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RACIAL ANXIETIES IN ADOPTION: REFLECTIONS ON
ADOPTIVE COUPLE, WHITE PARENTHOOD, AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO THE ICWA

Addie C. Rolnick & Kim Hai Pearson*

The Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) is under fire from people who argue that it interferes with adoptions and violates the constitution by doing so. The current crop of lawsuits is an outgrowth of a 2012 case in which the Supreme Court heard its second-ever challenge to the law. While the Court sidestepped the most far-reaching anti-ICWA arguments, the majority opinion evidenced a deep skepticism about the law. This skepticism led the Court to narrow the law’s application so that it didn’t apply to the family involved, and it seemed to invite further challenges to the law.

In the case, an unmarried father sought to stop his ex-fiancée from terminating his parental rights and allowing their daughter to be adopted by an educated, middle class, white couple. The father argued that the law applied to his situation because he is an enrolled member of the Cherokee Nation.1 A cursory reading of the law’s text suggests that he is correct.2 If applied, it would have required adherence to stricter procedural requirements than state law before the adoption could be finalized.

Under the ICWA, a parent’s rights cannot be involuntarily terminated in the absence of notice to the parents and the tribe, appointed counsel, a showing that active efforts were made to prevent the breakup of an Indian family, and a finding that continued custody by

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2. The law defines “Indian child” as any person under the age of 18 who is a member of an Indian tribe, or a biological child of a tribal member who is herself eligible for membership. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4). The father is a Cherokee citizen, and his daughter is also eligible for citizenship under Cherokee law. See Bethany R. Berger, In the Name of the Child: Race, Gender, and Economics in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 67 FLA. L. REV. 295, 329 (2015). It defines a parent as “any biological parent or parents of an Indian child,” but does not include an unwed father “where paternity has not been acknowledged or established.” 25 U.S.C. § 1903(9).

No argument was made in this case that the father did not acknowledge paternity. When he found out about the pregnancy, he asked his fiancée to move up the wedding date. After the breakup, he tried to contact her throughout the pregnancy, and he and his family tried to send her gifts and money. He was named in adoption paperwork, and he was asked to sign a form indicating his consent to the adoption before it proceeded. See id. at 301–04.
the parent will harm the child. The father in this case wanted custody of his daughter, and there was no suggestion made at any time that he caused her harm. Application of the ICWA would not have prohibited the adoption outright, but the presence of a stable and loving birth parent who wanted to keep his child would have prevented her adoption under the law. This outcome makes sense. In the absence of harm, prospective adoptive parents are not typically permitted to keep a child, even one they love and have cared for, over the objections of one of her parents. And yet, if the father were not an Indian, state law would have allowed his daughter to be given to another family despite his presence and over his objections. Because the Court determined that the ICWA didn’t apply, this is precisely what happened in the case.

Why didn’t the Court apply the ICWA? One answer is that the Court did not seem to believe or value the fact that the father and daughter are Cherokee Indians. Resisting the idea that their Cherokee status should matter in an adoption decision, it found a way not to apply the law that made it matter. In her article “In the Name of the Child: Race, Gender, and Economics in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl,” Bethany R. Berger deftly deconstructs the arguments, the majority opinion, and the back stories of the attorneys and the Justices to reveal the way that anxieties about race, and adherence to the modern version of colorblindness, led the Court to “do violence” to the law’s text. These racial anxieties ran deep. The very first sentence of Justice Alito’s opinion describes the baby as “1.2% (3/256) Cherokee.” By framing the baby’s connection to the Cherokee Nation only in terms of ancestry, Justice Alito revealed the Court’s fundamental investment in the idea that race (defined by the Court as equivalent to ancestry) is
insignificant to identity. As Justice Roberts asked during oral argument, is it “one drop of blood that triggers all these extraordinary rights?”\textsuperscript{12} The best (and most often given) response to this is that Indianness is not race.\textsuperscript{13} That is, it’s not reducible to a biological classification. Professor Berger makes this point eloquently, pointing out that the ICWA should have applied because of the child’s eligibility for citizenship (and the father’s citizenship) in the Cherokee Nation. Her “quantum of Cherokee blood was irrelevant to her citizenship,”\textsuperscript{14} and so, contrary to the Court’s repeated insistence, her fractional ancestry “was not the reason her father had rights to object to her adoption.”\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{12} Id. at 327. The Court’s skepticism regarding the ICWA is also apparent in the opinion’s suggestion that application of the law would disadvantage Indian children by making [non-Indian] people reluctant to adopt them, 133 S. Ct. at 2564–65; Berger, supra note 2, at 319 (explaining that this assertion is “implausible”) and its reference to the father’s argument as an “ICWA trump card [played] at the eleventh hour,” 133 S. Ct. at 2565. It’s view regarding the insignificance of the father’s Cherokee status is made clear by the opinion’s wholesale dismissal of any aspect of the father’s Cherokee identity outside of ancestry, see Berger, supra note 2, at 332–33 (detailing the father’s family’s political, cultural, and geographic integration into the Cherokee Nation, all ignored by the Court) and in the way the majority opinion fails to engage\textit{Mississippi Band of Choctaw v. Holyfield}, 490 U.S. 30 (1989), the Court’s only ICWA precedent and a case that strongly underscored the importance of the connection between Indian tribes and their children. The Court’s dismissive treatment of the family’s Cherokee status was no doubt fueled by the attitudes of others involved in the case. See, e.g., Brief for Respondent Birth Father, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, No. 12-399, 13 (quoting guardian ad litem’s finding that the advantages of “having Native American heritage ‘include[ed] free lunches and free medical care and that they did have their little get togethers and their little dances’”).

\textsuperscript{13} Berger, supra note 2, at 335. In legal terms, Indianness is a political classification that hinges here on citizenship (or eligibility for citizenship) in a federally recognized tribe, not a racial classification. In our view, it makes no sense to claim, as some do, that Indianness has nothing at all to do with race and racism. It is equally a mistake, however, to suggest that the specter of race renders it less of a political status in the sense that the term is used to denote a particular legal history in which the federal government has treated Indian tribes as separate nations and has assumed unique powers to legislate with respect to tribes and indigenous people. See Addie C. Rolnick, The Promise of Mancari: Indian Political Rights as Racial Remedy, 86 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 958, 1026 (2011).

