation tools to achieve this goal.

digital-economy-act-filessharing.

68 See infra Part IV.B.3 (discussing the constitutional aspect of the problem).
69 The situation is more complicated when operators, such as eBay or YouTube, provide space for users to post their own content; the degree to which such operators are able to monitor the content uploaded by the users is subject to debate. E.g., Content ID, YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/t/contentid (last visited Nov. 19, 2011). For a choice-of-law perspective on the problem of potential operator liability for the conduct of users, see generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie et al., The Law Applicable to Secondary Liability in Intellectual Property Cases, 42 N.Y.U. J. Int’l., L. & Pol., 201 (2009). See also Case C-70/10 Scarlet Extended SA v. Société Belge des Auteurs Compositeurs et Éditeurs (2011), available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=115202&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=doc&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=64604.
70 Internet service providers, or website operators operating search engines or public fora for users’ content, would not be the responsible parties if their liability is limited by a safe harbor provision. See, e.g., Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2) (2010); Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2006); Directive 2001/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market, arts. 12–15, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1, 3.
II. GEOLOCATION TOOLS

Before the next Part discusses cybertravel as the evasion of geolocation, this Part reviews what geolocation tools are, who uses them and for what purposes, and how the tools operate. As explained earlier, geolocation tools have become one of the means of erecting borders on the Internet; the tools can determine where an Internet user is physically located and allow tailored content to be delivered to that user based on the local regulatory framework and other localized preferences. Currently these tools utilize Internet protocol ("IP") addresses\(^{71}\) to localize Internet users; however, in the future, geolocation tools might not need to rely on IP addresses at all or solely on IP addresses\(^{72}\)—additional or different data points may serve as sources of information about an Internet user’s location.

A. Use of Geolocation Tools

If we regard the territorial partitioning of the Internet as an undesirable outcome (meaning detrimental to the original idea of the network),\(^{73}\) the story behind geolocation tools might indeed be another example of Tim Wu’s vicious “Cycle”\(^{74}\) because these tools—like other technologies subject to Wu’s “Cycle”—had innocent beginnings. Apparently, the first desire to find out where Internet users were located arose in the advertising industry when advertisers wanted to target advertisements based on a user’s location.\(^{75}\) So, if you opened a page on your home computer, the advertisers wanted you to be offered meals at your local restaurants; if you opened the same page on your laptop while connected to the Internet at a Chicago airport, the advertisers wanted you to see advertisements for local Chicago restaurants.

\(^{71}\) See infra Part II.B (explaining the term “IP address”).

\(^{72}\) See infra notes 163–64 and accompanying text.

\(^{73}\) “The bordered Internet is widely viewed to be a dreadful development that is antithetical to the Internet’s ‘true’ purposes and undermines the Internet’s promise.” Goldsmith & Wu, supra note 26, at 150.

\(^{74}\) See Wu, supra note 53; supra Part I.

\(^{75}\) “To the best of my knowledge, commercial Internet-based geographic analysis tools have been available since no later than 1999 . . . .” Edelman, supra note 9, at 2. On the history of geolocation see Goldsmith & Wu, supra note 26, at 58–61.
Although it might be annoying to some that connecting to the Internet during a short layover at the Frankfurt airport results in Google assuming that you wish to use the German version of their search engine, the general Internet population appears to prefer the convenience of localized content.

After they were applied in advertising, geolocation tools began to be employed by those who were attempting to comply with territorially-defined regulation. Regulation continues to be territorial; even in highly internationally-harmonized areas such as copyright, differences among the laws of countries persist, so it is desirable to tailor the accessibility of content on the Internet to the requirements and limitations of individual countries. Website operators use geolocation tools to comply with various regulatory requirements—for instance, to satisfy restrictions that the U.S. government imposes on exports to certain countries.

Companies may use geolocation tools to prevent customers from certain countries from ordering electronic equipment because of safety requirements that the particular country imposes on such equipment sold for use in that country. Even if parties regulate their affairs between themselves by private contract—for instance,
by obtaining a copyright license for certain content—their contracts may be limited territorially.

Often the uses of geolocation serve multiple purposes. For example, online gaming websites use geolocation tools both to comply with local gaming regulations and to prevent fraud. First, geolocation is employed to help ensure that customers will not access gaming sites from countries that impose prohibitions or limitations on Internet gaming. William Hill, one of the largest bookmakers in the United Kingdom and also an online gaming operator, uses geolocation tools to prevent U.S. players from accessing its gaming products that are legal in the United Kingdom, but expose various entities involved in the operation to liability in the United States. The second purpose for which the gaming industry uses geolocation tools is to identify potential credit card fraud. If the address given to the issuing bank does

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79 TV stations and other online content providers may have various reasons for limiting access to content from certain countries—copyright licensing issues are not the only reason. See infra note 180; see also Frequently Asked Questions: BBC Help, BBC http://faq.external.bbc.co.uk/questions/bbc_online/website_changes (last visited July 28, 2011). As a result of these various limitations, for instance, you cannot access episodes of The Tonight Show when you are in Germany; the NBC website will not play the video once it detects your foreign location. The Tonight Show, http://www.nbc.com/the-tonight-show/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2011). Similarly, the German television station SAT1 will not allow you to watch Kommissar Rex from a U.S. location; upon opening the webpage you will receive a message explaining that the content is not available in the United States. Kommissar Rex, http://www.sat1.de/filme_serien/rex/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2011). Users have reported that Netflix will not allow them to download a film if they access their U.S. Netflix account from a location outside the United States. I am indebted to my colleague, Professor Stacey Tovino of the William S. Boyd School of Law, for the observation about Netflix. Other Netflix users have reported the same problem.


81 I am indebted to Gregory R. Gemignani of Lionel Sawyer & Collins, Las Vegas, Nevada, for an insightful discussion about the uses of geolocation in the gaming industry.


83 On geolocation in preventing credit card fraud see Goldsmith & Wu, supra note 26, at 61; see also Hill, supra note 80; Kevin F. King, Personal Jurisdiction, Internet Commerce, and Privacy: The Pervasive Legal Consequences of Modern Geolocation Technologies, 21 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 61, 76 (2011).
not match the physical address that is self-reported by the Internet user at registration (as confirmed by the geolocation tools), the operator is alerted and may take additional measures to ensure that the player is a legitimate user of the credit card.

The list of reasons for the voluntary use of geolocation tools goes beyond achieving legal compliance or preventing fraud, and includes purposes such as implementing differential pricing, localizing advertising, and Internet searching. Of course, illegal operations also utilize the tools in support of their illegal activities. A Hong Kong website operator, who purposefully engaged in activities that appeared to infringe intellectual property rights, used the tools to limit the site’s exposure to local authorities by making sure that it did not infringe any rights in Hong Kong. To meet this goal, the company employed geolocation tools to make sure that no user from Hong Kong could download an infringing work posted on its website, but simultaneously permitted users connected from other countries to download the content.

In an important development for the future of geolocation, and consequently also for the future of cybertravel, governments are turning to geolocation as an enforcement tool—a means to force Internet actors to comply with regulatory decisions and court orders. For example, regulators in Italy have mandated that gaming websites use geolocation tools to prevent users located in Italy from accessing certain content. The U.S. Department of

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84 For this example I am indebted to Douglas Clark of Hogan Lovells International LLP, Shanghai, China.
86 According to NeuStar (formerly Quova), a geolocation tools provider, “[g]eolocation technology is a requirement in online licensing applications in Italy. . . . An operator wishing to obtain an online gaming licence in Italy is required to note during its license application the technology that will be used for geolocation. . . . The use of geolocation technology is required in order to enable an operator to identify the
Justice made it a condition of its agreement with PokerStars, an online gaming company operating from the Isle of Man, that the company “utilize geographic blocking technology relating to I.P. addresses.” In Germany, several courts have unequivocally accepted geolocation as “a viable and technically feasible method of determining website visitors’ location” and ordered online gaming operators to utilize geolocation tools to limit access to certain content from particular German states. Recent legislative efforts also show the need for clear jurisdictional borders on the Internet, whether they are efforts in the areas of Internet commerce or online gaming.
Sufficiently reliable geolocation tools,\textsuperscript{93} if used appropriately and with due regard to protection of privacy,\textsuperscript{94} could indeed assist in effective regulation and enforcement on the Internet.\textsuperscript{95} Defined borders on the Internet would also benefit Internet actors who could deal with their rights on a country-by-country basis. Such partitioning makes entries into markets less costly for smaller entities because they do not have to bear the expense of a worldwide license, and country-by-country rights give right-holders the opportunity to maximize their profits by seeking the best licensing opportunities.\textsuperscript{96}

\textsuperscript{93} On accuracy of the tools see infra section II.B.
\textsuperscript{94} For a project concerned with the protection of privacy (personal data protection) in geolocation see Barnes et al., supra note 8, at 5–6.
\textsuperscript{95} Clarification of online jurisdictional boundaries for purposes of determining personal jurisdiction over an actor on the Internet would also be beneficial. Although courts in the world are refining their approaches to asserting personal jurisdiction over actors acting on the Internet, the tests leave Internet users with no clear rules. Some of the "low-tech" factors used in personal jurisdiction analyses appear to be losing relevance; for instance, the fact that a website utilizes a particular top-level country domain (such as .de or .fr) might not say much about the website's intentions to target or avoid users in a particular country when users no longer type in website addresses but instead locate websites through search engines that link users directly to the sites. With English becoming the universal language of the Internet it might be increasingly difficult to claim that a website in English is not directed at a jurisdiction in which English is not the primary or official language. See Joined Cases C-585/08 & C-144/09, Peter Pammer v. Reederei Karl Schluter GmbH & Co. KG and Hotel Aplenhof GesmbH v. Oliver Heller, ¶ 84 (2010), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ LexUriServ.do?uri =CELEX:62008CJ0585:EN:HTML (noting that "the language or the currency used . . . do not constitute relevant factors for the purpose of determining" personal jurisdiction). Similarly, the fact that a website is interactive, although originally viewed by courts as a determinative factor in the personal jurisdiction inquiry, is no longer considered determinative on its own by many courts. See, e.g., id. at ¶ 79 (noting that the distinction between "interactive" and other websites "is not decisive"); see also Illinois v. Hemi Grp. LLC, 622 F.3d 754, 758 (7th Cir. 2010). The fact that a website employs geolocation tools might be a persuasive argument for the absence of personal jurisdiction over a website operator who uses the tools to prevent users from certain jurisdictions from accessing its website. See generally King, supra note 83 (discussing geolocation tools and personal jurisdiction).

\textsuperscript{96} It is possible that the right owner may determine that a worldwide license is the best option; however, partitioning may give the right owner a bargaining advantage. For a contrary view in the context of the EU single market see Joined Cases C-403/08 & C-429/08, Football Ass’n Premier League Ltd. et al. v. QC Leisure et al. and Karen Murphy
B. Operation of Geolocation Tools

Geolocation in the broadest sense is any means of detecting an Internet user’s location. The raison d’être of geolocation tools is the determination of the physical location of a user; the tools are not designed to identify or track a particular user. Although they may use information that identifies a particular device that is used to access the Internet, such information is not necessarily sufficient to identify a particular user.97 Absent implantation of a device into a human body, it will remain a challenge to attribute acts on the Internet to a particular human actor if more than one person has access to a device.98 Despite this shortcoming, geolocation tools are being designed, used, and constantly improved because of the value that is attached to the ability to identify a user’s location.

The most basic geolocation tools are based on self-reporting. For instance, an Internet website that requires registration asks a user for his location. Based on the information input by the user, the website tailors the content according to the regulations of the country where the user is located.99 Another self-reporting mechanism offers users a list of countries in a dropdown menu,

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97 In cases of dynamically assigned IP addresses, the same IP address may lead to different devices at different times. Statically assigned or embedded IP addresses can identify a particular device but cannot link the device to a particular user if several users have physical or virtual access to the device. For more on statically and dynamically assigned IP addresses see infra notes 107–15 and accompanying text. A device may also be identified by “fingerprinting” methods that can recognize the same machine repeatedly by various indicators other than—or in combination with—an IP address. See, e.g., PANOPTICCLICK, http://panopticlick.eff.org/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2011).

98 Former Google CEO Eric Schmidt was quoted as commenting on the need for attribution on the Internet: “In a world of asynchronous threats, it is too dangerous for there not to be some way to identify you. We need a [verified] name service for people. Governments will demand it.” Gareth Beavis, Schmidt: We Can Predict Where You Are Going to Go, TECHRADAR (Aug. 6, 2010), http://www.techradar.com/news/internet/schmidt-we-can-predict-where-you-are-going-to-go-708339.

99 This is what Seth Finkelstein called “co-operative geo-location” as opposed to “oppositional geo-location.” “[I]t is in the interests of the party being located to cooperate with supplying geographic information, in order to gain some benefit.” Expert Report of Seth Finkelstein, Nitke v. Ashcroft, 253 F. Supp. 2d. 587 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (No. 01 Civ. 11476).
and after the user selects a country, the website directs the user to its country-specific pages. Self-reporting is certainly sufficient for advertising purposes or for purposes of facilitating convenient content (such as pricing in local currency), but it is certainly not a tool for enforcement. Even if the self-reporting is part of a user agreement or licensing agreement, the benefits of the agreement or the threat of contractual sanctions under the agreement may not be sufficient incentives for users to report accurate information. However, if the self-reported location data are reliable, and if they are collected and retained, they may be used to recognize the same user in the future or help identify the location of additional users. Naturally, any such activity raises serious privacy concerns.

101 “A simple way to find out the geographic location of a user visiting a Web site is to ask them . . . Location data, once entered, can thereafter be associated with a client IP address.” James A. Muir & Paul C. Van Oorschot, Internet Geolocation: Evasion and Counterevasion, ACM COMPUTING SURVEYS, Dec. 2009, at 4:1, 4:8.
102 Three experts who work for Facebook have estimated the location of users based on their “friends” in social media, thus exploring the probability of friendship as a function of distance. Lars Backstrom et. al., Find Me If You Can: Improving Geographical Prediction with Social and Spatial Proximity, WORLD WIDE WEB CONFERENCE, 61 (Apr. 26–30, 2010), http://delivery.acm.org/10.1145/1780000/1772698/p61-backstrom.pdf?ip=150.108.239.43&acc=ACTIVE%20SERVICE&CFID=64593187&CFTOKEN=55291539&__acm__=1328312060_1287e167f6e6e65e8e6f255473435c4ab (a paper presented at the 2010 World Wide Web Conference).
103 “If IP addresses are considered ‘personal data’ or ‘personal information’ for privacy purposes, the collection, use and disclosure of such information may be seriously restricted.” Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, Geo-Location Technologies and Other Means of Placing Borders on the “Borderless” Internet, 23 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 101, 134 (2004) [hereinafter Svantesson, Placing Boarders]. See Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court] Sept. 8, 2010, 136 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES SCHWEIZERISCHEN BUNDESGERICHTS [BGE] II 508 (Switz.) (discussing IP addresses as personal data); Jennifer Valentino-Devries & Emily Steel, “Cookies” Cause Bitter Backlash, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 19, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870441690457550226133569370.html (“Since July, at least six suits have been filed in U.S. District Court for the Central District of California against websites and companies that create advertising technology, accusing them of installing online-tracking tools that are so surreptitious that they essentially hack into users’ machines without their knowledge. All of the suits seek class-action status and accuse companies of violating the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and other laws against deceptive practices.”). See Barnes et al., supra note 8, at 5–6.
Other methods of identifying the location of Internet users involve reliance on information that is presumably difficult for users to conceal or change. For instance, any website that requires payment by credit card may use the purchaser’s billing address as a reliable indicator of the user’s location. An online store may conclude that most delivery addresses will coincide with a purchaser’s location. An airline may assume that the country of departure on a plane ticket is an accurate proxy for the country where the traveler is located. These indicators are clearly not perfect; travelers do not always purchase tickets to depart from their current location, purchasers do not always buy from the same location to which they wish goods to be delivered, and people do not always carry credit cards with billing addresses that correspond to their current location. Although less susceptible to manipulation than self-reporting, these other methods also fail as sufficiently reliable enforcement tools.

