THE EFFECTS OF THE HYPER-GLOBALIZATION OF LEGALIZED SPORTS BETTING ON MATCH-FIXING AND COMPETITION MANIPULATION IN THE OLYMPICS

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Abstract

The Supreme Court’s decision to strike down the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA) in Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) opened the floodgates for states to permit sports betting. With the expansion of online sportsbooks, individuals can place bets on virtually any sporting event from their smartphone. The legalization of online sports betting is quickly expanding worldwide and has created a multi-billion-dollar industry. The globalization of legal sports betting and lack of uniform regulations poses a threat to the Olympic Games by providing additional incentives for athletes, coaches, and officials to participate in match-fixing and competition manipulation. This Note explores the inevitable consequences of legalized gambling on the integrity of the Olympic Games without effective global regulations. Part I briefly recounts the mythological roots of betting and competition manipulation in ancient Greece. Part II explores the history of match-fixing and competition manipulation in modern-day Olympics and the resulting discipline issued by the International Olympic Committee (IOC). Part III provides insight into past and current measures taken by the IOC, national entities, and sports organizations to impede betting-related cheating. Part IV discusses the primary challenges of enacting and enforcing sports betting laws on a global scale. Part V sets forth possible solutions for circumventing competition manipulation and describes existing, international frameworks by which a potential global agency can successfully implement betting-related, match-fixing regulations. Finally, Part VI concludes by acknowledging that sweeping, international recognition that unregulated betting threatens the integrity of sport is a necessary first step in addressing competition manipulation.

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I. INTRODUCTION: A MYTHOLOGICAL TIE TO GAMBLING

Although betting is often believed to be an inevitable result of sports competition, it is more likely that gambling predates competitive athletic events. According to Greek mythology, Zeus, Hades, and Poseidon rolled the dice to divide the universe among themselves. But even the most powerful gods were not immune to the high-stake consequences of gambling with Zeus receiving dominion over the Heavens, while Hades, having rolled the worst numbers, would spend an eternity guiding lost souls in the underworld. Eons later, the first Olympic Games was held in the Grecian Peloponnese to honor Zeus for defeating his tyrannical father, Cronus. With the purpose of celebrating perhaps the highest stakes gambler in history, it is no surprise that sports betting became inextricably tied to the Olympic Games.

Ancient Greek artifacts reveal that wagering bets on the success or downfall of Olympic athletes was commonplace. It is easy to understand the allure of betting on the Games as prevailing competitors in the ancient Olympics would receive unimaginable wealth and fame. Not to mention, being an Olympic athlete in Ancient Greece was much more dangerous than being an Olympic athlete today. Indeed, it was not uncommon for athletes to perish while competing in the Games, as surrendering to a competitor was often considered worse than death itself. With human lives and untold riches on the line, the Olympics became a market for high stakes gambling. It did not take long for gamblers to begin fixing the outcomes of competitions in an attempt to make a substantial profit on a winning wager.

Historical records also show that athletes were regularly offered bribes to engage in acts of match-fixing or competition manipulation. Athletes would receive a portion of the winner’s rewards in exchange for purposefully losing to...
a pre-selected competitor. Eupolus, a boxer from Thessaly, did exactly this in 388 BCE when he bribed three athletes to intentionally lose against him in their Olympic matches. The eventual uncovering of this match-fixing scandal demonstrates the Games’ history of inflicting dishonor and shame onto those found guilty of competition manipulation. As punishment, the four boxers were retroactively disqualified from the Games, and each was required to pay hefty fines that would cover the cost of erecting a bronze statue of Zeus, known as a Zane. Countless Zanes lined the entrance to the original Olympic stadium, warning athletes of the consequences of failing to abide by notions of fair play.

Although ancient historical roots of the Olympics demonstrate strict governance of betting-related competition manipulation, it would take hundreds of years for the IOC to address the threat of unlawful betting on the integrity of the Olympic Games and on sport in general. Although the Games have rightfully eliminated violent disciplinary tactics for cheating, such as flogging, current regulations and penalties for illegal sports betting on the Olympics are insufficient to safeguard the integrity of global sports competitions.