\textsuperscript{14} Berger, supra note 2, at 329.

\textsuperscript{15} Id. Unlike many other tribes, the Cherokee Nation does not require members to have any specific fraction of ancestry; members must instead demonstrate descent from a person on the historical tribal rolls. Const. of the Cherokee Nation, Art. IV. The fact that the Nation does not rely on “blood quantum,” a concept that has been criticized for injecting racial requirements into tribal citizenship, see, e.g. Kim TallBear, DNA, Blood, and Racializing the Tribe, 18 Wicazo Sa Review 81, 88-93 (2003) (summarizing critiques), provided little comfort the Court. Instead, the Court seemed to view the Nation’s citizenship law as problematic because it extends citizenship to people with an “insignificant” fraction of Cherokee ancestry. For a discussion of the paradox faced by American Indian tribal nations in which they are simultaneously viewed as (illegal) racially exclusive communities and as not being sufficiently Indian, see generally Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Race and American Indian Tribal Nationhood, 2 Wyoming L. Rev. 295, (2011), and Bethany R. Berger, Race, Descent, and Tribal Citizenship, 4 Cal. L. Rev. Cir. 23 (2013).
Indian tribes have a different relationship with the federal government than any other groups, a relationship based largely on treaties and recognition of nationhood. They are recognized as governments and their courts generally exercise jurisdiction over family and child welfare matters involving their children. That is why the baby’s Cherokee-ness mattered in a way that her Hispanic-ness (on her mother’s side) did not.\textsuperscript{16}

While correct, this response has not placated critics. After the decision, the Department of the Interior issued new guidelines in 2015\textsuperscript{17} intended to strengthen the force of the ICWA in state courts. Two new lawsuits were immediately filed challenging the constitutionality of the ICWA and the guidelines.\textsuperscript{18} Where the opinion in Baby Girl raised questions about Indianness, race, and adoption but decided the case on statutory grounds, these lawsuits directly attack the ICWA as an unconstitutional race-based law.\textsuperscript{19}

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\item \textsuperscript{16}See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (prohibiting express consideration of a step-parent’s non-white race as a dispositive factor in a custody dispute between divorced parents). Even though disputes about custody are very different from adoption proceedings, courts’ attitudes about race filter throughout all decisions that involve questions about the best interests of children, including custody, placement, termination, and adoption.
\item \textsuperscript{17}In 2016, after notice and comment, the Department promulgated new regulations to implement the ICWA and issued a revised set of guidelines. See Indian Child Welfare Act Proceedings Final Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 38,778 (June 14, 2016); U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Guidelines for Implementing the Indian Child Welfare Act (Dec. 2016).
\item \textsuperscript{18}A.D. v. Washburn, Case No. 2:15-cv-01259-DKD (D. Ariz., filed Jul. 6, 2015); National Council for Adoption v. Jewell, 156 F. Supp. 3d 727 (E.D. Va. 2015). Prior to publication of this article, the complaint in A.D. v. Washburn was dismissed without prejudice for lack of standing. Order, A.D. v. Washburn, Case No. 2:15-cv-01259-NVW (D. Ariz., Mar. 16, 2017), at *19 (“Any true injury to any child or interested adult can be addressed in the state court proceeding itself, based on actual facts before the court, not on hypothetical concerns. If any Plaintiffs encounter future real harm in their own proceedings, the judge in their own case can discern the rules of decision. They do not have standing to have this Court pre-adjudicate for state court judges how to rule on facts that may arise and that may be governed by statutes or guidelines that this Court may think invalid.”). The plaintiffs in National Council for Adoption challenged the 2015 guidelines on administrative and constitutional grounds. The district court denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the administrative claims, 156 F. Supp. 3d 727 (E.D. Va. 2015), and dismissed the constitutional challenges, Memorandum Opinion and Order, National Council for Adoption v. Jewell, Case 1:15-cv-00675-GBL-MSN (E.D. Va. Dec. 9, 2015), at *10 – *15, finding that the plaintiffs had not identified any authority to support their equal protection claim. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Fourth Circuit later vacated the district court’s judgment because the Bureau withdrew the 2015 guidelines and replaced them with new ones in December 2016. Order, National Council for Adoption v. Jewell, Case No. 16-1110 (1:15-cv-00675-GBL-MSN) (4th Cir., Jan. 31, 2017). See U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Guidelines for Implementing the Indian Child Welfare Act (Dec. 2016), at 6.
\item \textsuperscript{19}In A.D. v. Washburn, the complaint frames the ICWA as unconstitutional because it allegedly distinguishes among groups of children because of race: “Children with Indian ancestry, however, are still living in the era of Plessy v. Ferguson. Alone among American children, their adoption and foster care placements are determined not in accord with their best interests but by their ethnicity, as a result of a well-intentioned but profoundly flawed and unconstitutional
While we agree that the Court improperly inserted a discussion of race into its consideration of an Indian statute, the subsequent suits illustrate the folly in dismissing the Court’s racial anxieties too quickly. In this essay, we seek to engage the Court’s fears directly. For, although Indians are not identically situated to other racial minority groups, the harm that the ICWA was designed to counteract was a racial harm in the sense that the work of severing Indian children from Indian tribal communities was part of an effort to eradicate those communities (defined by law and social practice as racially inferior) by absorbing them via interracial marriage and cultural reprogramming. As Professor Berger explains, the practice of removing Indian children from their communities was directly linked to both the racialization of Indians and colonial efforts to acquire indigenous land and dominate indigenous people. The ICWA is a legal intervention intended to counteract this process. While it may not be a race-based statute, it seems that the Court’s skepticism of such an intervention was race-based, and the new lawsuits seek to mine this skepticism. It is this fear that we hope to interrogate: What is so terrifying about a law that so strongly protects minority families, works to ensure that minority children remain in their communities, and recognizes the rights of communities to control decisions regarding the placement of their children?