Geolocation tools provide a higher, though also not perfect, degree of reliability. These tools rely on the IP addresses of devices with which users access the Internet and are known as “IP geolocation” tools. IP addresses are often described as “analogous to . . . physical mailing addresses,” because they allow for accurate transmittal and receipt of data. As for their utility in localizing users, their use is more complicated than the use of physical addresses because often IP addresses are not static—meaning permanently assigned to particular devices—but are assigned dynamically (and temporarily) to those devices. By

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104 “Informally, Internet geolocation is the problem of determining the physical location (to some level of granularity) of an Internet user. A related but more specific term is IP geolocation, which refers to the problem of locating an Internet host using only its IP address.” Muir & Van Oorschot, supra note 101, at 2; see also SVANTESSON, http://www.svantesson.org/projects/geo-identification/free-geo-location-tools.aspx (last visited Nov. 19, 2011) (providing examples of free geolocation tools).


106 See, e.g., McIntyre, supra note 105 (discussing IP addresses).

107 Although it is possible to assign static IP addresses dynamically, this paper uses the term “dynamically assigned IP address” to refer to the practice of dynamically assigning an IP address for a temporary period of time.
analogy, imagine an apartment complex that has one street number and one hundred apartment numbers. A static IP address would be similar to a complete address with the street number and apartment number, which would never change and always identify the same apartment. Using a dynamically assigned IP address would be similar to using the address of the apartment complex main office, which assigns in rotation the reusable numbers 1 to 100 to the apartments as people rent various apartments in the building; in this case only the office would know at any given moment which apartment was identified as, say, apartment 57. Similarly, only Internet service providers know at any given moment which dynamically assigned IP addresses are assigned to which users.108

Dynamically assigned IP addresses have become a standard feature of Internet connections since IP addresses became scarce in recent years because of the exhaustion of all addresses that are available under the currently prevailing Internet protocol in use—IPv4.109 Because of the insufficient supply of IP addresses under this protocol (and as of February 2011 all IPv4 addresses were officially assigned),110 Internet service providers have commonly held a pool of reusable IP addresses that they assign to various users temporarily and reassign to other users as users log on and off the Internet. The successor to IPv4, IPv6,111 offers 340 undecillion IP addresses112 and therefore allows for static addresses to be assigned to or embedded in all individual Internet-connected

108 Internet service providers know which IP address is assigned to which account; naturally, they cannot identify which particular user (person, family member, colleague) is actually accessing the Internet with the device using the IP address.

109 Experts have warned about the shortage of available IP addresses, and “[a]s of 3 February 2011, the central pool of available IPv4 addresses managed by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) has been depleted.” IPv4 Depletion and IPv6 Deployment FAQs, No. RESOURCE ORG., http://www.nro.net/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/nro_depletion_deployment_faq.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2011).


112 See id. 340 undecillion is $3.4 \times 10^{38}$. 
devices,\textsuperscript{113} opening the way to new business models and technological innovations that may utilize advantages associated with certainty of identification and traceability of devices with permanent and identifiable IP addresses.\textsuperscript{114} For now though, many IP addresses continue to be dynamically assigned.\textsuperscript{115}

Once a device connects to the Internet it announces its IP address and thus allows others to geolocate it.\textsuperscript{116} The problem with geolocation is that there is no centralized register of all IP addresses that lists corresponding physical devices;\textsuperscript{117} lists exist

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item See McIntyre, supra note 105, at 901 ("Unlike current IP addresses, IPv6 addresses will include a unique code dictated by a computer's hardware, in effect making IPv6 addresses globally unique and permanently assigned to particular devices. IPv6 is unlikely to suffer from the address exhaustion that plagues the current protocol: the new system creates a 128-bit address, providing for approximately 340 undecillion . . . possible addresses."). Naturally, this development worries those who are concerned about privacy on the Internet. See, e.g., Shawn C. Helms, Translating Privacy Values With Technology, 7 B.U. J. SCI & TECH. L. 288, 299 (2001) ("IPv6, a proposed TCP/IP protocol for Internet communication, could be the nail in the coffin of anonymity on the Internet.").
\item For instance, household appliances may be connected to the Internet and easily recognized if they have static IP addresses. This raises important privacy issues. See generally Barnes et al., supra note 8.
\item The adoption of IPv6 did not keep up with the growing needs for IP addresses, and since IPv4 addresses could be assigned dynamically the adoption of IPv6 was not an imperative. However, we will probably see an acceleration in the adoption of IPv6 now since IP addresses under IPv4 were finally exhausted in February 2011 and there is a dramatically growing number of devices that require connection to the Internet. See Dylan Tweney, No Easy Fixes as Internet Runs out of Addresses, WIRED (Feb. 3, 2001), http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2011/02/Internet-addresses/. Users may purposefully change dynamically assigned IP address by powering off and on their routers. See Riva Richmond, Resisting the Online Tracking Programs, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2010, at B7, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/11/technology/personaltech/11basics.html.
\item For an easy-to-understand explanation of the functioning of the traffic on the Internet, see Jonathan Zittrain, Internet Points of Control, in THE EMERGENT GLOBAL INFORMATION POLICY REGIME 203, 204–07 (Sandra Braman ed., 2004).
\item This is what Dan Jerker B. Svantesson refers to as "source problems." See Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, The Impact of Geo-location Technologies on Internet Content Licensing – Let the "Cat and Mouse" Game Begin, Intellectual Property Forum, No. 63, Dec. 2005, at 25 [hereinafter Svantesson, Cat and Mouse]. On "circumvention problems" see infra note 130 and accompanying text; see also Edelman, supra note 9, at 3–4; Thomas Hoeren, Zoning and Geolocation – Technische Ansätze zu einer Reterritorialisierung des Internet, 1 MULTIMEDIA UND RECHT 3 (2007) ("[T]he decentralized management of the Internet means that there is no authoritative database of
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that provide some information but none are complete and updated in real time. Although geolocation tool providers use lists and databases—both publicly accessible lists and lists obtained from other sources—these data sources are often not sufficient and the providers may complement the functioning of their tools by utilizing other geolocation techniques. In their 2009 paper Internet Geolocation: Evasion and Counterevasion, apparently the first scientific paper to address the technical issues of both geolocation and geolocation evasion comprehensively, James A. Muir and Paul C. Van Oorschot provide an overview of other geolocation techniques. Among the techniques they list are estimates based on the time that it takes for the device in question to respond to a ping request (a request for response) from another device with a known geographical location, and estimates based on the routing of packets that carry information through the network. Combinations of methods are reported to yield the best results.
The accuracy of geolocation tools is subject to debate; less debate has occurred on the question of what degree of accuracy should be expected if these tools are to be considered tools of compliance with regulatory and enforcement measures. Not surprisingly, entities that sell geolocation tools claim that their tools are highly effective; critics tend to question the providers’ data and point out that even if geolocation tool providers publish data on the effectiveness of their tools, it is difficult to verify the data because most providers “do not publish their results, nor detailed information about their methods.”

Muir and Van Oorschot have also noted that the data reported by providers about the high accuracy of the tools “typically assume no evasive action by users.”

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125 For an interesting discussion about the expected level of accuracy of geolocation for purposes of compliance with a court order, see Oberverwaltungsgericht Nordrhein-Westfalen [OVG] [Higher Administrative Court] July 2, 2010, BECK-ONLINE DATENBANK [BECKRS] 50510 (Ger.) (“[T]he appellant is not required to exclude perfectly participation from Nordrhein-Westfalen in its Internet game of chance. It is only ordered that measures [of geolocation as ordered by the court] be introduced by the deadline [set by the court] and thereby the access from Nordrhein-Westfalen is significantly limited.”). See generally Trimble, Cross-Border Injunctions, supra note 85, at 349.

126 See Geolocation: Ensuring Compliance with Online Gaming Regulations, supra note 86, at 8 (“Using IP Intelligence data from Neustar, Ladbrokes was able to comply with [a Dutch Supreme Court] ruling by blocking online users from locations inside the Netherlands—a task that was achieved with virtually 100% accuracy.”); see also European Location Study, supra note 118. On the accuracy of geolocation tools, see also Svantesson, supra note 103, at 111 ff. For older data on other services, see Thomas Hoeren, Geolokalisation und Glücksspielrecht (Teil 2), 5 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WETT-UND GLÜCKSSPIELRECHT 311, 312–13 (2008) [hereinafter Hoeren, Geolokalisation]; Svantesson, The Accuracy of Geo-Location, supra note 28, at 13–15.

127 See Edelman, supra note 9, at 6; Svantesson, Placing Boarders, supra note 103, at 112.

It is questionable whether we should require impermeable barriers from website operators who utilize geolocation to comply with regulation, and whether operators should be expected to detect geolocation evasion. Evasion techniques will continue to be developed and it might be technologically impossible to preempt their development and use. Perhaps this is where “code” in the legal sense cannot be unequivocally shaped by “code” in the technical sense; maybe this is one of the cases in which legal rules have to intervene and provide support for the technical solutions, which in this case are endangered by evasion techniques that enable cybertravel.

III. EVASION OF GEOLOCATION

The seminal problem of geolocation is that techniques exist that allow users to thwart geolocation tools. Ben Laurie, the expert who provided testimony on geolocation in the well-known Yahoo! case in France, pointed out that, in fact, “it is fantastically easy to deliberately evade geolocation.” Notwithstanding the interest of governments and various actors on the Internet in geolocation as a means of achieving compliance with regulation and enforcement, and the fact that evasion may render geolocation largely ineffective, evasion techniques have been mentioned in the literature only marginally. Even in the

129 For “A Brief History of Geolocation and the Law” see Kevin F. King, Geolocation and Federalism on the Internet: Cutting Internet Gambling’s Gordian Knot, 11 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 41, 59–63 (2010); see also Trimble, Cross-Border Injunctions, supra note 85, at 349.
130 See Svantesson, Cat and Mouse, supra note 117, at 25 (referring to these techniques as “circumvention problems.”); see also Hoeren, Zoning and Geolocation, supra note 117.
131 For the response in the United States to the litigation in France, see Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006). Ben Laurie was also a founding director of the Apache Software Foundation. See Ben Laurie, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ben_Laurie (last visited Dec. 19, 2011).
133 See, e.g., Svantesson, Cat and Mouse, supra note 117, at 24–30; Hoeren, Zoning and Geolocation, supra note 117; Thomas Hoeren, Das Pferd friisst keinen Gurkensalat –
scientific literature it was not until December 2009 that the first paper was published that focused fully on the techniques for evading geolocation.\textsuperscript{134} Although a number of legal papers have been authored on geolocation and its legal implications, only two short articles\textsuperscript{135} have addressed the legal issues associated with geolocation evasion tools or cybertravel.\textsuperscript{136} However, interest in cybertravel will increase as geolocation becomes omnipresent and evasion tools even more user-friendly than they are today.

A spectrum of evasion techniques is available and a variety of providers offer means of evasion with various levels of sophistication.\textsuperscript{137} Of course, remote access to computers that would have resulted in evasion of geolocation existed long before some of the current “mainstream” cybertravel tools emerged. For example, the Telnet and SSH protocols both allow logins to remote computers, and today commercial services such as GoToMyPC\textsuperscript{138} and LogMeIn\textsuperscript{139} make it easy for a user to remotely access a computer located anywhere in the world, thereby facilitating the
use of the remote computer’s Internet connection and foreign IP address. This type of cybertravel can be described as “self-sustained” because it is facilitated by equipment that a user may own or have available through family or friends in another country. As opposed to these “self-sustained” cybertravel methods, the “mainstream” cybertravel tools that are described below do not rely on a user’s own equipment or equipment to which a user specifically secures access in advance.

Most Internet users who remember the beginnings of the Internet are familiar with the most basic geolocation evasion technique, although they do not usually think of it as a tool for evading geolocation. It is the use of a dial-up connection to an Internet service provider phone number in a foreign country. Once connected to the foreign dial-up service provider, the user is assigned an IP address for that country by the foreign provider, and it appears as if the user is located in the foreign country. The problems with this technique are the cost and speed of the connection. The speed problem is familiar to anyone who has ever used a dial-up connection, and calling a telephone number in a foreign country for an extended period of time can still be expensive. Although subject to these disadvantages, this form of cybertravel could be the only cybertravel available if a government shuts down the Internet throughout the country by ordering all Internet service providers to stop providing access to the network, as the government of Egypt did in January 2011.

140 The use of a user’s own equipment makes the “self-sustained” cybertravel similar to the Slingbox concept. See infra note 259.
141 See Mair & Van Oorschot, supra note 101, at 13.
142 See Evgeny Mozorov, Egypt Action May Spread Internet Kill Switch Idea, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE (Feb. 6, 2011), http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/%2Fc%2Fa%2F2011%2F02%2F05%2FINO91HHD7P.DTL. Although it was the situation in Egypt in January 2011 that raised general attention to the problem of governmental interference with access to the Internet, there were other instances of smaller countries (Nepal and Burma) engaging in the same tactics (in 2005 and 2007, respectively). See Christopher Beam, Egypt Protest Internet Shut Off: How Did the Egyptian Government Turn Off the Internet?, SLATE (Jan. 28, 2011), http://www.slate.com/id/2283000/. For a detailed account of the Internet disconnection in Egypt, see James Crowie, Egypt Leaves the Internet, RENESYS BLOG (Jan. 27, 2011), http://www.renesys.com/blog/2011/01/egypt-leaves-the-internet.shtml.
Another cybertravel technique involves the use of a proxy IP address: users connect to the Internet through special software or a website that reroutes their connection, shields their IP address, and uses its own, creating the appearance in cyberspace that the user is connected through another device in another location. The easiest of these proxy tools to use, but the least likely to function well enough to satisfy most purposes for which cybertravel is desired, is a website in which users insert the Internet addresses of pages blocked by geolocation tools. The website then opens the requested pages on the users’ behalf. The major problem with this system for users is that the requested websites easily recognize a proxy and can simply block all access by the proxy.

Another type of proxy service is the easy–to–use subscription services that allow users, for a fee, to sign in on a website and be reconnected through a proxy. There are variations of these services based on the audience that they target; some services focus primarily on customers interested in anonymization—Internet users who are concerned about their privacy. These services, such as Anonymizer, promise anonymity on the Internet by rerouting users to a neutral IP address—an IP address that is located somewhere that “do[es] not create suspicion.” Some users wish to obtain an IP address from a particular country; for instance, in addition to anonymization, Anonymizer also offers a

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144 Svantesson has noted additional problems: because the websites are so easy to use they are quickly overloaded by users; additionally, they offer “only a limited number of countries one can appear to be located in.” Svantesson, The Accuracy of Geo-Location, supra note 28, at 17–18.