II. MATCH-FIXING AND COMPETITION MANIPULATION IN THE OLYMPICS

Competition manipulation occurs when any participant “knowingly underperforms or deliberately makes bad or wrong decision affecting the result or course of competition in order to obtain an undue benefit.” There are two primary forms of competition manipulation: (1) competition manipulation to profit in the gambling market; and (2) sporting-motivated manipulation that is unrelated to betting and does not usually involve criminal activity, even if someone profits from the eventual outcome. To facilitate illegal sports betting,

11 See generally id.
13 Id.
14 See KIERNAN & DALEY, supra note 10, at 16.
16 See, e.g., Padecy, supra note 7.
gamblers are often part of a network of individuals that engage in competition manipulation.19

Match-fixing is considered a subset of competition manipulation, in which actors perform in a specific manner during a sporting event to ensure a partially or completely predetermined result.20 Unlike match-fixing, other types of competition manipulation are often more covert and harder to detect. For example, an athlete does not need to fix a match or throw a game in order to cash out on an illegal bet. Instead, the athlete can simply feign a mistake in athletic performance, thereby allowing a preselected player to receive a corner kick, earn an assist, or gain a minimum amount of yardage. However, many of these obscure bets can still be lucrative and do not require the involved athlete to be overly conspicuous in manipulating aspects of his performance. To spectators, a game may appear as if the athlete simply made an error or had a “bad” game.

Although the IOC acknowledges that sports betting entities have supported athletics and key social causes, it also warns that such entities pose several risks to the integrity of the Olympic Games.21 It is important to note that not all match-fixing is linked to betting and not every act of match-fixing will result in disciplinary repercussions.22 For example, in the 2012 London Games, the Japanese women’s soccer team intentionally tied with South Africa to avoid having to travel to another venue for the quarterfinals.23 Ultimately, the Japanese team lawfully won the gold medal.24 Compare this event with a sports betting-related, match-fixing incident, in which an Irish sailing competitor in the 2008 Beijing Olympics placed two $200 bets on his direct competitors to win.25 Yet, the Irishman escaped the IOC’s Ethics Commission’s investigation with a mere warning and was permitted to compete in both the 2008 and 2012 Games.26 Because regulations that governed participants’ betting on the Olympics were still unclear at the time, the IOC ostensibly chose not to impose retroactive penalties.27

The IOC did not officially begin to focus its efforts on governing match-fixing until the largest disqualification of athletes in Olympic history during the

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20 Prevention of Competition Manipulation, supra note 17.
21 Id.
22 Chappelet, supra note 18, at 1263.
23 Id. at 1262.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Chappelet, supra note 18, at 1262.
2012 London Games. Eight badminton players from China, South Korea, and Indonesia were eliminated from the Games for attempting to throw their matches in an effort to secure a more favorable position in future rounds of the tournament. The players’ disqualification proved to be an arbitrary and abrupt disciplinary action when compared to previous IOC-imposed penalties. Whereas the Irish sailor gambled directly against himself and even lost to the team he wagered would win, he was neither retroactively disqualified nor prohibited from participating in future Olympics. In contrast, the IOC berated the badminton players for acting in a manner that was abusive and detrimental to the sport. It seems like this particular disqualification occurred because the badminton players were too obvious in their unsportsmanlike conduct, rather than acting covertly like the sailor had in the 2008 Olympics. The sharp contrast between the penalties in 2008 and 2012 identifies a turning point for the IOC. Indeed, the Irishmen would have almost certainly faced a more exacting punishment had he bet against himself sixteen years later.

III. REGULATORY BODIES OF BETTING-RELATED COMPETITION MANIPULATION

The IOC and other governing bodies have only recently started to show interest in creating an international legal framework for regulating sports betting-related competition manipulation. The need for international collaboration came shortly after a 200-member, match-fixing ring was uncovered in Europe in 2009. The ring had fixed twelve matches in the Europa League, a second-tier football club, and several Under-21 European Championship qualifying matches. Individuals involved also targeted less elite football leagues, including thirty-two matches “in Germany’s lower division as well as dozens of..."
first and second division matches in Turkey, Belgium, Bosnia, Hungary, Croatia, Switzerland, Austria, and Slovenia.”