I. DISPLACED CHILDREN

The Indian Child Welfare Act was a response to a particularly chilling history in which generations of Native children were removed from their homes and communities. Sometimes removal occurred with the express intent of annihilating tribal culture and literally handing Native children over to white institutions to be remade. Such was the goal of federally run boarding schools in the late 1800s and early 1900s. Native people have stories of children being kidnapped from federal law, the Indian Child Welfare Act.” A.D. v. Washburn Complaint, at 29. The National Council for Adoption complaint states, “ICWA violates the due process and equal protection rights of ‘Indian children’ as well.” National Council for Adoption v Jewell Complaint, at 4. 20. See Berger, supra note 2, at 325–36; see also Alyosha Goldstein, Possessive Investment: Indian Removals and the Affective Entitlements of Whiteness, 66 Am. Q. 1077, 1077 (2014); Aura Bogado, The Cherokee Nation’s Baby Girl Goes on Trial, Colorlines (Apr. 24, 2014), http://www.colorlines.com/articles/cherokee-nations-baby-girl-goes-trial. 21. Berger, supra note 2, at 330 (explaining that the racial boundary between whiteness and Indianness was “deliberately porous” in order to facilitate disappearance, while the racial boundary between whiteness and blackness was “rigidly maintained” in order to increase the supply of slave labor). 22. Id. at 330–31. 23. Id. at 351 (citing COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 1.04 (2012)). 24. See generally K. TSIANINA LOMAWAIMA, THEY CALLED IT PRAIRIE LIGHT: THE STORY OF CHILOCCO INDIAN SCHOOL (1994) (relating Indian experience of assimilation through boarding school program); MARGARET CONNELL SZASZ, EDUCATION AND THE AMERICAN
their families and taken far away to a boarding school, where they were physically and mentally abused. But people also tell stories of parents voluntarily sending their children to school, and of positive educational experiences at some of the schools. Like anything else, it is a complicated history that is not easily cabined in a voluntary versus forced dichotomy.

This express assimilation campaign was eventually rejected, but Indian children continued to be removed from tribal communities via state child welfare workers, foster care, and adoption. Although removal was no longer animated by a malicious intent to annihilate Indian culture, it was premised on the assumption that Indian families and, more pointedly, Indian communities were dysfunctional and that leaving children in the custody of their parents or even their extended families and communities would work a harm so severe that child welfare intervention was needed. The bar for showing that removal was necessary was quite low. Children were removed based on vague


26. See generally, e.g., LOUISE UDALL, ME AND MINE: THE LIFE STORY OF HELEN SEKAQUAPTEWA (1969); POLINGAYSI QOYAWAYMA AND VADA F. CARLSON, NO TURNING BACK: A HOPI INDIAN WOMAN’S STRUGGLE TO LIVE IN TWO WORLDS (1977); see also LOMAWAIMA, supra note 20 (recounting stories of positive experiences despite repressive institutional practices at Chilocco in the 1920s and 1930s); Native Americans File Lawsuit Against Boarding School Abuses, supra note 21 (quoting one attendee from the 1940s who “value[d] the religious training I got there as well as the academics”).


28. Brian D. Gallagher, Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: The Congressional Foray into the Adoption Process, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 81, 85 (1994) (“Congress was especially critical of the general standards employed by the child welfare system in determining the necessity of intervention. One survey cited found that ninety-nine percent of the cases involving the removal of Indian children from their families were predicated “on such vague grounds as ‘neglect’ or ‘social deprivation’ and on allegations of the emotional damage the children were subjected to
allegations of neglect or deprivation with very little except for misunderstandings of tribal cultures, devaluation of extended family structures, and racist assumptions about Indian people to back them up.  

Indian children are not the only children who have been involuntarily removed from their parents and communities at disproportionately high rates, nor the only population subjected to wholesale transfer out of their communities and into “good” white homes. Although various minority groups have experienced the removal and/or placement of their children in ways unique to each group and historical moment, there are strong thematic ties in the discourse surrounding childhood displacement that bear exploring. African American and Latino children, especially poor children, are removed from their homes and placed in foster care at higher rates than other children.  

Analyzing the statistics in conjunction with evidence of case-

by living with their parents.” Congress was altogether dismayed at the lack of understanding non-Indian child welfare workers had of Indian family society.”). Systematic removal of Indian children is not only a relic of the past; South Dakota child welfare officials were recently found to have adopted procedures facilitating easy removal of Indian children from their homes, violating the ICWA and denying Indian parents their rights to due process prior to removal. See Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Van Hunnik, 100 F. Supp. 3d 749, 773 (D.S.D. 2015) (granting partial summary judgment); 2016 WL 697117 (D.S.D. Jan. 19, 2017) (denying reconsideration request in substantial part).

29. Gallagher, supra note 24, at n.27, citing H.R.REP. No. 1386, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., at 10 (1978). (“Indian communities are often shocked to learn that parents they regard as excellent caregivers have been judged unfit by non-Indian social workers . . . . For example, the dynamics of Indian extended families are largely misunderstood. An Indian child may have scores of, perhaps more than a hundred, relatives who are counted as close, responsible members of the family. Many social workers, untutored in the ways of Indian family life or assuming them to be socially irresponsible, consider leaving the child with persons outside the nuclear family as neglect and thus as grounds for terminating parental rights. Because in some communities the social workers have, in a sense, become a part of the extended family, parents will sometimes turn to the welfare department for temporary care of their children, failing to realize that their action is perceived quite differently by non-Indians.”); see also Margaret Howard, Transracial Adoption: Analysis of the Best Interests Standard, 59 Notre Dame L. Rev. 503, 520 (1984) (describing the role of biases and misunderstandings in facilitating removal of Indian children).

by-case mishandling and mistreatment by child welfare agencies, Dorothy Roberts argues, would lead a person to “conclude that [child welfare] is an institution designed to monitor, regulate, and punish poor families of color.”

A generation of adoptees from Korea and China are coming of age in their adoptive homes, most of them with white families and most living in the United States. A younger set of children, those who lived through the 2012 Haiti earthquake, may have a similar experience in twenty years. Like some of the Indian children sent to boarding schools, some of these children were “voluntarily” placed—some the children of single mothers with few options, and others the children of families facing such a lack of resources that they believed their children would be better off raised by strangers in another country.