145 For more on anonymization and its relationship to cybertravel, see Part IV.B.2.


148 For instance, the following website offers advice on how to connect via a German IP address. Although the advice is of general application, the website targets users who wish to appear as if they are connected to the Internet from Germany. See Change Your IP Address to Germany, IPRIVACYTOOLS, http://www.ipprivacytools.com/ip-address-germany/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2011).
Geographic Distribution technology, which allows users to select the geographical location of their proxy IP address.¹⁴⁹

There are also services that specialize in cybertravel to certain countries. For instance, My Expat Network¹⁵⁰ provides connections to users who want to watch U.K. television programs but are located outside the United Kingdom and cannot access the programs because of geolocation. For £5 per month they can sign in to My Expat Network and watch all the television shows that are on U.K. websites as if they were connected from inside the United Kingdom.¹⁵¹ The same provider offers the same service, for $6.50 per month, to users outside the United States who want to watch U.S. television programs but are unable to do so because they are connected to the Internet with an outside-of-the-U.S. IP address and face similar access restrictions.¹⁵² Once they appear to be connected from inside the United States, these users may access not only television programs but any other content that may be viewed only from within the United States.

One free proxy service that is more sophisticated than the services described above utilizes a series of proxies, for instance “private proxies”—volunteers who provide access to their machines to people from other countries, such as political activists who fear detection and persecution in their own countries.¹⁵³ The Tor project,¹⁵⁴ which enjoys significant funding from the U.S. government,¹⁵⁵ uses a chain of proxies to protect its users,¹⁵⁶ who

¹⁵¹ See id.
¹⁵² See id.
¹⁵⁶ See Karsten Loesing, et al., A Case Study on Measuring Statistical Data in the Tor Anonymity Network, in FC 2010 WORKSHOPS 203, 203–05 (R. Sion et al. eds., 2010); Muir & Van Oorschot, supra note 101, at 15; Tor: Overview, supra note 153.
are not only dissidents criticizing oppressive governments or persons avoiding government censorship, but also journalists communicating with whistleblowers, and the U.S. Navy gathering intelligence.

As are any evasive technical solutions, tools for the evasion of geolocation are also susceptible to detection, at least to some degree. For instance, a Java applet in a webpage may lead to the identification of a user’s true IP address, and certain timing-based geolocation tools might be able to localize a user without the tools ever detecting the user’s true IP address. Providers of geolocation tools are constantly searching for ways to eliminate evasion and identify true IP addresses to determine the accurate geographic locations of Internet users. As one might expect, this is a constant race where it may take just a few weeks or months for the creators of evasion techniques to respond to improvements in geolocation tools and improve their techniques to further challenge geolocation.

It is important to note that while cybertravel tools offered by various sources currently operate on the basis of IP addresses,

157 See Loesing et al., supra note 156, at 203. “While the original goal of Tor was to enhance privacy, recently Tor has become popular amongst users who wish to circumvent national censorship systems, such as those in countries like Iran and China.” Id. at 204. “[T]he statistics . . . indicate that Tor usage significantly increased from Iranian IP space in June 2009 after the Iranian elections.” Id. at 206; see also Interview with Andrew Lewman, supra note 155.

158 See Tor: Overview, supra note 153. For other ways to evade geolocation see Edelman, supra note 9; Muir & Van Oorschot, supra note 101, at 14.

159 “Another problem is that Internet anonymizers (intermediate web servers that disguise the user’s IP address) and remote Internet connections can, despite countermeasures by geo-ID firms, still sometimes defeat the identification process.” GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 26, at 62.

160 See Muir & Van Oorschot, supra note 101, at 16; see also Hoeren, Geolokalisierung, supra note 126.

161 See Muir & Van Oorschot, supra note 101, at 18. Tools also exist to “fingerprint” a device; however, unless one of the identifying features contains location information, the fingerprinting does not localize the device.

162 Compare Muir & Van Oorschot, supra note 101, at 3, with information by the founders of the Tor project at the Def Con 18 conference in 2010 in Las Vegas, Nevada. See also Geographic Location/Privacy/geopriv, IETF, http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/geopriv/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2011).
cybertravel will not disappear simply because methods of locating Internet users other than methods based on IP addresses will be employed. Indeed, in the future other methods of tracking Internet users’ geographical locations could replace the current geolocation tools that use IP addresses; either newly emerging or already existing means—for instance means based on the global positioning system (“GPS”)—could become the norm for localizing Internet users.\(^{163}\) Switching to any other means will not necessarily end cybertravel but will likely lead to the development of new evasion tools that will permit cybertravel under new conditions.\(^{164}\)

IV. THE LEGAL STATUS OF CYBERTRAVEL

It seems inevitable that the more geolocation is used to limit access to certain content on the Internet, the more users will cybertravel to bypass geolocation and access restricted content. Even in the absence of governmentally mandated use of geolocation by website operators, geolocation is likely to become widespread as website operators respond to the requirements of territorially-defined regulation on the Internet with a greater use of geolocation tools. The more emphasis that regulators place on territorial regulation, and the more that geolocation tools become the means of complying with that regulation, the more pressing it will become for there to be a legal conceptualization of cybertravel. This conceptualization will also be needed if in the future the need for attribution of acts on the Internet to particular devices leads to IP addresses or other location identifiers being embedded in Internet-connected devices; particularly in such an


\(^{164}\) Even if IP addresses are embedded in devices—and even if they are permanently attached to particular persons (for instance, through implantation into the human body)—cybertravel will not necessarily be excluded, because tools are likely to continue to be developed that will allow users to bypass geolocation.
environment the desire for cybertravel will intensify. It is therefore crucial and timely to determine whether cybertravel is a legal activity under present legal regimes and whether there are reasons for which cybertravel should be made or remain legal in the future. This Part discusses the current legal status of cybertravel and suggests how the law should treat cybertravel in the future—if there is or should be a future for legal cybertravel. It also reviews some technological and business solutions that may complement the future legal framework for cybertravel.

A. Is Cybertravel Legal?

It is difficult to analyze all the legal aspects of cybertravel in the abstract because cybertravel is used for a wide variety of purposes, both legal and illegal, such as avoiding governmental regulation, bypassing limitations imposed because of the contractual obligations of website operators, or merely viewing advertisements created for a location other than the one in which the user sits. However, it seems safe to state that there is one party involved in cybertravel that is unlikely to be exposed to liability: the website operator, who employs geolocation tools to make his website viewable only to users from certain countries, states, regions or locations. In fact, if a website operator’s decision to limit access to his website is based on a law-related purpose (rather than a business-related purpose), he will usually employ geolocation tools to restrict access to his website from certain countries precisely for the purpose of complying with his legal obligations rather than avoiding them.

There are two parties that might be concerned about potential liability for their involvement in cybertravel and two acts in cybertravel that might lead directly or indirectly to liability. The same can be said for future devices that might be implanted into the human body, thereby allowing for identification of not only the device but also the particular person.
parties are the Internet user, who utilizes cybertravel tools to access restricted content, and the cybertravel tool provider, who facilitates cybertravel by offering and providing the cybertravel tools.\textsuperscript{170} The two acts involved in cybertravel that may expose the user and the provider to liability are the act of viewing or using restricted content and the act of cybertravel itself as a method of circumventing tools used to restrict access to content. Although cybertravel providers might not view or use restricted content or cybertravel themselves, their facilitation of acts by users might subject the providers to liability.

This section discusses the various legal aspects of cybertravel. It reviews the potential for liability for both the cybertraveling user and the cybertravel provider while taking into account current law in both the United States and other countries, with particular emphasis on copyright law.

1. Liability of Cybertraveling Users

The initial problem in assessing potential cybertraveler liability is the problem of localization of their acts. Localization may determine not only the countries under whose laws a cybertraveler may be liable, but also often which countries’ courts have personal jurisdiction over the cybertraveler. Regardless of whether a cybertraveler’s other acts establish general jurisdiction in a country, cybertravel can generate specific jurisdiction over the user that emanates from the acts of cybertravel itself.

There are two approaches to the localization of the acts of cybertravel: the physical world approach and the cyberspace approach. The physical world approach is straightforward: anything that the user does is localized in the place of his physical location. Under this approach, when a user sits at his Internet-connected device in Chile and cybertravels to Germany by utilizing a German IP address, his acts are localized in Chile where he is physically located. If cybertravel enables the user to copy, without the copyright holder’s authorization, content that is protected by copyright in Chile, the cybertraveler will be liable for

\textsuperscript{170} See supra Part III discussing cybertravel tools.
copyright infringement in Chile—even if the content is made available on the website of a non-Chilean website operator and is stored on a server located outside of Chile. If Chile permits its courts to exercise personal jurisdiction based on tortious activity committed in their jurisdiction, Chilean courts will have personal jurisdiction over the user based on the user’s acts in Chile.

The user in the example could also be liable for his actions in Germany if Germany had adopted the cyberspace approach to localization. The cyberspace approach follows the packets that carry information on the Internet and localizes acts based on the place or places in which the cybertraveler’s physical acts (of typing on a keyboard) cause technological effects. For example, imagine that the user in Chile cybertravels to Germany to access copyrighted content on a website run by a German website operator that is protected by technological protection measures against viewing by users connected from outside Germany. If using cybertravel to bypass the measures and access the content without the copyright holder’s authorization is illegal under German law, liability for the act would arise in Germany because Germany is the place where the measures are breached (causing technological effects) to access the servers that store the content. Because Germany provides for the jurisdiction of German courts in the place of the effects of a tortious act, German courts have personal jurisdiction over the user in Chile based on the effects of the user’s acts in Germany.

Of course difficulties arise if, using the example above, the content on the website that permits access only to users connecting from Germany is stored on servers that are located in another country, such as the United States. In this scenario, the acts of

171 See infra Part IV.A for a discussion of the European approach to liability for breaching technological protection measures.
breaching the protection measures and accessing the content without authorization would then technically occur in the United States. While liability might arise under U.S. law, establishing personal jurisdiction in the United States based on the acts may be difficult unless information about the location of the servers was available to the cybertraveler at the time of his acts and it can be claimed that he purposefully directed his actions at the particular forum where the servers were located. This is a general problem of personal jurisdiction on the Internet when purposeful direction of tortious acts is required and a user directs the acts at a specific forum, but the forum is unknown to him at the time of his acts.\(^{173}\)

Even when users’ acts occur while the users are cybertraveling to another country, the users may still be in breach of laws that prohibit them from viewing certain content or engaging in certain conduct in the country where they are physically located.\(^{174}\) For instance, the online gambling laws of South Africa penalize not only companies that provide illegal online gambling in the jurisdiction of South Africa and Internet service providers who allow users in South Africa to access illegal online gambling websites, but the laws also hold liable users who gamble on such websites.\(^{175}\) Therefore, if a user located in South Africa gambles

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\(^{173}\) For a discussion of the problem of acts on the Internet that are clearly directed at some forum but the identity of the forum is unknown to the user at the time of the act see Marketa Trimble, *Setting Foot on Enemy Ground: Cease-and-Desist Letters, DMCA Notifications and Personal Jurisdiction in Declaratory Judgment Actions*, 50 IDEA 777, 818–21 (2010) [hereinafter Trimble, *Enemy Ground*].

\(^{174}\) This article provides a few examples of such laws but does not cover all the legal doctrines that may be invoked when a user cybertravels.

on one of these websites, the user breaches South African law, and the fact that the user cybertravels to another country to do the gambling will probably not shield the user from liability under South African law nor from the personal jurisdiction of the South African courts.

What if the laws of the country of the user’s physical location permit the user’s acts but the acts are contrary to the laws of the country to which the user cybertravels? Will a user’s cybertravel to a country where access to particular content or certain activities are prohibited lead to the user’s liability in that country? While it may seem implausible that a user would purposefully cybertravel to a country to engage in an activity that is illegal under the laws of that country, such scenarios are possible. For example, a user might want to criticize the country’s political leaders to an extent that would be deemed illegal in that country and wish to appear as though he were located in the country. In a particularly alarming scenario, a user may cybertravel to a country inadvertently—by being redirected randomly through an intermediate IP address in that country or by being assigned a final IP address in that country without the user’s intent or knowledge. While the physical approach to cybertravel would create no user liability in a country to which the user had cybertraveled, the cyberspace approach would result in user liability. However, the level of the interest of a country to which the user had cybertraveled in extending its prescriptive jurisdiction over a non-resident user or enforcing its laws against a non-resident user will vary according to the country’s interest in regulating behavior by non-residents. For example, a country might have a minimal interest in enforcing its anti-online gambling laws against non-resident users, even if the country’s courts could find grounds for extending their personal jurisdiction over non-resident users. A country might, however, have a much greater interest in extending its prescriptive and adjudicatory jurisdiction in a situation involving a restriction of speech or attacks on computers located in the country.

176 See supra note 137 (discussing “accidental cybertravel”).
177 See infra notes 315 and 316.
a) Liability under Copyright Laws

Copyright law is a particularly pertinent area for review in the context of cybertravel because geolocation tools are often used as a means of compliance with copyright laws, which afford territorially-limited rights, and which, despite their significant level of international harmonization, still vary among countries.\(^{179}\) Although a website operator, for example, may secure a license for particular content, the license may be restricted to one country or a limited number of countries. Website operators (or any licensee) may enter into licenses that are not worldwide for any number of reasons. First, the licensee might not have the necessary resources to pay for worldwide rights, and obtaining a license for a limited market could be the licensee’s only option. Or, the licensor may decide not to license content in certain markets if the licensor plans to launch a country-specific version of the same content and does not want competition from foreign versions.\(^{180}\) Further, the licensor may wish to implement a strategy for releasing the work in different countries in various media at various times. It is also possible that copyright in a particular work might not be held by the same right-holder in all countries and as a result there might be high transaction costs associated with locating all of the right-holders and negotiating licenses with all of them, and right-holders in some countries might simply not agree to a license. Because of the territorial limitations of licenses, website operators and other licensees use geolocation tools to limit access to licensed content.

\(^{178}\) See infra Part IV.A.1.b (discussing the applicability of anti-hacking laws to acts of cybertravel).

\(^{179}\) Notwithstanding the great degree of international harmonization that has been achieved through several international treaties on copyright, copyright law is still a matter of national legislation and subject to national differences associated with certain flexibilities that are embedded in the treaties, occasional non-compliance with the treaties, and the fact that some issues of copyright law remain unaffected by international treaties.