Unlike Korean and Chinese adoptees, and perhaps even more than American Indian children, African American children are not transferred into white families so much as they languish in the purgatory of foster care because they are viewed as the least desirable in the racial


32. According to the Korean Ministry of Health and Welfare by 2002, an estimated 200,000 Korean children had been placed internationally, most to the U.S. The Evan B. Donaldson Adoption Institute estimates that China has placed 70,000 children in international adoptions.

33. Ginger Thompson, After Haiti Quake, the Chaos of U.S. Adoptions, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/04/world/americas/04adoption.html. Thompson’s article describes the issues raised by post-earthquake adoptions out of Haiti to the U.S., citing concerns raised by child protection advocates. “[T]hose ends [placing them in middle class U.S. homes] do not justify the means. Rushing children out of familiar environments in a crisis can worsen their trauma… Expediting adoptions in countries like Haiti – where it is not uncommon for people to turn children over to orphanages for money – violates children’s rights and leaves them at risk of trafficking.” In contrast, adoption advocates expressed concern about temporarily housing children in-country, arguing that “attempts to locate the children’s biological relatives [would] deny tens of thousands of needy Haitian orphans the opportunity to be placed in loving homes.” Id. See also Kathryn Joyce, The Child Catchers: Rescue, Trafficking, and the New Gospel of Adoption (2013), at 3-5 (detailing the media framing of Haiti as “a sort of animal kingdom from which children must be rescued, lest . . . ‘they won’t even grow up to be human’”). Joyce’s account of the post-disaster Haitian adoptions reveals that the efforts to remove children by foreign adoption agencies and Haitian orphanages, citing the children’s best interests, was occurring at the same time U.S. government officials made it clear that adult Haitian refugees were unwelcome in the United States.

34. Berger, supra note 2 at 332 (“adoption of Indian children into non-Indian homes has a particularly honored and accepted place in American culture, and the notion of easy and beneficial assimilation of Indian children into white culture helps fuel the desirability of Indian children as adoptees”). While Professor Berger asserts that Indian children are treated just like white children in terms of racial desirability in adoptions, id. at 322, the reality is likely more complicated. As the foster care data in footnote 35, infra, suggests, Native American children are over-represented in foster care.
hierarchy of adoption. As Roberts explains, “[m]ost white children who enter the system are permitted to stay with their families, avoiding the emotional damage and physical risks of foster care placement, while most black children are taken away from theirs. And once removed from their homes, black children remain in foster care longer, are moved more often, receive fewer services, and are less likely to be either returned home or adopted than any other children.”

II. RACE IN FAMILY LAW

Race is uniquely devalued in family law proceedings, especially adoptions. While many other aspects of a child’s identity development may be important factors in whether the law is willing to intervene in parenting decisions, custody, or placement, race is a third rail. As a comparison, courts attend to a child’s religious identity, usually by considering the parents’ religious beliefs and traditions, even if such

35. Mariagiovanna Baccara & Allan Collard-Wexler et al., Gender and Racial Biases: Evidence from Child Adoption, CESifo, Working Paper No. 2921 (2010) (showing that the group which was least preferred by prospective adoptive parents was African American boys); United States Gov’t Dep’t of Health and Human Services, Recent Demographic Trends in Foster Care, Data Brief 2013-1 (September 2013) (showing that despite a marked decline of 47% of African American children in foster care since 2002, they still represent more than one quarter of all children in foster care; after 2009, Native American children have the highest rates of representation in foster care). (According the the same report, between 2002 and 2012, all groups experienced a decrease in the number of children placed in foster care, but children who identified as two or more races experienced an increase. We note that, although the report shows a net decrease in the number of foster children overall, this pattern also likely reflects a change in demographic categories used to count children in the system.) Adoptive parents’ racial preferences drive the adoption market domestically and internationally. See Kim H. Pearson, Displaced Mothers, Absent and Unnatural Fathers: LGBT Transracial Adoption, 19 Mich. J. Gender & L. 149, 165–66 (2012) (describing the shift away from domestic foster care adoptions and towards international adoption because of shortages of white adoptive children, making children believed to be capable of passing as white preferable).


attentiveness may violate one of the parent’s constitutional rights.\textsuperscript{39} Another point of comparison is sexual orientation; in some states parents are prohibited from forcing their gay children to attend conversion therapy.\textsuperscript{40} Courts and legislatures make the connection between LGBT children’s poor health outcomes, including high depression, substance abuse, and suicide rates and attempts to change their sexual identity development.\textsuperscript{41} The law is willing to regulate parenting—normally considered a private sphere—to protect the child from the harm that will come from seeking to change that child’s sexual identity. In contrast, the law does not similarly attend to children’s racial identity development, assuming that a child’s racial identity is malleable, fungible, and of less significance to a child’s innate sense of self than sexual orientation.\textsuperscript{42} This is the case despite having data that suggest some transracially adopted children have negative outcomes linked to poor racial identity development and severed connections to their communities.\textsuperscript{43}

What would it look like for the law to value and protect a child’s racial identity? The National Association of Black Social Workers (NABSW) proposed legislation in the late 1980s and early 1990s modeled on the ICWA that would have required states to give “due consideration” to a child’s race and established a placement preference first for a blood relative and, if that were not available, for a same-race


\textsuperscript{40} California passed SB 1172 in 2012 and Governor Christie signed A-3371, New Jersey’s gay conversion therapy ban, into law in 2013.


family. The proposed law would not have prohibited transracial adoption; it would have required state agencies to consider race and, like the ICWA, would have required them to follow the established placement preferences absent good cause to the contrary. By establishing a legal preference for placement of minority children in same-race adoptive homes, the law would have forced the child welfare system to acknowledge and attend to the importance of racial identity development in children, and it would have attached legal value to African American and other minority families and communities, the historical devaluation of which has led to the breakup of many families. The law never passed at the federal level, although at least one state adopted similar legislation.

We do not intend here to advocate for passage of the NABSW bill. The proposed legislation had many flaws, and we do not necessarily...
believe that a bill modeled on the ICWA is workable or desirable where the child’s community does not coincide with a government entity. \footnote{48} We want to focus instead on the response: Congress passed two separate laws specifically prohibiting states from weighing race heavily in placement and adoption decisions. The Multi-Ethnic Placement Act \footnote{49} prohibits states from denying a person the right to become a foster or adoptive parent “solely on the basis of the race” of the child involved and from “delay[ing] or deny[ing] placement” of any child “solely on the basis of race.” Although it permits states to “consider [a child’s] cultural, ethnic, or racial background,” race is singled out as a factor that cannot be important enough to base a decision on. \footnote{50} The Interethnic Placement Amendments strengthened the MEPA’s prohibitions by imposing penalties for violating it. \footnote{51}

By prohibiting placement decisions based on race, the MEPA stops state child welfare agencies from assigning legal value to race. To the extent that race can be considered, it is viewed as only an individualized aspect of personality development, an idea that has been conceived thinly, even stereotypically, by courts that do address it. \footnote{52} Like in the case law governing the use of race in higher education admission standards, the MEPA ensures that race can only be considered as a personal quality and, even then, as one of many factors. \footnote{53} At the same

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \footnote{48} Inter-country adoptions, such the adoption of Haitian children by U.S. families, might present a better parallel to American Indian children because the Haitian government has a role in decisions regarding removal and placement of Haitian children. Similarly, the Hague Convention of 29 May 1993 on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption (Hague Adoption Convention) is a system of central government authorities complying with agreed upon guidelines in the protection of children who are removed from home countries and placed in Convention-participating countries. The Convention, like the ICWA, does not ban adoption; instead, it creates child-centric guidelines as procedural protections to value the child’s interests in her connection to her community.
\item \footnote{49} Pub. L. No. 103-382 (1994).
\item \footnote{50} Pub. L. No. 104-188 (1996). The IEP amendments also clarified that the MEPA did not affect the ICWA in any way.
\item \footnote{51} See sources cited, supra note 33.
\item \footnote{52} See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329, 337 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
time, it prohibits state actors from establishing a legal regime that makes it more difficult to break up minority families and, if families are disrupted, re-directs minority children back into their families and communities wherever possible. In other words, the MEPA prevents states from making a structural intervention to correct for the historical devaluation of minority families and communities that led directly to the transfer of so many children out of them. It also forecloses consideration of the way that white race has always operated as a clear plus factor in determining which families were considered the most ideal adoptive placements and how proximity to whiteness has always defined a child’s desirability in the marketplace of adoption. The problem is not special consideration of race; it is that race is the only thing that can’t be accorded primary importance, despite its central role in the history of child welfare and adoption.

The ICWA is an exception to this rule in that it is a legislative regime that changes the procedures governing the breakup of Indian families and the removal of Indian children from Indian communities. It forces state courts to acknowledge a child’s Indianness, putting the responsibility on the child welfare system to determine whether someone is an “Indian child” and to contact the child’s tribe. It establishes a preference for tribal control over the proceedings by requiring states to transfer jurisdiction to the tribal court unless the tribe

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54. This is also consistent with the cases holding that the goal of undoing generalized past racism is not a sufficiently compelling interest to permit use of racial classifications in the present. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995); id. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493–94 (1989) (plurality opinion); id. at 505–06 (opinion of the Court); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289–90, 307–10 (1978).

55. The ICWA can be justified even under the Court’s narrow approach to racial remedies under several theories. The primary approach is that Indian classifications are political ones that depend on a person’s relationship to a recognized tribe, so Indian classifications are not governed by the law on racial classifications. Even acknowledging that Indian legal status often overlaps with Indian racial status, tribes have clear membership rules, recognized leadership, and federally-acknowledged legal institutions that make them uniquely able to exercise authority over removal and adoption proceedings. Furthermore, even if the Court were to apply strict scrutiny to Indian classifications, the harm that the ICWA was meant to counteract was so direct, specific, and well documented that a racial classification could permissibly be employed to remedy it. Rolnick, supra note 12, at 995–96 (explaining different legal theories for upholding Indian legislation); Carole E. Goldberg, What’s Race Got to Do With It?: The Story of Morton v. Mancari, in Race Law Stories 237, 238, 257 (Rachel F. Moran & Devon Wayne Carbado, eds., 2008); Carole Goldberg, American Indians and “Preferential” Treatment, 49 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 943, 955–58 (2002); see also Matthew L.M. Fletcher, ICWA and the Commerce Clause, The Indian Child Welfare Act at 30: Facing the Future 29 (2009) (arguing that the Indian Commerce Clause provides a constitutional basis for the ICWA).

does not or cannot accept it.\textsuperscript{57} When the case remains in state court, it forces the actors (from caseworkers to judges) to carefully justify removal and placement outside the child’s community by adding heightened requirements for removal and termination\textsuperscript{58} and establishing a hierarchy of placement preferences.\textsuperscript{59} Most importantly, the ICWA recognizes that the relationship between tribe and child is not simply one of personal identity or self-esteem, but is in fact the key to the continued existence of the tribe, which is in turn a fundamental aspect of the child’s “best interests.”\textsuperscript{60}

It bears reiterating that the ICWA’s intervention is structural,\textsuperscript{61} not substantive. It doesn’t require a particular outcome,\textsuperscript{62} and none of its barriers are absolute. A child can still be removed, and a parent’s rights terminated, if there is a showing that the child faces serious harm.\textsuperscript{63} A court can depart from the placement preference for good cause.\textsuperscript{64} Instead, it tilts the process in favor of keeping the child in the tribal community in order to counteract the strong historical advantage accorded to white parents that resulted in contests for children that Indian parents (and tribes) often lost. Indeed, many mainstream child welfare organizations have touted the ICWA as the “gold standard” for child welfare.\textsuperscript{65} It prevents a court from doing precisely what courts did