\(^{180}\) There are numerous examples of national versions of television shows that are made inaccessible to users from other countries where local national versions are available. Dancing with the Stars is an example. See Outside the U.K.?, BBC: STRICTLY COMEDANCING, http://www.bbc.co.uk/strictlycomedancing/about/#outside_the_uk (last visited Apr. 12, 2012).
to users located only in the countries for which they have secured a license.\footnote{181}

A cybertraveler might be subject to liability if cybertravel is interpreted as an act of circumvention of geolocation, and if geolocation tools are considered tools that prevent access to or certain uses of a copyrighted work. Protection against the circumvention of tools that protect works from unauthorized acts was introduced at the international level by the 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty\footnote{182} and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty\footnote{183} (the “WIPO Treaties”), which in Articles 11 and 18 respectively require countries that are parties to the Treaties to provide adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies against the circumvention of effective technological measures that are used by [right-holders] in connection with the exercise of their rights . . . and that restrict acts . . . which are not authorized by the [right-holders] concerned or permitted by law.\footnote{184}

Provided that geolocation tools meet the required standard of effectiveness,\footnote{185} and cybertravel is viewed as a circumvention tool,
the question becomes, at least under the language of the WIPO Treaties, whether the use of geolocation tools—the filtering of access based on a user’s location—is used to restrict unauthorized or illegal acts.\(^{186}\)

In line with the language of the WIPO Treaties, European laws that have implemented the WIPO Treaties and the corresponding circumvention provisions. In the United States, technological protection measures have to be measures that, “in the ordinary course of [their] operation, require the application of information, or a process or a treatment, with the authority of the copyright owner, to gain access to work.” 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(B) (2006). In 321 Studios v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (N.D. Cal. 2004), the court rejected the argument that a technological measure cannot be considered effective if its countermeasures are “widely available on the Internet.” *Id.* at 1095. The court noted that the argument would be “equivalent to a claim that, since it is easy to find skeleton keys on the black market, a deadbolt is not an effective lock to a door.” *Id.* See also Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (noting that the effectiveness of a technological measure does not depend on “whether or not it is a strong means of protection.”).

In the United Kingdom Lord Justice Jacob commented on the term “effective technological measures” in a 2008 decision: “It is an odd phrase to use in English—in its context it clearly refers to something which is intended to have an effect rather than something which is invariably successful. If it meant the latter, then there would be no need to have a law preventing circumvention.” Neil Stanley Higgs v. The Queen, [2008] EWCA (Crim) 1324, [27] (Eng.). In the United Kingdom a measure is considered “effective” if it “achieves the intended protection” by providing the copyright owner control of the use of the work “through . . . an access control or protection process . . . [or] a copy control mechanism.” Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 296ZF(2).

In Germany, geolocation tools that allow the restriction of access to users from certain countries would probably qualify under the definition of an *effective* technological measure as “an access control.” Gesetz über Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte [UrhG] [German Copyright Act], Sept. 9, 1965, Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I [BGBl. I] 3044, as amended, § 95a(2) (Ger.).

As the Oberlandesgericht München pointed out, the ineffectiveness of a technological protection measure cannot be concluded from the existence of a circumvention tool; “it is more determinative for the effectiveness of the protection measures whether they prevent an average user from infringing copyright.” Oberlandesgericht München I [OLG I] [Higher Regional Court] Nov. 14, 2007, BECK-ONLINE DATENBANK [BECKRS] 23466 (Ger.). For a commentary on the issue of effectiveness from the EU perspective see Stefan Bechtold, *A Commentary on the 2001 EU Information Society Directive, in CONCISE EUROPEAN COPYRIGHT LAW* 343, 387–88 (Thomas Dreier, P. Bernt Hugenholtz eds., 2006).

\(^{186}\) For a discussion of the problem from the Australian perspective see Svantesson, *Cat and Mouse*, supra note 117, at 27–28.
provision of the 2001 EU Information Society Directive \(^{187}\) require that circumvention of technological measures be associated with a committed or potential unauthorized or illegal act. \(^{188}\) For instance, a U.K. law provides protection for technological measures only to the extent that the measures aim at “prevent[ing] or restrict[ing] . . . acts that are not authorised by the copyright owner . . . and are restricted by copyright.” \(^{189}\) Since authorization is necessary only for acts that would infringe copyright if committed without authorization, \(^{190}\) measures preventing a user from accessing a work for reasons other than to prevent acts of copyright infringement will not enjoy the protection that the law


\(^{188}\) Martin Senftleben, *a commentary on the 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty, in CONCISE EUROPEAN COPYRIGHT LAW* 87, 111–12 (Thomas Dreier & Brent Hugenholtz eds., 2006). The requirement of a connection with the exercise of [the WIPO Copyright Treaty] or Berne rights reflects the principle expressed at the 1996 Diplomatic Conference that the protection of technological measures should complement the grant of exclusive rights so as to allow their effective enforcement in the digital environment. Accordingly, the international obligation to protect the right holder against acts of circumvention does not arise if the use of technological measures goes beyond the scope of the rights granted in the [WIPO Copyright Treaty] or the [Berne Convention].

\(^{189}\) Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 296ZF(3). The provision that applies to a person circumventing a technological measure “applied to a copyright work other than a computer program” is § 296ZA.

\(^{190}\) “When speaking of ‘acts which are not authorised’ it is implicit that one is considering only acts which need authorisation, i.e. acts which are otherwise restricted. To ‘authorise’ a man to do something he is free to do anyway–something which needs no authority–is a meaningless concept.” Lord Justice Jacob in *Neil Stanley Higgs v. The Queen*, [2008] EWCA (Crim) 1324, [32] (Eng.).
provides for technological protection measures. Similarly, the German Copyright Act limits the protection provided to technological measures by defining them as measures that are “designed to prevent or restrict” unauthorized acts. Therefore, the question of liability for circumvention of geolocation under the copyright laws of these countries depends on whether the cybertraveling user engages or may engage in an act of copyright infringement.

Based on the territoriality principle that governs copyright laws, it would appear logical for acts of circumvention to be illegal under the laws that protect copyrighted works only if the acts are connected to the infringement of copyright under the law of the same country. For example, if the associated act of direct

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191 However, for a discussion on copyright infringements that occur in the United Kingdom when temporary copies are created, see infra notes 220–21 and accompanying text.


193 In a 2010 decision the German Supreme Court confirmed that technological measures are also protected by German law when they are designed to protect the right to make a work available to the public under §19a of the German Copyright Act. The right would probably not be interpreted to include the right of access by an individual user. See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Apr. 29, 2010, MEDIEN, INTERNET UND RECHT [MIR] 159, 2010 (Ger.). For safeguards against technological measures that prevent uses allowed by copyright law see infra note 205. See also Australian Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) § 10(1), available at http://www.adelaide.edu.au/legals/docs/copyright1968.pdf (“[C]ircumvention service means a service, the performance of which has only a limited commercially significant purpose, or no such purpose or use, other than the circumvention, or facilitating the circumvention, of an [sic] technological protection measure.”); Svantesson, Cat and Mouse, supra note 117, at 26–27 (discussing the technological protection measure provision of the Act).

194 Theoretically, country A could impose liability under its copyright law even for a circumvention in country A of technological measures that was connected to an act of copyright infringement in country B. Courts in country A would then have to assess whether copyright was infringed under B’s law. Courts in country A would determine liability for the acts of circumvention as long as A’s courts considered copyright infringement actions to be transitory causes of action (meaning that infringements under B’s copyright law would be justiciable in A’s courts) or were willing to assess
copyright infringement is reproduction of the copyrighted work, the act of circumvention, if it can be tied to the direct infringement, can be infringing only where the act of reproduction occurred. Therefore, if a cybertraveler travels from Chile to Germany, and the only copyright infringing act that he commits is reproducing the accessed works on his computer in Chile (if the act is considered copyright infringing under Chilean law), it will be the Chilean anti-circumvention law that will apply; the German anti-circumvention provision will not apply if there is no associated act of copyright infringement that could be localized in Germany.\(^{195}\)

The territorial limitations will not apply if a country’s anti-circumvention provisions do not protect copyrighted works from access only for copyright infringing purposes but also for copyright non-infringing purposes. If the provisions are drafted to impose direct liability for any circumvention of measures that prevent access to the works—whether or not the circumvention occurs for the purpose of infringing copyright—no related act of copyright infringement in the same country will be necessary to find the user liable under the anti-circumvention provisions. Therefore, if country B has such anti-circumvention provisions, a user who cybertravels from country A to country B, or who cybertravels through servers located in country B on the way from country A to country C, may be liable in country B under the anti-circumvention provisions of country B even if while cybertraveling the user does not infringe copyright under the laws of country B.

In the United States, the federal circuits disagree on whether all of the provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA") that protect technological measures\(^ {196}\) require a showing of nexus between the circumvention and the copyright infringement under B’s copyright law as an ancillary question. It appears unlikely that countries would be willing to extend their protection to foreign copyright laws, but if countries were willing to extend their protection to foreign copyright laws, a protective mechanism against enforcement of copyright laws that included policies contrary to A’s policies could be drafted into A’s anti-circumvention laws.

\(^{195}\) See supra notes 192–93 and accompanying text.

infringement.\(^{197}\) The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit requires a plaintiff who complains of circumvention of its technological protection measures “to demonstrate that the circumventing technology infringes or facilitates infringement of the plaintiff’s copyright.”\(^{198}\) This requirement means that the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA is consistent with the European approach because it limits liability under the provision to acts that result in copyright infringement;\(^{199}\) other acts of circumvention that are not connected with existing or potential infringement are permitted.\(^{200}\) In the cybertravel context this interpretation means that cybertravel, whether into the United States or from the United States, results in no liability under the DMCA unless there is an associated act of direct infringement that can be localized in the United States.\(^{201}\)

\(^{197}\) However, this circuit split may be irrelevant in practice because of the courts’ approach to temporary copying and the possibility of rendering such copying as copyright infringing through a simple contractual provision. See infra note 224 and accompanying text.

\(^{198}\) MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 948 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). The Chamberlain court “conclude[d] that 17 U.S.C. § 1201 prohibits only forms of access that bear a reasonable relationship to the protections that the Copyright Act otherwise affords copyright owners. . . . [I]t is the only meaningful reading of the statute.” Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1202–03 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng’g & Consulting, Inc., 421 F.3d 1307, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“A court must look at the threat that the unauthorized circumvention potentially poses in each case to determine if there is a connection between the circumvention and a right protected by the Copyright Act.”) (citation omitted).

\(^{199}\) Cf. Bechtold, supra note 185, at 343, 390–92 (on options that EU member countries have when implementing provisions on protection of technological measures).

\(^{200}\) See Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1204 (“A copyright owner seeking to impose liability on an accused circumventor must demonstrate a reasonable relationship between the circumvention at issue and a use relating to a property right for which the Copyright Act permits the copyright owner to withhold authorization—as well as notice that authorization was withheld.”). See also Storage Tech. Corp., 421 F.3d at 1318–19 (finding an insufficient nexus between the circumvention measure and rights protected by copyright law).

\(^{201}\) See infra note 276 on “dual use” technologies.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit disagrees with the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA. The Ninth Circuit maintains, as does the Second Circuit, that while section 1201(b) of the Copyright Act is bound to an act of copyright infringement, section 1201(a) creates liability for circumvention per se, which means that an unauthorized act of circumvention leads to liability even if it is undertaken for purposes that are not copyright infringing. The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation therefore recognizes section 1201(a)

202 MDY Indus., 629 F.3d at 950.
203 See infra note 208.
205 Among the arguments that the Ninth Circuit listed in support of its interpretation of section 1201(a) as prohibiting acts of circumvention of any measures controlling access to copyrighted work is the fact that section 1201(a) authorizes the Librarian of Congress to determine when circumvention for certain “noninfringing uses” of selected copyrighted works will be exempted from the provision. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(D) (2006); MDY Indus., 629 F.3d at 951. The existence of the authorization to provide for exemptions suggests that absent an exemption, circumvention for “noninfringing uses” will result in liability under section 1201(a). Indeed, among the exemptions that the Librarian of Congress issued in July 2010 are examples of circumvention used to achieve what appear to be fair uses, such as circumvention of DVD Content Scrambling System to extract “short portions of motion pictures into new works for the purpose of criticism or comment . . . [for] educational uses by college and university professors.” Libr. Of Cong., Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies, 75 Fed. Reg. 43825, 43827 (July 27, 2010) (codified at 37 C.F.R. § 201.40). However, similar fair-use-sounding uses appear among the “classes considered, but not recommended,” id. at 43834, for which no exemption was issued. See 37 C.F.R. § 201.40 (2010). For instance, one of the classes that was not exempted in 2010 was “subscription based services that offer DRM-protected streaming video where the provider has only made available players for a limited number of platforms.” Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies, 75 Fed. Reg. at 43834. In this case, the Librarian denied an exemption that would have allowed users to watch the video on other platforms, because alternative devices already exist (such as DVD players) that a user interested in a non-infringing use can utilize. Id. at 43835. Compare this with Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 296ZE (detailing the complaint procedure and remedies available “where effective technological measures prevent permitted acts”). For other approaches that EU countries have adopted for the same problem of remediating protection by technological measures that affect copyright non-infringing uses see Bechtold, supra note 185, at 343, 392.
as creating a new “right to permit access to copyrighted work,” a right that is not among the exclusive rights that copyright holders traditionally enjoy and that is not—as opposed to the exclusive rights enumerated in section 106 of the Copyright Act—subject to the fair use doctrine.

If the Ninth and Second Circuit Courts’ interpretation of section 1201(a) prevails, cybertravel could expose a user to liability for the act of circumventing an access control, regardless of what use—copyright infringing or not—might follow, as long as there is access to a copyrighted work involved in the particular act of cybertravel and the court determines that geolocation tools are “effectively control[ling] access to a [copyrighted] work.” This interpretation has far-reaching consequences for cybertravel. Not only would the application of section 1201(a) result in liability for anyone cybertraveling from the United States, whether or not for copyright infringing purposes, but it would also lead to liability for anyone who cybertravels into the United States, regardless of purpose, or anyone who, through cybertravel to another country, accesses a website stored on a server in the United States, regardless of purpose. In any of these cases, under the Ninth and Second Circuit’s interpretation, a breach of section 1201(a) would

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206 It could also be called the right to prevent digital trespass.

207 On the relevant legislative history see MDY Indus., 629 F.3d at 946 (“Congress created a new anticircumvention right in § 1201(a)(2) independent of traditional copyright infringement and granted copyright owners a new weapon against copyright infringement in § 1201(b)(1).”); id. at 948 (“[S]ection (a) creates a new anticircumvention right distinct from copyright infringement, while section (b) strengthens the traditional prohibition against copyright infringement.”). See also Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 441 (2d Cir. 2001) (identifying the distinction between sections (a) and (b)).

208 See 17 U.S.C. §107 (2006). See also Universal City Studios, 273 F.3d at 443 (rejecting the argument that circumvention of encryption technology protecting copyrighted material should be exempted from copyright liability “when the material will be put to ‘fair uses.’”). In the same case the appellants unsuccessfully attempted to present a constitutional argument. Id. at 444–45. See also Gideon Parchomovsky & Philip J. Weiser, Beyond Fair Use, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 91, 103–04 (2010) (discussing the Universal City Studios case); id. at 93 (arguing that, “[t]he golden era of fair use—if one ever existed—ended... with the enactment of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act”).

occur because the use of the cybertravel tools would occur in the United States.\footnote{For a discussion of such a scenario, see supra note 194 and accompanying text.}

The only way to remove any cybertravel to, from, or through the United States from the application of the DMCA as interpreted by the Ninth and Second Circuit Courts would be to achieve an exemption from the Librarian of Congress from the scope of the anti-circumvention provision;\footnote{For a discussion of the exemption process, see supra note 205.} whether such an exemption is possible depends, \textit{inter alia}, on whether the cybertravel is being employed for copyright non-infringing purposes.\footnote{17 U.S.C. §1201(a)(1)(D) (2006).} Whether the acts in which the user engages through cybertravel are infringing or non-infringing is decisive if the interpretation by the Federal Circuit is adopted, and an analysis of the user’s possible direct copyright infringement liability under potentially applicable foreign laws is essential in determining whether the user who travels into or through the United States may also be directly liable for circumvention of technological protection measures in the foreign country of direct infringement.

The viewing of a copyrighted work does not \textit{per se} infringe copyright. Once a work is made available to the public any user is free to view a work even without the copyright holder’s authorization unless a “right to permit access to [the] copyrighted work” exists, which may be the case under the interpretation by the Ninth and Second Circuits of section 1201(a) of the Copyright Act. However, reproducing a work without authorization may be an act of copyright infringement, and therefore if a cybertraveler (or any Internet user, for that matter) deliberately makes a copy of a work, absent a valid defense or copyright exception, the cybertraveler will be liable for copyright infringement.\footnote{Here some significant differences exist between the United States and the rest of the world because outside the United States users do not enjoy as many limitations on the rights conferred by copyright as users in the United States enjoy under the U.S. fair use doctrine. Generally, other countries rely on a limited number of enumerated exceptions to copyright. \textit{See}, e.g., Amélie Blocman, \textit{Court of Cassation Pronounces on Private Copying Versus Technical Protective Devices}, IRIS Merlin 2006-4:12/20, available at http://merlin.obs.coe.int/iris/2006/4/article20.en.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2011).} The problem is that
even if the user only intends to view the work without creating a copy, a copy is created anyway—automatically, by the user’s computer memory in the process of displaying the work. The question then becomes whether this copying in a computer’s temporary memory, which occurs outside a user’s control, is an infringing reproduction as defined by copyright law, and if so, whether it falls within one of the exceptions to copyright, or is subject to the fair use doctrine.

Existing court decisions suggest that the status of temporary copies will depend, *inter alia*, on the associated acts by the user. As long as the temporary copies are made in the course of a lawful use of the work they will likely be non-infringing; however, if they are created as a part of an unlawful use, they may be held infringing. In the United States, the Ninth Circuit in *Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.* explained that the creation of temporary copies on a user’s computer may constitute fair use in a particular situation, but the court indicated that not every temporary copy will be fair use. U.K. courts have declared
automatically-created temporary copies to be infringing when the copies resulted from playing counterfeit video games;\textsuperscript{220} these copies could not benefit from the explicit exception from copyright protection that temporary copies enjoy under the U.K. law because the exception applies only if such copies are created to enable “a lawful use of the work” with “no independent economic significance.”\textsuperscript{221}

The “lawfulness” of the use of a copyrighted work does not depend only on the status of the acts under copyright law; the use of a work will be “unlawful” even if it is contrary only to a provision in a user agreement.\textsuperscript{222} Therefore, for instance, if a user agreement limits possible uses to non-commercial purposes, using the work for commercial purposes will be unlawful, and any temporary copying associated with the commercial purposes may

\textit{Id.} (emphasis added).

\textit{Compare} Ticketmaster, LLC v. RMG Tech., Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1109–10 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (discussing the status of cache copies), with Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holding, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008). In \textit{Cartoon Network}, the Second Circuit distinguished between buffer data and “data . . . embodied in the computer’s RAM memory until the user turned the computer off.” \textit{Id.} at 130. The Court held that buffer data did not fulfill the fixation or embodiment requirement under copyright law, specifically the duration requirement. \textit{Id.} at 127, 130.

\textsuperscript{220} Sony Comp. Entm’t v. Ball, [2004] EWHC (Ch) 1738, 6 [15], (Eng.); R v. Higgs, [2008] EWCA (Crim) 1324 (Eng.); R v. Gilham, [2009] EWCA (Crim) 2293 [25] (Eng.) (“[E]ven if the contents of the RAM of a game console at any one time is not a substantial copy, the image displayed on screen is such.”).

\textsuperscript{221} Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 28A(b) (Eng.). The second exception is made to enable “a transmission of the work in a network between third parties by an intermediary.” Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 28A(a) (Eng.); \textit{see also} Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 17(6) (Eng.) (explaining that infringing “copying in relation to any description of work includes the making of copies which are transient or are incidental to some other use of the work”). On the situation under German law see Koch, supra note 216; Thomas Busch, \textit{Zur urheberrechtlichen Einordnung der Nutzung von Streamingangeboten}, 6 GRUR 496, 501–03 (2011).

\textsuperscript{222} However, under the WIPO Copyright Treaty countries are not required to protect technological measures designed to protect a work beyond the protection afforded by copyright. \textit{See} WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 184, at art. 11.
be considered infringing.\textsuperscript{223} The fact that an appropriately worded user agreement may render temporary copies infringing\textsuperscript{224} means in practice that the difference in the approaches to § 1201(a) taken by the Federal Circuit and the Ninth and Second Circuits might be marginal: the terms of the user agreement could cause courts to view the creation of any temporary copies as a violation of the user agreement, and the user could be subject to liability under § 1201(a) for an act of circumvention associated with the creation of such copies even under the Federal Circuit’s “European-style” interpretation.

Whether a user breached a user agreement will affect a user’s liability for circumvention only when the user cybertravels from the United States; it will have no effect on a user’s liability if the user cybertravels into the United States. The user cybertraveling from Chile to the United States to access a copyrighted work

\textsuperscript{223} This conclusion appears to be confirmed by the decision in Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd. v. Meltwater Holding BV, [2010] EWHC (Ch) 3099 (Eng.).

[T]he temporary copies exception is solely concerned with incidental and intermediate copying so that any copy which is ‘consumption of the work’, whether temporary or not, requires the permission of the copyright holder. A person making a copy of a webpage on his computer screen will not have a defence under s. 28A CDPA simply because he has been browsing. He must first show that it was lawful for him to have made the copy. The copy is not part of the technological process; it is generated by his own volition. The whole point of the receipt and copying of Meltwater News is to enable the End User to receive and read it. Making the copy is not an essential and integral part of a technological process but the end which the process is designed to achieve.

\textit{Id.} at [109].

The exception cannot have been intended to legitimise all copies made in the course of browsing or users would be permitted to watch pirated films and listen to pirated music. The kind of circumstance where the defence may be available is where the purpose of the copying is to enable efficient transmission in a network between third parties by an intermediary, typically an internet service provider.

\textit{Id.} at [110]; see also Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd. & Ors v. Meltwater Holding BV & Ors, [2011] EWCA Civ 890 (Eng.), at [30]-[35].

\textsuperscript{224} \textit{See, e.g.}, Ticketmaster, LLC v. RMG Tech., Inc., 507 F .Supp. 2d 1096, 1110 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (finding cache copying was not fair use if it occurred while the defendant violated the Terms of Use).
be liable under the Ninth and Second Circuits’ interpretation of § 1201(a), regardless of whether or not he accessed the content in breach of a user agreement, because the Ninth and Second Circuits do not require a related act of copyright infringement in the United States to accompany the circumvention of technological measures. The existence or non-existence of a user agreement will also have no effect on the result of the assessment of the user’s liability under the Federal Circuit’s interpretation in a scenario in which the user cybertravels into the United States, but with the opposite result: the user should not be liable in the United States under § 1201(a) of the DMCA because the temporary copy created by the user’s computer in Chile does not infringe U.S. copyright law (though it may infringe Chilean law if Chilean law considers infringing the creation of temporary copies that result from an unlawful use of a work). The only scenario in which a breach of a user agreement will make a difference is when a user cybertravels from the United States and the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of § 1201(a) of the DMCA is operative: without a user agreement the user’s cybertravel for purposes that do not infringe copyright will be legal because the temporary copies on his computer will not violate a user agreement, but under a user agreement that renders temporary copies copyright infringing, cybertravel will be illegal.

b) Liability under Other Laws

User agreements may not only generate or solidify right holder protection under copyright law provisions on protection of technological measures, but the agreements, if breached, may also expose end users to contractual liability. To limit cybertravel directly under contract, content providers may prohibit users from

225 Under the Ninth and Second Circuit’s interpretation of section 1201(a) the breach of a user agreement will not matter, whether a user cybertravels from or into the United States: all cybertravel will violate the anti-circumvention provisions of section 1201(a).

226 “Contract law has rapidly become a regular companion to copyright protection as the structure of the Internet enables the formation of contract relationships between information producers and end users, either directly or through intermediaries.” PAUL GOLDBEIN & P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW, AND PRACTICE 334 (Oxford University Press, 2d ed. 2010).
changing the information that identifies their physical location. For instance, the German television station SAT1 in its user agreement includes a provision against circumvention of the geographical limitations that SAT1 imposes on access to audiovisual content on its website. According to the agreement, the user must “use the retrieved content only within the use areas permitted by [the media company], and may not in particular alter, circumvent or otherwise disregard technical measures applied by [the media company] to territorially limit the use.” Consequently, users cybertraveling from unpermitted areas breach the contract and are exposed to direct liability through the contractual provisions; the applicable law in user agreements like that of SAT1 will often be set in the contract, or may depend on choice-of-law provisions in the country where the cybertraveler is sued.

Because cybertravel entails remote access to content stored on a computer or a storage facility, the question arises as to whether cybertravel can expose users to liability under anti-hacking laws, and not only to civil but also to criminal liability. Anti-hacking provisions such as the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act in the United States target acts of access to a computer without authorization, and such acts include not only physical access but


228 Id. § 4.1(g) (English translation).

229 Data storage facilities are included in the definition of a “computer” in the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1) (2008); see also, Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA of 24 February 2005 on attacks against information systems, art. 1(a), 2005 O.J. (L 69) 48 (EU); Computer Misuse Act, 1990, c. 18, § 17(6) (Eng.). The definition is likely to expand to encompass a greater number of devices; for instance, recently the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit confirmed that a cellular phone is a “computer” under the provision. See United States v. Kramer, 631 F.3d 900, 901 (8th Cir. 2011). For a discussion of “access,” see Computer Misuse Act, 1990, c. 18, § 17(2) (Eng.).


231 E.g., id. § 1030(a)(2)(C) (“Whoever . . . intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains . . . information from any protected computer . . . .”); see also Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA of 24
also remote access through a network. However, there could be limitations on the liability of a cybertraveler under anti-hacking provisions; for instance, under U.S. law a cybertraveler’s acts might not result in the kind of “damage” or “loss” that would warrant a civil action against the cybertraveler. Perhaps the website operator could avoid this limitation by permitting access to restricted content only for a fee; cybertraveling to the United States to avoid the fee would then bring the cybertraveler within

February 2005 on attacks against information systems, art. 2(1), 2005 O.J. (L 69) 48 (EU); Computer Misuse Act, 1990, c. 18, §§ 1(1), 17(5), 17(8) (Eng.).


The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act defines “damage” as “any impairment to the integrity or availability of data, a program, a system, or information.” 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(8). For a discussion of the terms “damage” and “loss” under the Act see, e.g., Multiven, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., 725 F. Supp. 2d 887, 894–95 (N.D. Cal. 2010).

According to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, “loss” means any reasonable cost to any victim, including the cost of responding to an offense, conducting a damage assessment, and restoring the data, program, system, or information to its condition prior to the offense, and any revenue lost, cost incurred, or other consequential damages incurred because of interruption of service.


Id. § 1030(g).

Any person who suffers damage or loss by reason of a violation of this section may maintain a civil action against the violator to obtain compensatory damages and injunctive relief or other equitable relief. A civil action for a violation of this section may be brought only if the conduct involves 1 of the factors set forth in subclauses (I), (II), (III), (IV), or (V) of subsection (c)(4)(A)(i) . . . .

Id. The only potentially relevant factor would be loss to 1 or more persons during any 1-year period (and, for purposes of an investigation, prosecution, or other proceeding brought by the United States only, loss resulting from a related course of conduct affecting 1 or more other protected computers) aggregating at least $5,000 in value . . . .

Id. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(I); see also EU Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA, supra note 231, at art. 2(1) (allowing EU member states not to criminalize certain acts of accessing information systems in cases that are considered “minor”).

This solution addresses only the issue of the magnitude of the loss; it does not address the potential problem of the nature of the loss as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(11).
the scope of the Act.\textsuperscript{237} Although making access from abroad contingent upon the payment of a fee might be a straightforward and simple solution to implement technically, it might not always be possible; in many cases website operators employ geolocation tools because they either do not have rights to make the content available to users from certain countries or they do not want to be regulated by the laws of those countries.\textsuperscript{238}

Although allowing access from countries from which access is restricted, even for a fee, might not always be an option, one business implementation on the horizon may test this arrangement. The BBC announced in November 2010 its plan to offer to users connecting to its website from outside the United Kingdom some of the content that it currently makes available only to users connecting from inside the United Kingdom.\textsuperscript{239} Making access from abroad contingent upon the payment of a fee while maintaining free access for users connecting from inside the United Kingdom could result in liability not only for users who cybertravel to avoid payment of the fee but also for those who facilitate the cybertravel to the United Kingdom by providing the tools that enable the cybertravel. Apart from making applicable various legal doctrines to prevent unwanted cybertravel, such a pay-per-foreign-view system will compete with the services of mainstream cybertravel providers who charge for their tools that are designed to accomplish the same result—the viewing of the restricted foreign content. The next section analyzes the question of liability of cybertravel providers, whether or not those using their tools circumvent a fee when cybertraveling.

\textsuperscript{237} See infra note 246 and accompanying text for a further discussion of how making content available for a fee might bring a cybertravel provider within the scope of not only the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act in the United States but also national provisions implementing the 1998 EU Conditional Access Directive.

\textsuperscript{238} See supra Part II.A for a discussion of the reasons for using geolocation tools to limit access to content.

\textsuperscript{239} Jonathan Wynne-Jones, BBC Aims to Gain from Global iPlayer, TELEGRAPH (Nov. 7, 2010), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/mediatechnologyandtelecoms/digital-media/8114911/BBC-aims-to-gain-from-global-iPlayer.html.
2. Liability of Cybertravel Providers

Although individual cybertravelers may be subject to direct liability in either the country where they are physically located or the country to which they cybertravel, they might not be the best targets for enforcement actions; as has been shown in the relatively short history of the Internet, the most valuable enforcement targets are often intermediaries. Enforcement actions against individual Internet users can be highly inefficient, and the costs of detection and enforcement will often be excessive when compared to any benefits that might be achieved through such enforcement—both in terms of recourse against individual users and the deterrence of other users.\textsuperscript{240} Enforcement against intermediaries is likely to yield better results. In the case of cybertravel these intermediaries are the providers of cybertravel tools.

Cybertravel providers should be concerned about the secondary liability they might face in connection with end users who use their cybertravel tools for direct infringement;\textsuperscript{241} however, providers might also need to be concerned about exposing themselves to direct liability. For example, in the case of South Africa, it is possible that cybertravel providers could be held liable as “persons, entities or organisations which facilitate the provision of [illegal] on-line gambling.”\textsuperscript{242} Cybertravel providers could also face direct liability under copyright law provisions that protect technological measures; national implementing provisions concerning the measures cover acts of manufacturing, importation, offering to the public, providing, and otherwise trafficking in technologies for circumventing technological measures.\textsuperscript{243} For providers to be liable, some nexus will generally be required

\textsuperscript{240} For a discussion of the problem of “asserting control at the source” see Zittrain, supra note 116, at 207–09. See also Goldstein & Hugenholtz, supra note 226, at 330–31.