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{57}Id. at § 1911 (b).
\item \textsuperscript{58}Id. at §§ 1912, 1913.
\item \textsuperscript{59}Id. at § 1915 (preference for placement with members of the child’s family, members of the child’s tribe, and other Indian families, in that order).
\item \textsuperscript{60}Id. at § 1901(c). The Court’s only prior ICWA decision, Holyfield, underscored this aspect of the law by holding that the tribe’s interest (and the child’s future interest in its connection to the tribe) could outweigh an Indian parent’s fully informed attempt to circumvent its provisions. The Adoptive Couple opinion ignores this aspect of the law, characterizing it as nothing more than a law protecting the individual interests of Indian parents.
\item \textsuperscript{61}Rolnick, supra note 20, at 1042–43 (describing the ICWA as a structural intervention that “explicitly acknowledges the link between the individualized effects of Indian racialization and the political rights of tribal governments”); Briggs, supra note 25 (“ICWA does not determine who gets a child. It determines jurisdiction — who gets to decide who gets a child… ICWA does not provide special ‘racial entitlements’; it treats (some) American Indians as having a distinct political status conferred by treaty rights. . . . [A]ll ICWA does is give birth parents rights that many think they should have regardless . . .”)
\item \textsuperscript{62}In Holyfield, the Court affirmed exclusive tribal court jurisdiction over a voluntary adoption of children domiciled on the reservation in compliance with the Act, ordering that the case be transferred to tribal court despite the children’s three-year placement with the prospective adoptive parents. After review of available options, the tribal court placed the children back in the same non-Indian adoptive home that had been chosen by the birth parents who had originally tried to avoid the tribe’s jurisdiction, ordering the adoptive mother to maintain contact with the children’s extended family and tribe. Maldonado, supra note 36, at 17.
\item \textsuperscript{63}25 U.S.C. § 1912(e)-(f).
\item \textsuperscript{64}25 U.S.C. § 1915(a)-(b). A child’s tribe can also establish a different order or preference. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(c).
\item \textsuperscript{65}See National Indian Child Welfare Association, Letter to Elizabeth Appel, U.S. Dept. of the Interior,

\textit{available at}
for decades: removing a child from her family and community, placing her with a white family in another state just because that new family seems better, and offering only a cursory justification for the decision.

III. WHITENESS AND IDEAL PARENTHOOD

Within a year of the Court’s decision in Adoptive Couple, an entirely different kind of case involving parents and children thrust questions about race and family into the public eye. Jennifer Cramblett, one half of a white lesbian couple living in a small town in Ohio, sued Midwest Sperm Bank for mistakenly delivering sperm from an African American donor resulting in a biracial child. The case was a breach of contract and wrongful birth action, and it made out a claim for damages based not upon the fact that Cramblett and her partner do not love their daughter (they do), but upon the loss suffered by a family who expects to be all white and then loses that status. In her complaint, Cramblett alleged that she “must relocate to a racially diverse community with good schools.” Her complaint implied that there is a legal harm that should be remedied for her inability to remain near her “all-white community [and] all-white, and often unconsciously insensitive family” because of her daughter’s “irrepressible” differences. In other words, the complaint explained that being part of her white community has legal value and that having to move to a more “diverse” area would entail a quantifiable cost. Some of this cost is material: Cramblett and her partner moved to the all-white town because its schools are better, and they must now send their daughter to potentially worse schools because they understand that being the only African American child at this “good” school will harm her even more. White communities—their schools, their associations, their distance from non-white


68. Complaint for Wrongful Birth, at 7.

69. Id. at 6–7.
communities—are valuable in this equation. The unspoken implication that follows is that non-white communities are not.

These cases may seem to have little in common on the surface: one is an adoption case originating with a separated, never-married heterosexual couple and an Indian child, while the other is a case arising out of an intact lesbian couple’s efforts to start a family using artificial reproductive technologies, and a case that does not involve Indian children at all. Both cases, however, involve white couples seeking to parent through non-traditional methods, and both involve non-white children. In each case, a white, upper-middle class, educated couple appears to have done everything right in their quest to start a family, including making a substantial investment of time and money. In our view, access to this particular vision of voluntary, resource-intensive family formation provides significant advantages to parents.

In each case, the child’s race is problematized. The difference lies in the proposed solution: for the Capobiancos, the preferred solution is to ignore differences that they view as only skin-deep, absorb her fully into their home, and erase any aspect of her difference. Brown’s invocation of the ICWA and the legal salience of the baby’s Cherokee identity made this difficult. In Cramblett, on the other hand, the parents’ preferred solution was to avoid the difficult identity and community issues faced by inter-racially adopted and racially mixed children by choosing a white donor, a solution foreclosed by the bank’s mistake.

The Cramblett complaint seeks to quantify the value of voluntary, upper-middle class, white family formation, but one need not even use such a far-flung set of facts to see how such families are valued. It is readily apparent in the rich history of removing Korean, Chinese, American Indian, Haitian, Latino and African American children from their homes and placing them in (or leaving them in search of) good white homes. It is also apparent in the way the potential adoptive parents were described in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl. Media accounts describe them as “ideal” parents, emphasizing their educational pedigree and economic status.70 The Court’s opinion

70. Addie Rolnick and Kim Pearson, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl Blog Series, PRAWFSBLAWG, http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2013/07/adoptive-couple-v-baby-girl-4-of-4-whiteness-and-ideal-parenthood.html; see Andrew Knapp, Veronica’s Adoptive Parents Frustrated After Winning Legal Fights, Not Seeing Results, POST AND COURIER (Aug. 8, 2013) (human interest story featuring the adoptive couple’s home and family life); Broken Home: The Save Veronica Story, CHARLESTON CITY PAPER (Sept. 26, 2012) http://www.charlestoncitypaper.com/charleston/broken-home/Content?oid=4185523 (“People try to portray us as these rich people, but I was working at an auto body shop at the time,’ says Matt, who now works for Boeing. Before this custody case, the couple poured their income into seven unsuccessful in vitro fertilization attempts and then the legal and travel expenses of finding Veronica’s birth mother, a Mexican woman living in Oklahoma. ‘We scraped our money to do the adoption in the first place,’ Melanie says. ‘We saved and borrowed for that.’”); Robert Barnes, Baby Veronica’s Loved Ones Wait for the Supreme Court to Weigh In,
emphasizes how they supported mother and baby “emotionally and financially” during the pregnancy and how the adoptive father “even cut the umbilical cord.”