\textsuperscript{241} See infra for a discussion of the potential indirect liability of cybertravel providers.


\textsuperscript{243} E.g., 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2), (b)(1) (2006). While the Federal Circuit Court views these DMCA provisions as codifying forms of secondary liability, the provisions are drafted to create direct liability.
between the acts of facilitated circumvention and potential or existing copyright infringement. However, in the United States no nexus is required if the Ninth and Second Circuits’ interpretation of section 1201(a) applies, and cybertravel providers may be liable for providing circumvention tools even without a nexus.

Cybertravel providers face another problem if their tools allow users to bypass the payment of a fee for access. As explained earlier, website operators can decide to provide content for free in countries where access is not restricted but charge a pay-per-foreign-view fee to users accessing the same programming from other countries. If cybertravel providers facilitate user access to websites without the payment of a required fee, the providers could be exposed in the United States to liability under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, and similarly, in the EU, the providers could be liable under national provisions implementing the 1998 EU Conditional Access Directive, which protects services that limit access in order to collect remuneration from “illicit devices which allow access to these services free of charge.”

244 It is debatable whether the same nexus is required in the EU for the protection of computer programs against “any act of putting into circulation, or the possession for commercial purposes of, any means the sole intended purpose of which is to facilitate . . . circumvention of any technical device which may have been applied to protect a computer program.” Council Directive 2009/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the legal protection of computer programs, art. 7(1)(c), 2009 O.J. (L 111) 52.

245 See supra Part IV.A.1.a (discussing the circuit split).

246 See id.


activities under the Directive include the manufacture, import, distribution, sale, rental, possession, installation, maintenance, replacement and use for commercial purposes\(^{251}\) of “any equipment or software designed or adapted to give access to a protected service.”\(^{252}\)

Even if their cybertravel tools are not used to bypass the payment of a fee, cybertravel providers should be concerned about their liability under anti-hacking provisions. These provisions target not only hackers but also those who provide tools for hacking, such as “any password or similar information through which a computer may be accessed without authorization.”\(^{253}\) Cybertravel tools could be viewed as such “similar information,” and therefore, tool providers could face civil and criminal liability under anti-hacking laws, subject to the limitations mentioned above that are applicable to cybertravelers.\(^{254}\) Additionally, limitations associated with territoriality may exist in countries where the liability of providers of hacking tools is drafted in the form of secondary liability.

Another danger for cybertravel providers is direct liability for secondary transmission. Other services that resemble cybertravel have been designed to “place shift,” or to facilitate the viewing of content elsewhere that is broadcast or made available to a limited geographical area, and some of these similar services have been challenged based on their retransmission of the content. For instance, in Japan a service called ManekiTV offered “a location-free, Internet-based transmission” of Japanese television programs for a fee;\(^{255}\) in January 2011 the Supreme Court of Japan held that


\(^{252}\) Id. at art. 2(e).


\(^{254}\) See supra notes 230–35 and accompanying text.

\(^{255}\) Aritake, supra note 23; see also MANEKİTV, supra note 19.
the service infringed copyright. In the United States, a similar service has been attacked in *WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc.* ivi’s online TV player allows users to view on the Internet broadcasts that were originally available over the air. In February 2011, the Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York issued a preliminary injunction against ivi, Inc., determining that the service is not eligible for the statutory license established by the U.S. Copyright Act for cable services.

It may be argued that there is an important difference between place shifting services and cybertravel. While the technologies employed by ManekiTV and ivi require that the services retransmit the signal to provide access to additional viewers, cybertravel technologies, with one exception, do not involve the retransmission of a signal. Instead of retransmitting a signal, cybertravel tools relocate the user in cyberspace so that the user can access the content directly from the original website. The tools do not retransmit the content; rather, they “shift” the perceived location of the viewer. The one exception might be website cybertravel tools—websites that display web pages based on users’ requests. These tools could be described as operating on the principle of retransmission; however, as noted earlier, this type of tool is

258 *ivi, supra* note 16.
259 *WPIX, Inc.*, 765 F. Supp. 2d at 622. Other services, such as Slingbox, a U.S. service that allows users to “[w]atch and control [their] TV shows over the Internet from anywhere in the world,” could face similar challenges depending on their particular technology. [Slingbox](http://www.slingbox.com/go/slingbox) (last visited Feb. 2, 2012). The Slingbox concept is similar to the bypassing of geolocation that is described in Part III of this paper as “self-sustained” cybertravel because Slingbox also requires a user’s own device (the Slingbox) located in another country. A similar service in Japan is Rokuraku. See H. Kikuchi, *Comment on the Rokuraku II decision*, 41 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 860 (2010); see also [ROKURAKU](http://www.rokuraku.com/) (last visited Nov. 19, 2011).

unlikely to be utilized for content streaming because it involves slow connection speeds.\footnote{See supra Part III.}

Although the phrase “making available” that is used in the\footnote{17 U.S.C. §§ 106(4)-(5) (2006); see also Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1159 (9th Cir. 2007).} 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty and the\footnote{See 2001 EU Information Society Directive, supra note 187, at art. 3; Case C-306/05, Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de España (SGAE) v. Rafael Hoteles SA, 2006 E.C.R. I-11519.} 2001 EU Information Society Directive\footnote{WIPO Copyright Treaty art. 8, Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-17, 36 I.L.M. 65, 70 (1996); 2001 EU Information Society Directive, supra note 187, at art. 3.} indeed includes the component of “making available to the public.”\footnote{The phrase is used to clarify the scope of the term “public.” “[T]he making available to the public of their works in such a way that members of the public may access these works from a place and at a time individually chosen by them.” WIPO Copyright Treaty art. 8, Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-17, 36 I.L.M. 65, 70 (1996). See also the definition of performing or displaying a work “publicly” in 17 U.S.C. §101 (2006) (providing the definition of performing or displaying a work “publicly”); Goldstein & Hugenholtz, supra note 226, at 328–29.} However, the Agreed Statement Concerning Article 8 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty suggests that the component does not create specific liability for passive behavior,\footnote{2001 EU Information Society Directive, supra note 187, at recital 23.} and explains that Article 8 does not impose liability for acts of “mere provision of physical facilities for enabling or making a communication.” Similarly, recital 23 of the\footnote{2001 EU Information Society Directive, supra note 187, at recital 23.} 2001 EU Information Society Directive states that the right “should cover any . . . transmission or retransmission of a work to the public” and that the “right should not cover any other acts.”\footnote{2001 EU Information Society Directive, supra note 187, at recital 23.} The Directive is different from the WIPO Treaty in that, with respect to holders of rights to specific subject matter in Article

\footnote{See supra Part III.}
3(2), the Directive does appear to create a new “right to make available to the public,” which “cover[s] all acts of making available such subject-matter to members of the public,” meaning acts that are not restricted to transmission or retransmission. However, the Directive repeats that “[t]he mere provision of physical facilities for enabling or making a communication does not in itself amount to communication,” leaving open the question of whether providing cybertravel tools is equivalent to providing “facilities” and thus exempted from liability under the “making available” provision of the Directive.

In the United States, cybertravel providers might benefit from an exemption that passive carriers enjoy from liability for the “secondary transmission of a performance or display of a work.” Indirect liability may be limited by safe harbor provisions that protect Internet intermediaries from secondary liability for Internet

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267 The “exclusive right to authorize or prohibit the making available to the public” is provided to

performers, of fixations of their performances; . . . for phonogram

producers, of their phonograms; . . . for the producers of the first

fixations of films, of the original and copies of their films; . . . for

broadcasting organization, of fixations of their broadcasts, whether

these broadcasts are transmitted by wire or over the air, including by
cable or satellite.


268 Id. at recital 24.

269 On conflicting European decisions concerning hyperlinks, see Bechtold, supra note 185, at 343, 361.


271 It speaks in favor of such an interpretation that recital 25 of the Directive seems to suggest that Article 3(2) should target on-demand transmission services. 2001 EU Information Society Directive, supra note 187, at recital 25. However, recital 23 of the Directive calls for a broad interpretation of the right. Id. at recital 23. See also Case C-306/05, Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de España (SGAE) v. Rafael Hoteles SA, 2006 E.C.R. I-11519, at par. 36. In ITV v. TV CatchUp Ltd., Justice Floyd opined that TV CatchUP does not “merely provide technical means to ensure or improve reception . . . It is not merely supportive of the original exploitation of the work.” ITV v. TV CatchUp Ltd. [2011] EWHC 1874 (Pat), [98]. See also Bechtold, supra note 185, at 343, 361. As Goldstein and Hugenholtz note, “[p]osting hyperlinks to works already available on websites, however, is not an independent act of communication.” Goldstein & Hugenholtz, supra note 226, at 329–30.

users’ conduct; the provisions may also apply to cybertravel providers.\textsuperscript{273} Safe harbor provisions apply to Internet service providers without regard to the location of users who connect to their networks; therefore, in the case of the most basic cybertravel, which consists of a dial-up connection to a foreign Internet service provider,\textsuperscript{274} the fact that the user connects from another country should not defeat the safe harbor that the service provider enjoys. Even cybertravel providers that are not Internet service providers can probably benefit from the provisions of the safe harbors that are designed for transitory digital network communications.\textsuperscript{275}

Not all countries offer safe harbor provisions for Internet intermediaries, and even those countries that do offer safe harbor provisions may limit their safe harbors to secondary liability for infringements of only certain laws. Moreover, the safe harbor provisions will certainly not protect cybertravel providers from liability for actively inducing infringements. To limit their indirect liability, cybertravel providers will likely market their tools in a manner that does not suggest that they are promoting copyright infringement or other rights infringement by end users.\textsuperscript{276} For instance, instead of advertising that their tools will allow users to watch specific copyrighted content, the providers may choose nonspecific language to advertise the fact that their tools may enable users to watch television programs in general.\textsuperscript{277}


\textsuperscript{274} See supra Part III.

\textsuperscript{275} E.g., 17 U.S.C. \S 512(a); Directive 2000/31/EC, \textit{supra} note 273, at art. 12 (“Mere conduit”).

\textsuperscript{276} On the “dual use” technologies that may serve both legal and illegal purposes see Stefan Bechtold, \textit{supra} note 185, at 343, 387. “In general, in such ‘dual use’ cases, [the provision on protection of technological measures] probably applies as long as the technological measure is not misused primarily for the purpose to substitute the absence of copyright protection by technological protection.” \textit{Id.} at 387; \textit{see also} Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913, 936–41 (2005).

\textsuperscript{277} E.g., \textit{MY EXPAT NETWORK, supra} note 150 (Note: the U.K. top-level domain name, the price in British pounds, the website strictly addressing British expatriates living outside the United Kingdom, and the language about watching “UK TV abroad.”).
Cybertravel providers may also attempt to limit their exposure to indirect liability by disassociating their activities from the countries from which users, who use their tools, cybertravel. Although the likelihood of success of such attempts is questionable, it is instructive to review their model. For example, a cybertravel provider in Hungary might offer a cybertravel tool to Hungarians who travel abroad and wish to view Hungarian programs online that are not accessible outside of Hungary. The provider could argue that because any acts of potential direct copyright infringement would be committed by users outside Hungary, and therefore under foreign (non-Hungarian) copyright laws, no indirect liability of the cybertravel provider for copyright infringement should arise in Hungary under Hungarian law. Of course, the provider would also claim that it had not directed its operations at the countries in which acts of direct infringement occur (all countries other than Hungary), but only at Hungary, and thereby attempt to limit its exposure to personal jurisdiction outside Hungary. Indeed, a provider could support its claim if its website were in Hungarian, as that would suggest that it had only targeted customers inside the sole country in which Hungarian is widely spoken and understood.

Although existing laws do not address cybertravel, a number of legal doctrines may apply to various aspects of cybertravel, and it is for the courts to decide which, if any, of these existing doctrines apply. The lack of any specific legislative provisions addressing cybertravel is not surprising given the brief history of the use of

278 See Martin Senftleben, commentary on the 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty, in CONCISE EUROPEAN COPYRIGHT LAW 87, 102–03; see also Bechtold, supra note 185, at 343, 362.

279 See supra note 277.


geolocation tools to limit access to certain content and the relatively recent advent of cybertravel. So far there appear to be no cases raising the question of the legality of cybertravel, whether in the context of copyright law or of other laws pertaining to conduct on the Internet. Whether or not courts decide to deem cybertravel legal under existing laws, it is time to discuss the future of cybertravel.

B. Should Cybertravel be Legal?

Although current legal regimes do not directly address cybertravel and court cases dealing with cybertravel appear to be nonexistent, it would be a mistake to think that cybertravel will continue to remain outside the scope of legal inquiry. The need to erect borders on the Internet to prevent the undesirable results of the application of cyberlaw seems to dictate only one possible future for cybertravel: making it illegal. Without making or keeping cybertravel illegal, the goal of those who want a territorial partitioning of the Internet will be defeated or significantly endangered. Therefore it seems that, regardless of its current status, it is imperative that cybertravel be declared illegal. This section discusses the apparently grim and inevitable fate of cybertravel and then attempts to identify potential arguments for saving it.

1. Cybertravel as a Misrepresentation of One’s True Location

There currently exists no right to know a user’s true IP address, and no corresponding obligation for a user to reveal his true IP address; however, this could change in light of the developments

282 Cf. Yvette Joy Liebesman, The Wisdom of Legislating for Anticipated Technological Advancements, 10 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 154, 157 (2010) (warning that “we should proceed with caution in allowing the potential effects of either technology in its infancy or future unrealized technology to influence our policy decisions before the science has had a chance to mature and develop, and its effects on society better determined.”).

283 See supra notes 5, 51–58 and accompanying text.

The developments appear to dictate that in the future a user’s IP address be unchangeable; if that be the case, an IP address will constitute an element of a user’s digital identity that the user would not be permitted to alter. The user would have a disclosure obligation that he would have to fulfill by always presenting himself to the outside world with his true IP address.

The change from IPv4 to IPv6 may support the idea of non-changeability of IP addresses. If one of the virtues of IPv6 is the ability to identify a particular device by its IP address, allowing users to change the IP addresses of their devices, even if only temporarily, would render the virtue worthless. Experts have promised that having IP addresses permanently assigned or embedded in various devices will be an advance that will spur further innovation in the online world because new applications may thereafter be developed to target specific devices connected to the Internet, and these devices will no longer be limited to computers or cell phones but will include devices such as cars, refrigerators, washing machines and other appliances. Allowing cybertravel would hinder this development because applications could not rely on the user leaving the fixed IP address of a device unaltered.

In addition to being inconsistent with the interests of the parties aligned in support of IPv6, cybertravel also appears to be inconsistent with the desires of governments and the private sector to erect borders on the Internet. In spite of the zeal of true Internet enthusiasts to remain faithful to the original concept of the borderless network, there are reasons why both governments and the private sector need a territorial partitioning of the Internet. Use of geolocation tools by website operators appears to be a reasonable method of erecting borders on the network, however,

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287 See supra Part I.

288 See id.
the functioning of these tools can be undermined by cybertravel, which evades the tools and defeats the partitioning. Outlawing cybertravel seems to be a logical answer in support of the border-building process.

2. Cybertravel and the Right to Obscure One’s Location

The ability to assign permanent IP addresses to every device connected to the Internet, and the ability to attribute acts on the Internet to those devices and possibly to particular persons, raises serious privacy concerns. This possibility explains an increasing interest, or even determination, among Internet users for options to change their IP addresses as a way of maintaining their privacy on the Internet. Indeed, services already exist that offer a simple way to obscure information about users’ Internet connections by altering users’ IP addresses. These anonymizing services do not fit the definition of cybertravel because users do not necessarily use the services to evade geolocation to “travel” to another country; users seeking anonymization often want only to obscure their own IP address but do not care about the location of the replacement IP address.

It might appear that the debate about the availability of anonymous Internet browsing relates to the future of cybertravel; however, there is not necessarily a link between the legality of anonymization and the legality of cybertravel. The law may permit a change of IP address for the purposes of anonymization, yet require that the replacement IP address also be located in the jurisdiction of the user’s physical location. This approach would achieve a certain level of anonymization that

289 I am indebted for this term to Megan M. Carpenter, Associate Professor of Law at Texas Wesleyan School of Law, who proposed its use in this context.

290 If you were concerned about someone hacking into your computer you might decide that having someone hack into the contents of your refrigerator would be worse.

291 See supra Part III (discussing examples of such concerns).

292 See id.

might be sufficient for many purposes, and yet maintain the desired localization specificity of the IP address. The localization might not be detailed enough to bring the user localized information about restaurants, for example, but would be sufficiently detailed to allow website operators to detect the jurisdiction from which the user is connecting and adjust the accessibility of content accordingly. This solution would allow users a certain degree of anonymization but give them no ability to obscure their location to the point of avoiding compliance with territorially-defined laws and regulations.

Similarly, legalization of cybertravel does not automatically dictate a legalization of anonymization; depending on the structure of legal cybertravel, legalization of anonymization might be unnecessary and also undesirable. For instance, legal cybertravel might be conditioned upon the use of a digital passport that would identify not only the user’s location or domicile but also the user’s identity or account; such a condition would permit cybertravel but require that the user maintain accurate information about his or her identity. This solution would allow cybertravel but defeat anonymization; users would be able to obscure their current location if, for instance, the digital passport required information about the user’s domicile or residence but not the user’s current location.

If the future of the Internet includes permanently assigned IP addresses, anonymous Internet speech may have to be safeguarded by means other than the obscuring of one’s IP address, and alternative means are likely to require careful attention to the protection of privacy. It is possible that privacy law could

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294 Anonymization in the same jurisdiction might not, in fact, always be sufficient—for example, if the jurisdiction is too small or has an insufficient number of Internet users with the same characteristics, identification of the particular user might be possible. Similarly, anonymization within the same jurisdiction will not work if the desire for anonymization is combined with a need to cybertravel.

295 See infra Part IV.C for a discussion of the impact of selecting the domicile instead of the current location.

296 There will be someone in the process—some other “anonymizer”—who will know the IP address of the Internet user; therefore, privacy rules will have to protect the user from having this information disclosed.
develop before any policy decisions are made concerning anonymization or cybertravel, and some experts will undoubtedly argue that as privacy protection becomes stronger for IP addresses, the arguments in favor of allowing users to change their IP addresses should yield. Some experts may present this outcome as a necessary compromise: the law will protect a user’s personally identifiable information, but the user will be expected to keep it personally identifiable. Although information subject to privacy protection must lead to the identification of a particular person (by definition), there seems to be no link between providing protection to such information and requiring that the particular person not change the information. The result of the debate may impact the design of cybertravel but should not be dispositive of the question of whether cybertravel should be legal or not; the answers to the questions about cybertravel and anonymization should not be mutually dependent.

3. Cybertravel as An Equivalent to Physical Travel

Because the developments outlined earlier appear to dictate that cybertravel be illegal in the future, it is difficult to find an argument for allowing cybertravel. One attempt is to analogize cybertravel to physical travel and claim an equivalent right to travel in cyberspace. If cybertravel is considered equivalent to physical travel, it can be argued that cybertravel should be permissible in some form and enjoy the same protections that physical travel—and in particular international travel—does.

The right to travel internationally has been recognized in the United States as a constitutional right, and is implied as a human right in international human rights treaties. In the 1958 case *Kent v. Dulles*, the Supreme Court of the United States discussed the constitutional right to travel internationally and explained the underpinnings of that right, surveyed the roots of the right in U.S. history and traditions, and quoted Zechariah Chafee on social values associated with the freedom of movement. Although some of the values cited in *Kent v. Dulles* are not pertinent to the present discussion of cybertravel (values of allowing families to reunite, persons to work in other countries), others, such as educational values and the values of learning different viewpoints, are very relevant. “In many different ways,” the Supreme Court quoted Chafee, “direct contact with other countries contributes to sounder decisions at home.” It would seem that cybertravel is as much associated with these values as physical travel is.

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299 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10 1948, G.A. Res. 217A U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 67th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810, art. 13(2) (1948) (includes “the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country”); Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights, Strasbourg, September 16, 1963, art. 2(2) (includes the freedom “to leave any country, including his own”); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 12(2) (includes a provision that “[e]veryone shall be free to leave any country, including his own”); American Convention for Human Rights, Opened for Signature Nov. 22, 1969, Ch II, art. 22(2) (provides that “every person has the right to leave any country freely, including his own”).
301 Id. at 125–26.
302 Id. at 126–27 (quoting Zechariah Chafee, *Three Human Rights in the Constitution of 1787* 195–96 (Univ. of Kansas Press 1956)).
303 Id. (quoting Zechariah Chafee, *Three Human Rights in the Constitution of 1787* 195–96 (Univ. of Kansas Press 1956)). In some contexts the right to be allowed to work in another country could require the right to cybertravel.
304 Id. (quoting Zechariah Chafee, *Three Human Rights in the Constitution of 1787* 195–96 (Univ. of Kansas Press 1956)).
305 Id. at 127 (quoting Zechariah Chafee, *Three Human Rights in the Constitution of 1787* 195–96 (Univ. of Kansas Press 1956)).
306 But cf. Zick, supra note 298, at 1004 (noting that the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court that followed *Kent v. Dulles* “effectively neutered any First Amendment liberty to travel abroad for purposes of inquiry and information-gathering”).
Even if, by analogy with physical travel, the right to travel internationally is extended to cybertravel, the right to cybertravel would be subject to limitation through governmental regulation analogous to the regulation that is applicable to physical travel. In the United States the right to travel internationally is subject to rational basis scrutiny, which allows the government to use reasonable means to limit the right as long as the limitation is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. Similarly, international treaties on human rights recognize that the right to travel across national borders may be limited. For instance, the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which the United States has been a party since 1977 and which it ratified in 1992, allows restrictions of the right as long as the restrictions “are provided by law, are necessary to protect national security, public order (ordre public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other rights recognized in the . . . Covenant.” One of the generally accepted restrictions is the requirement that persons traveling across national borders carry passports that identify them and thereby allow countries to monitor the movement of persons. Indeed, it could be foreseen that in the digital environment countries could impose a similar requirement for cybertravel.

Some might argue that there is an even stronger argument for the protection of cybertravel—the right of access to information. International treaties, including treaties to which the United States is a party, define the right of freedom of expression to include the right to access information from wherever it may be located. For

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307 See Califano v. Aznavourian, 439 U.S. 170, 178 (1978). This is different from domestic travel, which is protected by a higher level of scrutiny. Id. at 176–78.
310 On the potential overlap between the right to travel and the right to free speech see Zick, supra note 298, at 954–57, 985–86, 1004–12.
example, Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights protects the right “to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.” In the United States some commentators have advocated that the right to travel internationally be derived from the free speech protection of the First Amendment rather than from the Due Process Clause because of the values encompassed by international travel. Advocates of this view could use cybertravel to help persuade countries to acknowledge this link between the right to international travel and the right to free speech; to many, the link may be more relevant in the context of cybertravel than physical travel. If countries refuse to link the concepts, of course, equating cybertravel to physical travel would not improve cybertravel’s chances of benefitting from the protection of access to information.

Any attempt to extend the rights of international travel or access to information to cyberspace would certainly not be the first attempt to assert constitutional and human rights in cyberspace. The first constitutional right to receive attention in the context of


312 Zick, supra note 298, at 1005, 1008; see also supra INTRODUCTION (discussing the values associated with travel).

313 Zick is concerned that the focus on protecting free speech on the Internet will distract attention from the need to protect international travel:

[I]t may be tempting to reason that because speech can transcend territorial borders via the Internet, there is less need for a fundamental right of cross-border movement. But even in the digital era, freedom of speech and other First Amendment liberties still depend upon rights of cross-border movement and trans-border information-gathering. . . . [I]t remains important that we have a constitutional foundation for cross-border movement and intermingling.

Zick, supra note 298, at 1004–05.

Cybertravel is an activity on the Internet that could provide additional support for the right to travel internationally.

the Internet was the right to free speech; users have asserted this right when faced with limitations on Internet speech imposed by other countries. The *Yahoo!*\textsuperscript{315} and *Viewfinder*\textsuperscript{316} cases are examples of cases in which U.S. courts have denied recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments because of the significant public policy embedded in the U.S. constitutional guarantee of free speech. In line with these cases and other cases involving foreign libel judgments and speech on the Internet, the 2010 SPEECH Act ensures that no foreign defamation judgments will be recognized in the United States unless they comport with U.S. standards of free speech.\textsuperscript{317}

One problem in asserting the right to free speech on the Internet is that the functioning of the Internet depends on non-state actors, and only when constitutional rights or human rights involve governmental action that must be effectuated on the Internet by non-state actors (such as recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment, or content filtering mandated by the government) will an assertion of constitutional rights on the Internet be possible.\textsuperscript{318} Given the importance of the Internet, it is not surprising that experts such as Christoph B. Graber are calling for an extension of the rights to bind private actors on the Internet;\textsuperscript{319} the actors to be bound by the rights should be the providers of critical Internet infrastructure, such as Internet service providers, intermediaries, and others who are providers of web services that are unique and indispensable to the usability of the Internet. Graber gives an

\textsuperscript{315} *Yahoo!* Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001), rev’d en banc, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006).

\textsuperscript{316} *Sarl Louis Feraud Intl.* v. *Viewfinder*, Inc., 489 F.3d 474 (2d Cir. 2007).


\textsuperscript{318} On “Constitutional Rights in the Private Sphere of the Internet” from a comparative perspective see Graber, supra note 42, at 17–20.

\textsuperscript{319} See generally Graber, supra note 42; see also Rebecca Tushnet, *Power Without Responsibility: Intermediaries and the First Amendment*, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 986, 988 (2008) (“[I]f individuals’ speech should not be attributed to intermediaries when it is unlawful, we should at least consider ways in which intermediaries could be deterred from interfering with it when it is lawful.”). Rebecca Tushnet argues that “if we limit intermediary responsibility . . . we should also limit intermediary power to control speech.” Id. at 1009.
example of preemptive filtering that demonstrates the risk of serious intrusions into the right to “communicative freedom,” which in his definition includes not only the right to free speech, but also the “passive” aspect of the right, which is the right of access to information—a right that is embedded in international human rights treaties. The filtering in Graber’s example is conducted by intermediaries who block user access to peer-to-peer networking sites or other websites with potentially infringing content, thereby preemptively censoring speech that might not be infringing at all. Such censorship, if conducted by a government, would be contrary to free speech protections and subject to legal recourse; however, no recourse is available to users when the filtering is conducted by private actors.

Users expect Internet service providers to comply with constitutional and human rights, and as the Internet has changed

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320 The “right to freedom of opinion and expression . . . includes the freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.” Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 19, G.A. Res 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). The right to freedom of expression “shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.” International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 19(2), Dec. 16, 1966, 99 U.N.T.S. 171. (emphasis added). For permissible limitations on the right see id. at art. 19(3). The right to freedom of expression “shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.” European Convention on Human Rights art. 10(1), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (emphasis added). For permissible limitations on the right see id. at art. 10(2); see also American Convention on Human Rights art. 13, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143; Recommendation CM/Rec(2008)6 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe to member states on measures to promote the respect for freedom of expression and information with regard to Internet filters, Mar. 26, 2008.

321 Graber, supra note 42, at 10. For a similar argument concerning a “prior restraint by proxy,” see Wendy Seltzer, Free Speech Unmoored in Copyright’s Safe Harbor: Chilling Effects of the DMCA on the First Amendment, 24 HARS. J.L. & TECH. 171 (2010). Seltzer notes that the actions of service providers in her example are mandated by law and states that “[g]overnment cannot insulate itself from responsibility for this abridgment of free speech by routing its influence through third-party service providers.” Id. at 190.

from being solely a means of communication to a medium for many other activities, such as trade and entertainment, the expectations for constitutional and human rights on the Internet have expanded beyond free speech. For example, if users have built their business models on selling merchandise on eBay, and eBay at some point no longer allows them to sell on eBay, this has a drastic impact on their livelihood. Although an initial incarnation of the problem of Internet users’ expectations clashing with Internet service providers’ actions was small merchants demanding continuing access to eBay,\textsuperscript{323} the subsequent debate about network neutrality shows that the problem of accessibility has entered a new and more critical stage.\textsuperscript{324} Not only is the right to free speech at stake, but other rights are as well. For instance, following the unrest in Egypt in January and February 2011, Mohamed ElBaradei, the leading opposition figure, was quoted as observing that prior to the shutdown of the Internet by the government, the Internet had provided the right to freedom of association that was missing \textit{de facto} on the ground.\textsuperscript{325} Indeed, it is an exercise of this constitutional right that today’s Internet users expect private actors such as Twitter or Facebook to facilitate. It is understandable that people relying on the infrastructure of the Internet will search for constitutional protections for their access to the infrastructure.\textsuperscript{326}

\textsuperscript{323} “PowerSellers” on eBay objected to eBay’s practice of denying them access to the auction website based on repeated complaints filed against them under the DMCA, 17 U.S.C. §512(c)(3) (2006). For a discussion of the problem, see Trimble, \textit{Enemy Ground}, supra note 173, at 808–09.


\textsuperscript{326} Although private actors who furnish critical infrastructure may resist any new legal obligations that countries may attempt to impose upon them, the actors may have no choice other than to accept the additional obligations: if a critical part of the Internet is in the hands of one or a small number of private actors, countries will have a limited ability—short of nationalizing that part of the Internet—to protect constitutional rights in cyberspace.
Constitutional and human rights may in the future shield Internet users not only from governmental intrusion, but also from certain acts by Internet service providers and other providers of critical infrastructure—regardless of whether such acts result from indirect governmental intervention or voluntary decisions by providers.\textsuperscript{327} The right to travel should enjoy parity with the right to free speech, the right to free assembly, the right to access to information, and other recognized constitutional and human rights that should be fully implemented on the Internet.

\textbf{C. Can Cybertravel be Legal?}

If we accept the premise that cybertravel, or the capability of a user to evade geolocation and use the Internet as if he were located in a location other than where he is physically located, is socially valuable and worth permitting in some form, the question turns to the conditions under which cybertravel could be legal. As explained earlier, the existence of this capability does not depend on permitting anonymity on the Internet;\textsuperscript{328} anonymization and cybertravel need not go hand in hand.