The tenor of both the opinion and most of the media coverage was one of sympathy for a family who had done everything right and yet was facing the loss of a child they loved. This narrative ignores the preceding loss faced by the father, the tribe, and the baby at the moment she was placed for adoption. It ignores the fact that children have attachments to their families and communities and in this sense are not free for the taking, no matter how deserving the adoptive family.

In the contest over who could provide a better home for the baby, the adoptive couple had a built in advantage because they were white, educated, upper class, and Christian. Historically, this advantage has been strong enough to overcome even the presumption in favor of biological parents rights to raise their children. Instead of

71 133 S. Ct. at 2558.

72 The failure of imagination in modern family law when it comes to valuing a birth parent’s rights and a child’s community is stunning, particularly when compared to historic family law decisions such as Spence-Chapin Adoption Service v. Polk, 29 N.Y.2d 196, 198 (1971), which articulated the primacy of a birth parent’s rights as compared to would-be adoptive parents: “A baby born out-of-wedlock, even of a troubled mother, is not no-one's child. In the inimitable vernacular, it is not 'up for grabs.' It is not a waif claimable by the first finder, however highly qualified.” Accord 133 S. Ct. 2572 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“It has been the constant practice of the common law to respect the entitlement of those who bring a child into the world to raise that child. We do not inquire whether leaving a child with his parents is “in the best interest of the child.” It sometimes is not; he would be better off raised by someone else. But parents have their rights, no less than children do.”).

73 Kevin Maillard, A Father’s Struggle to Stop His Daughter’s Adoption, The Atlantic, July 7,
counteracting this imbalance, South Carolina\textsuperscript{74} state law shored up the adoptive parents’ advantage (as state child welfare laws have historically done) by according the biological father the same status as another prospective adoptive parent, erasing the existence of a birth parent whose rights could possibly trump even the most ideal adoptive home. ICWA’s enhanced procedural protections would have tipped the scales back toward balance, but the Court—hiding behind its fear of making race significant—neutralized its force by holding that it did not apply to the father’s situation.

In a case with many disturbing angles, this easy erasure of a stable, loving birth parent may be the most frightening. The record is rife with facts showing at best ineptitude and at worst deliberate efforts to circumvent the law.\textsuperscript{75} As a result, by the time the case reached the courts, the baby was two years old and had lived her whole life with her adoptive parents. Her initial placement with the adoptive parents was characterized as completely voluntary (on the part of the mother), and the father’s claim to his own child appeared as an “eleventh hour” disruption.\textsuperscript{76} In holding that the ICWA’s protections against involuntary termination did not apply to a father who had never had custody, the Court drew a line between the involuntary removal of Indian children from their families, which the law was designed to stem, and an adoption “voluntarily and lawfully initiated by a non-Indian parent with sole custodial rights.” \textsuperscript{77} This dichotomy between voluntary and

\textsuperscript{74} As Professor Maillard points out, South Carolina already had a reputation for laws favoring adoptive parents. “In the 1980s and 1990s, South Carolina gained a reputation as an ‘adoption mecca’ for wealthy out-of-state couples seeking children. The lack of protective laws drew prospective parents who sought quick, easy, and uncontested adoptions. An infamous March 1984 Time magazine article featured a ‘loving, financially secure college-educated couple’ that placed a personals ad in a local paper for a ‘white newborn,’ promising vacations and expenses paid for an expectant mother who wanted to ‘LIVE LIKE A QUEEN.’ The same month that the \textit{Time} article was published, \textit{The New York Times} found that doctors and lawyers privately arranged many adoptions, with little oversight from state agencies. Judges often approved adoptions with few questions under the assumption that children fared better in adoptive homes. At the time, no state law prohibited the open sale of children.” Maillard, supra at note 75.

\textsuperscript{75} Adoption agency notes show that the mother at first refused to name the father because she thought his Cherokee enrollment would complicate the adoption. When the agency finally provided notice to the tribe, his name and identifying information were misstated in the letter, leading the Nation to respond that they could find no enrollment records. The mother refused contact with the father and his family during the pregnancy and maintained strict secrecy during the birth itself. The father was not notified of the planned adoption until several months after the baby had been placed with the adoptive family and the adoption petition had been filed. Berger, supra note 2, at 302–06.

\textsuperscript{76} 133 S. Ct. at 2565.

\textsuperscript{77} Id. at 2562.
involuntary child welfare proceedings is, of course, too simplistic.  

It misses the way that racial hierarchies continue to structure ideas about who deserves children, influencing even decisions that are nominally voluntary, such as private adoptions.

Policies shaped by values such as stability and permanency in a loving home are important, but they should not overshadow the value a child derives from knowing that her birth relatives want her and that she is a member of a community. Insofar as idealized homes and a strong emphasis on stability is cover for moving children of color or low income status children to richer, better educated white families simply because prospective parental desires are overvalued, adoption can involve a problematic leveraging of resources and cultural capital to attain other people’s children.

EPILOGUE

In spite of the unique legal status of tribal communities and the presence of a law mandating recognition of that status in child welfare and adoption context, some members the Court in *Adoptive Couple* seemed ready to dismantle, or at least significantly limit the reach of, the ICWA because of a concern that it places too much emphasis on a child’s ancestry. As Professor Berger’s analysis of the case demonstrates, missing or failing to talk about the role of race in adoption is not enough to assuage the Court’s fears, and it leaves the field open to opponents of tribal sovereignty.

In this sense, the recent lawsuits challenging the ICWA are natural heirs to *Adoptive Couple*. The first is an action on behalf of two adoption organizations, one child in foster care, and the birth parents

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78. Professor Berger describes the “shift toward easy adoption and away from rights of biological parents,” including both mothers and fathers, that has characterized state child welfare law. Berger, *supra* note 2, at 343–50.