Thinking about the possible future of cybertravel requires considering all of the various policies and business motives that lead website operators to limit access to their content on the Internet.\textsuperscript{329} First, website operators design content limitations to enhance user convenience by localizing accessible content, for example by showing advertisements for local businesses. Second, website operators may have contractual obligations with content providers, for example to limit access to video programs that a provider has licensed only for certain countries or regions.\textsuperscript{330} Third, the operators may limit access to content to comply with laws that prohibit certain types of content in certain countries, for example by blocking gambling when it is outlawed by some countries. Prohibitions may also apply, however, for less-maligned content that may be made inaccessible because of

\textsuperscript{327} See Interview by NPR with Laban Coblentz, supra note 325.
\textsuperscript{328} See supra Part IV.B.2.
\textsuperscript{329} See supra Part II.A (discussing the various reasons).
\textsuperscript{330} Id.
countries’ legal requirements—for instance, countries’ consumer protection laws may require certain products to be offered only if they have been certified for use in the country.  

Fourth, website operators may decide voluntarily to limit access to content to avoid being exposed to personal jurisdiction and liability in certain countries where they wish to avoid litigation, taxes, regulation or some other type of obligation. Finally, website operators may implement access limitations for security reasons; for example, a bank will not allow a user from outside the account holder’s country of residence to log into the account holder’s account because the bank assumes that such a login is a fraudulent attempt to access the account.

The first type of restriction—content localized for advertising or for user convenience—should cause the least difficulty. There should be no reason for prohibiting users from viewing this type of content as if they were sitting in another country. In fact, website operators such as Google and Lufthansa offer links to allow users to switch easily among different country versions. This switching may not be completely without cost to the website operator, however; if users regularly escape the “convenience” of localized content and use other country versions in lieu of their own local versions, it may diminish website operators’ advertising revenues because they lose some of the advantage that a partitioned cyberspace provides in allowing them to charge premium advertising rates for advertisements that target local consumers.

Cybertravel that is used to evade the other types of access limitations listed above is problematic. It is unrealistic to expect countries to allow users connecting to the Internet from their territory to bypass any prohibitions against certain content or activities by cybertraveling to another country where such content or activities are expressly or implicitly permitted. Allowing cybertravel for these purposes would defeat the public policies behind the prohibitions and undermine national sovereignty.

331 Id.
332 Id.
Similarly, it is difficult to defend cybertravel that is used for the purpose of bypassing geolocation tools employed by website operators who are complying with contractual obligations, seeking to avoid personal jurisdiction and liability, or protecting themselves and others against criminal activities. The question is whether there is a way to permit cybertravel when it is conducted to avoid these types of limitations, but the conduct has a legitimate goal, such as accessing one’s own bank account from a foreign country. The method of cybertravel is not important, because the tools for its implementation will change; what is important is that travel to another portion of cyberspace be possible.

There are three perspectives from which possible solutions for the future of cybertravel will arise: legal, technological and business. As has been shown by other examples in the Internet environment, a combination of solutions from all three perspectives seems most likely to succeed. For example, laws that prohibit copyright infringement have not stopped online music piracy, and neither have filters that have been imposed by Internet service providers or automatic warnings that are generated by college campus service providers. Although these measures and laws addressing piracy have probably slowed online music and film piracy, the solutions had to be assisted by business solutions, such as iTunes and Netflix, to offer a legal and viable alternative to piracy.

As discussed earlier in section IV.A, a number of legal doctrines cover issues potentially associated with cybertravel; however, because these doctrines were neither created for nor shaped with cybertravel in mind, courts will be required to determine the extent to which the doctrines may make illegal all or some instances of cybertravel. Whatever the status of cybertravel will be, it will be beneficial to clarify the applicability of existing laws to cybertravel and possibly draft specific

333 See supra Part III (explaining the functioning of various cybertravel tools).
334 See supra Part I (explaining the “borderlessness” of the Internet and the impetus for partitioning of the Internet).
335 See supra Part IV.A.
regulations to govern cybertravel further. If IPv6 makes IPv4 obsolete and a transition actually occurs to permanently assigned or embedded IP addresses, the transition could provide momentum for the creation of cybertravel-specific legislation, and perhaps even for an agreement on a legislative solution at the international level.

Within some permitted extent, cybertravel, as an equivalent to physical international travel, could be subject to reasonable limitations. Traditionally, the obligation to carry a passport is considered one such limitation, and a digital passport could serve this purpose for cybertravel. The passport could either be a virtual equivalent to a physical passport and carry the same personally identifiable data of the holder/Internet user, or be a document with only limited information, such as the user’s location. The location identified in either type of passport could be either the current physical location of the user or the place of residence or domicile of the user, depending on the criterion that was set as the factor determining the accessibility of the Internet content.

Although intuition seems to dictates the selection of the user’s current physical location as the determining factor, the other option—place of residence or domicile—should not be summarily excluded. The prevailing principle of territoriality of law suggests that current physical location be the correct solution; under the principle, laws apply territorially, or alternatively stated, the prescriptive jurisdiction of a country extends only to the country’s borders—and outside its borders only to the extent that the country’s jurisdiction covers acts that have effects within its borders. Another principle, the principle of personality of law, exists as well, but with less applicability because the principle of territoriality of law applies to the vast majority of the legislative activities of a country. The use of residence or domicile as the determinative factor for access to Internet content would present a remarkable opportunity to introduce the principle of personality of law for activity on the Internet. Under this principle countries legislate for their own nationals and permanent residents and the laws follow those persons wherever they travel. An analysis of the issues surrounding personality of law on the Internet is beyond the
scope of this article and deserves a separate study, but is worth mentioning.

A law for digital passports cannot exist without a technological implementation. It is not difficult to imagine such a system if the IPv6-related vision of permanently assigned or embedded IP addresses that would identify specific devices (or even persons if the devices were embedded in human bodies) becomes a reality; the law could make it illegal to change or reroute an IP address because that act would be equivalent to forging a physical passport. The digital passport would inform each website operator about the location of the user, or the user’s residence or domicile, depending on the information in the passport.

Knowing exactly how many cybertravelers are connecting to a website and from what locations could assist intellectual property owners, for example, in the creation of tailored licensing schemes; if information about cybertravelers were to include personal identifiers, the system could become what Paul Goldstein described in 1994 as the “celestial jukebox”—a service that would allow on-demand access to copyrighted works from anywhere in the world for a fee. The digital environment is perfectly equipped to implement this system; in such a world, each user could access copyrighted works from anywhere in the world and be charged only for works that the user accessed. This is where a technological solution would prompt the need for a business solution.

What hampers progress towards a “celestial jukebox” are the significant transaction costs associated with the identification and location of right holders and the negotiation of licenses with multiple right holders. The magnitude of these costs must be addressed in order for global licensing to be feasible, and there are

336 See Loesing et al., supra note 156, at 205 (“There are estimated to be hundreds of thousands [of] Tor users every day routing their data through the Tor network.”).
338 See id.
339 See id.
initiatives being developed in this area to pave the way for this type of solution;\textsuperscript{340} for example, experts have proposed that the World Intellectual Property Organization create and administer an international repertoire database,\textsuperscript{341} and other experts are exploring possibilities for cross-border collective management of rights in the digital environment.\textsuperscript{342}

Even without a celestial jukebox solution that would cover all works globally, and even without digital passports, there is clearly space for smaller-scale business solutions to meet the challenges of cybertravel. If content is limited because of the contractual obligations of website operators, cybertravel could be enabled by global or regional licensing schemes that would allow operators to offer certain content either worldwide or in selected countries.\textsuperscript{343} Instead of paying cybertravel providers to facilitate cybertravel, users would pay for access directly to website operators, who would then bear any licensing costs and any other costs associated with the content, such as a public television licensing fee.


\textsuperscript{343} See supra Part IV.A.1 (providing an example of the BBC preparing to launch its TV shows for viewing by users accessing the BBC website from outside the United Kingdom).
Of course, these solutions are directed only toward access to content that is restricted because of contractual limitations; any content that is illegal in a country will continue to be inaccessible to users accessing the Internet from that country, and potentially to nationals or permanent residents of that country even when they are temporarily present in another country, if digital passports are used. For certain types of content—and the instances of these types of content are likely to be limited—countries may reconsider the legal status of content in light of the possibilities afforded by digital passports. For example, some countries might reconsider their stance on online gambling if they have the ability to tax users located in their country who use foreign online gambling sites.

The solutions also fail to address cases in which access to content is limited by a website operator’s or content provider’s choice; these cases arise because of issues of jurisdiction, taxation or online security. When website operators or content providers decide *sua sponte* to restrict their content to certain viewers, users have minimal recourse; only in rare circumstances will a government direct private entities to make content more widely available than it already is. Here a system of digital passports could prove useful; for example, if access to content were based on a user’s permanent residence, content could be made available to a qualified user while he was temporarily located in another country, without exposing the website operator to jurisdiction or taxation in that country.

Finally, knowledge of the numbers and physical locations of cybertravelers could make possible not only sophisticated licensing arrangements but also agreements—either private (meaning between individual content providers and website operators) or international (meaning among countries)—as to an acceptable level of free spillover. In the physical world, it is accepted that some content limited to a certain country will be available to those who travel to that country. For example, when distribution rights under copyright are licensed for one country, it is understood that some of the copyrighted works will land in the hands of persons who are present in the country only temporarily and those persons may carry the work with them to other countries; laws provide exceptions for individual users to do this because it is considered
natural spillover. Exceptions for a similar reasonable spillover could be permitted for cybertravel. However, without information about the extent of cybertravel, it is impossible to find arguments to support the exceptions for the spillover; a passport system would allow the collection of such information.

**CONCLUSION**

This article presents a comprehensive analysis of cybertravel—the evasion by a user of geolocation that prevents the user from viewing certain Internet content from the user’s physical location. By cybertraveling, the user can view the Internet as if the user were located in a country other than the country in which the user is physically located. The goal of the article is to explain what cybertravel is, why it exists, what purposes it serves, what its legal status is, what arguments exist for making it available in the future, and what solutions might be developed to allow users to cybertravel for legitimate purposes without undermining the evolution of the Internet. It seems clear that even though cybertravel will probably not survive in its current form, new technological and business solutions will preserve the concept and the law will complement these solutions.

The current importance of questions regarding the future of cybertravel is heightened by the desire of governments and the private sector to erect borders on the Internet to achieve compliance with territorially-defined regulation. This article assumes that this desire is shaping or will shape the future of the Internet, and that geolocation tools will play a major role in the future in light of user disfavor toward alternative types of access controls: user hardware filtering and Internet service provider filtering. However, it is possible that countries will adopt still

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other approaches to the problem of “missing borders.” For example, courts could continue to use a low-technology approach to defining personal jurisdiction on the Internet, thereby relieving website operators of the necessity of employing geolocation tools to comply with the laws of different countries. Or, instead of mandating Internet service provider filtering of possibly prohibited content, countries could decide to implement detailed Internet traffic monitoring and aggressively identify and pursue users engaging in illegal activity in cases where countries cannot pursue website operators.

Although it is possible that the use of geolocation tools will not be the method of choice for the territorial partitioning of cyberspace in the future, it appears to be the preferred method at present. Partitioning through the use of geolocation tools enjoys a number of advantages when compared to other available methods, and even if the alleged benefits of IPv6 are not fully utilized and IPv6 does not lead to permanently assigned or embedded IP addresses, geolocation tools can still function to achieve the goal of cyberspace partitioning that many Internet actors desire. However, for Internet partitioning to be truly effective the problem of cybertravel must be addressed; cybertravel frustrates the success of geolocation tools, making it difficult to determine or even estimate the effectiveness of these tools.

The legal framework in which cybertravel operates is a patchwork of legal doctrines that were not formulated to regulate cybertravel, or even conceived with cybertravel in mind. Whether the doctrines apply to cybertravel, and if so to what extent, are questions that courts will have to address. Copyright will probably be the area in which litigation will first arise, and the first issues targeted will be associated with making content available to audiences to whom the copyright holder did not intend.

345 See supra note 95 and accompanying text (discussing the low-technology approach to the determination of personal jurisdiction).
346 See supra Part I, IV.B.3 (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of the methods of partitioning cyberspace).
347 See supra Part II.B (discussing the effectiveness of geolocation tools).
348 See supra Part IV.A (discussing the current legal status of cybertravel).
to extend access. These disputes will emulate cases concerning place-shifting services that have arisen recently, such as litigation involving ManekiTV in Japan, TV Catch UP in the United Kingdom, and ivi and Justin.tv in the United States.\textsuperscript{349} Cybertravel disputes will define the next generation of these cases.

The extent to which cases concerning cybertravel will appear in courts, what the outcome of such cases might be, and whether or not any particular legal doctrines will be found to apply to cybertravel, are questions that merit a thorough analysis. The undeniable value in being able to view the Internet as if one were located in another country, and the legitimate reasons why users want or need to cybertravel warrant the consideration of options for legal cybertravel. This article suggests that cybertravel should be analogized to physical travel, and the benefits that society will enjoy through cybertravel correspond in large measure to the benefits provided by physical travel.\textsuperscript{350} Therefore, cybertravel should enjoy constitutionally protected rights.

Of course, cybertravel is free of the natural barriers that limit physical travel. As a result, a greater number of users can engage in cybertravel than in physical travel, and the volume and quality of reproduction of the content that cybertravelers can obtain will usually be much higher than that of the content that physical travelers may carry back to their country.\textsuperscript{351} This means that content spillover that may be negligible in cases of physical travel can in the case of cybertravel almost instantaneously exceed what anyone might consider reasonable spillover.\textsuperscript{352} For example, while the number of foreign visitors who buy a book in one country and travel home with it may number in the thousands, the number of

\textsuperscript{349} See supra Part Introduction, IV.A.2 (discussing the cases and their potential impact on cybertravel).
\textsuperscript{350} See supra Part IV.B.3 (discussing the arguments for equating cybertravel to physical travel).
\textsuperscript{351} High volume data storage allows for a similar volume of data to be transported physically and with the same potential reproduction quality. However, cybertravel remains a faster and easier mode for transporting data.
\textsuperscript{352} See supra Part IV.C (discussing a reasonable spillover associated with physical travel).
foreign users cybertraveling to access a television show may be in the millions. One problem for cybertravel is that there are no data available to suggest the size of the cybertravel phenomenon, and it is difficult to formulate arguments in response to those who claim that cybertravel is a significant problem unless some data are collected to support a claim that cybertravel, like physical travel, leads to only negligible spillover.

Even if it can be proven that cybertravel does not currently pose any significant threat to right holders, website operators, and countries’ efforts to limit access to certain content, cybertravel technology is rapidly changing and new simplified tools permit more users, even ones with extremely limited technical skills, to cybertravel. More Internet users will also be prompted to cybertravel because of the increased use of geolocation tools by website operators. The legal, technological, and business solutions will need to address the practice of cybertravel and shape an environment in which legal cybertravel—cybertravel for legitimate purposes—will be available.

This article explores one answer to cybertravel—a system of digital passports that would either identify specific users or provide a minimum of information about a user’s location, domicile, or permanent residence. A technological solution supported by an appropriate legal framework and enhanced by sophisticated business solutions could solve the problem of cybertravel and increase the opportunities that the partitioned Internet offers. This system would need to be supported by a strict data protection structure that would impose both legal and technical requirements on Internet actors. Although increased data protection requirements may face strong resistance from some Internet actors today, strict data protection must be integrated into the cyberspace future.