79. The Court characterized the ICWA as being concerned only with the involuntary breakup of intact Indian families via child welfare intervention, 133 S. Ct. at 2561, but many pre-ICWA adoptions were also voluntary. See Brief of Adult Pre-ICWA Adoptees, *supra* note 43 at 5–8, 14–18.

80. See 133 S. Ct. at 2584 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The majority's repeated, analytically unnecessary references to the fact that Baby Girl is 3/256 Cherokee by ancestry do nothing to elucidate its intimation that the statute may violate the Equal Protection Clause as applied here.”).

81. The National Council for Adoption is an adoption advocacy organization. Among the “value statements” listed on the NCFA’s website are the belief that “[e]thnic and cultural identity, while extremely important considerations, should not prevent a child from finding a permanent, nurturing family through adoption” and the belief that “[c]ultural and racial identity and birth history are important to adopted individuals, and every effort should be made to respect and preserve this information so the adopted individual may retain his or her history and heritage.” National Council for Adoption, Mission, available at [https://adoptioncouncil.org/who-we-](https://adoptioncouncil.org/who-we-)
of another child.\textsuperscript{82} One of the attorneys listed on the complaint is Lori Alvino McGill, who represented Maldonado in the \textit{Baby Girl} case.\textsuperscript{83} The second suit is a class action organized by the Goldwater Institute on behalf of two named Indian children in foster care in Arizona,\textsuperscript{84} their prospective non-Indian adoptive parents, and “all off-reservation children with Indian ancestry in the State of Arizona.”\textsuperscript{85} Three other

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item McGill was also involved in a 2013 challenge to the constitutionality of the ICWA filed on behalf of Christina Maldonado, another non-Indian birth mother of a Cherokee child, and unnamed “unwed non-Indian birth mothers” of Indian children. Maldonado v. Holder, Case No. 2:13-cv-02042-DCN (D.S.C., filed July 24, 2013). See Michael Overall, New Lawsuit Challenges Adoptions Under the Indian Child Welfare Act, Tulsa World (Jul. 26, 2013). That lawsuit was voluntarily dismissed in 2014 after Veronica was placed with the Capobiancos and another plaintiff “‘decided to keep her baby rather than allow the tribe to choose who would raise her child.’” Samantha Vicent, Baby Veronica’s Birth Mother Dropping Related Lawsuit Against Cherokees, U.S., Tulsa World (April 8, 2014) (quoting McGill). McGill also represented the foster parents in a California case in which the court ordered a Choctaw foster child removed from her non-Indian foster placement, where she had been temporarily placed with the consent of the tribe to facilitate reunification efforts, and placed with (non-Indian) relatives in compliance with the ICWA. After unsuccessfully arguing in the lower courts that \textit{Adoptive Couple} made the law inapplicable to the child’s situation, In re Alexandria P., 228 Cal. App. 4th 1322, 1337 (2014), the foster parents sought U.S. Supreme Court review of whether the ICWA applies at all a child who was not being removed from an “existing Indian family.” R.P. and S.P. v. California Dep’t of Children and Family Servs., 137 S. Ct. 713 (2017) (denying request for certiorari). See Suzette Brewer, Supreme Court Denies Hearing in Lexi Case, Indian Country Media Network (Jan. 11, 2017); Suzette Brewer, ICWA: Lexi to Remain with Utah Family in Appeals Court Ruling, Indian Country Media Network (Jul. 9, 2016) (describing California litigation); Richard Prince, “Everything Was Wrong” in Coverage of Indian Child Custody Case, Journal-isms (Mar. 26, 2016), available at \texttt{http://journalisms.com/2016/03/everything-wrong-in-coverage-of-indian-child-custody-case/} (describing inaccurate media coverage that strongly sympathized with the foster parents).
\item The named children are both younger than five years old. Although seeking certification on behalf of all Indian children in the Arizona child welfare system, the complaint specifically alleges that the named children are each “more than 50%” non-Indian blood.
\item Goldwater Institute has developed a website to support the lawsuit, which refers to the ICWA as “a well-intentioned but a profoundly flawed and unconstitutional federal law” and includes several policy reports supporting its campaign against the law. Goldwater Institute, A.D. v. Washburn: Equal Protection for Indian Children, available at
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lawsuits challenge the constitutionality of various state laws that parallel the ICWA: two suits by biological parents of Indian children who want to place their children with non-Indian parents through private adoption agencies[^86] and a third suit by non-Indian foster parents seeking to adopt Indian foster children.[^87]

The new lawsuits[^88] lay bare the parallels between efforts to pass the MEPA and the IEP and efforts to overturn the ICWA. The lawsuits characterize ICWA and related state laws as impeding (white) parents’ access to Native children in the same way that informal race matching policies did before MEPA and the IEP tilted the scales in favor of parental access and reintroduced a language of neutrality that prevented full consideration of children’s best interests. ICWA’s opponents see it as another instance of race matching that must be defeated. At least one court has correctly dismissed this argument, pointing out that the ICWA applies based on a child’s citizenship status, not her biological ties, but the lawsuits are ongoing.

The law is clearly constitutional, but sound legal arguments have not dissuaded critics’ racial anxieties. In *Adoptive Couple*, the Court left a crack of doubt, and scores of litigants have stepped in to pry the crack...
In order to monitor and coordinate responses to the onslaught of cases, several Native rights and child welfare organizations have formed a coalition called the ICWA Defense Project. See Kathryn E. Fort, ICWA Appellate Project and the ICWA Defense Project, Turtle Talk, available at https://turtletalk.wordpress.com/fort/icwa/.

89 In order to monitor and coordinate responses to the onslaught of cases, several Native rights and child welfare organizations have formed a coalition called the ICWA Defense Project. See Kathryn E. Fort, ICWA Appellate Project and the ICWA Defense Project, Turtle Talk, available at https://turtletalk.wordpress.com/fort/icwa/.

Laws that protect Native children are distinguishable from proposed laws to protect other children of color. But, because both challenge the baseline assumptions about ideal parenthood and access to children that have shaped adoption policy, resistance to ICWA is driven by the same investments that supported enactment of MEPA and IEP.