Up until this point, there had been no record in documented sports history showing the sheer pervasiveness of betting-related competition manipulation on a global scale. In the years following the scandal, numerous governing bodies and systems emerged in an effort to impede international attempts of betting-related competition manipulation.

In his opening statement during a historic meeting that brought together national Olympic organizations around the world in 2011, then IOC President Jacques Rogge addressed the threat of irregular and illegal betting on athletics and society. Although Rogge clarified that the IOC had no present desire to interfere with the rights of sovereign nations to navigate sports betting, he emphasized the importance of international collaboration in implementing uniform prohibitions and sanctions for illegal sports betting. Despite its longstanding commitment to impede competition manipulation, the IOC only recently initiated task forces specifically responsible for addressing and monitoring irregular and illegal betting on Olympic sports.

A. The International Olympic Committee

The first time the IOC mentioned sports betting in the Olympic Games was in its amendment to the IOC Code of Ethics in 2006. The amendment bans Olympic coaches, athletes, and participants from betting on all Olympic events and requires reporting of any suspected competition manipulation. However, it was not until shortly before the 2012 Games that the IOC truly began to enforce its ethics rules regarding gambling.

With a shared need for intelligence on potential violations, the IOC and other Olympic stakeholders created the Joint Assessment Unit (JAU). The JAU became operational one day after the Athletes’ Village opened at the 2012 London Games. The JAU’s primary mission was to collect and assess intel on suspected corrupt sports betting to ensure that decision-makers could

37 Id.
38 See id.
39 See generally IOC Historic Meeting, supra note 15.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 See generally id.
43 Prevention of Competition Manipulation, supra note 17.
44 Id.
45 See id.
46 Id.
appropriately respond before, during, and after the Games.\textsuperscript{48} In addition to the JAU’s collaborative efforts, London was the first host city that included a sports betting, monitoring, and cooperation clause in its contract with the IOC.\textsuperscript{49} Soon after the closing ceremony of the 2012 Games, the Joint Integrity Intelligence Unit (JIIU) was established, uniting “[the] IOC Organizing Committee, national authorities, law enforcement bodies, and the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL).”\textsuperscript{50}

To help facilitate and distribute necessary intelligence between JIIU members, the IOC created the Integrity Betting Intelligence System (IBIS) in 2014.\textsuperscript{51} The new IBIS system not only provided extensive intelligence from sports betting operators, betting regulators, and lottery associations, but it also created a central network where stakeholders could communicate and inquire about specific information on the betting market.\textsuperscript{52} IBIS was intended to be used as a preemptive alert system to warn International Sports Federations, National Olympic Committees, and organizers of multisport events of potential competition manipulation and illegal sports betting.\textsuperscript{53} Although the extensive intelligence network proved successful in putting stakeholders on notice of illegal activity, there still remained a general lack of regulation and applicable sanctions in place once competition manipulators were identified.\textsuperscript{54}

In an attempt to harmonize regulations around the world, the IOC implemented the Olympic Movement Code on the Prevention of the Manipulation of Competitions (Olympic Movement Code), which requires adoption by all International Sports Federations recognized by the Olympic Movement.\textsuperscript{55} In 2017, the IOC created the Olympic Movement Unit on the Prevention of the Manipulation of Competitions (OM Unit PMC) for the sole purpose of supporting multisport organizations in carrying out the Code and protecting the integrity of sport.\textsuperscript{56} The Olympic Movement Code outlines

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{48} \textit{Id.}
\item \textsuperscript{49} See \textit{id.}
\item \textsuperscript{50} See \textit{Prevention of Competition Manipulation, supra} note 17.
\item \textsuperscript{51} \textit{Id.}
\item \textsuperscript{52} \textit{Factsheet: The Integrity Betting Intelligence System (IBIS), INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., https://stillmed.olympics.com/media/Documents/Beyond-the-Games/Factsheets/Integrity-Betting-Intelligence-System.pdf} (last visited Feb. 18, 2024).
\item \textsuperscript{53} See \textit{generally id.}
\item \textsuperscript{54} See \textit{generally IOC Historic Meeting, supra} note 15 (IOC recognizing that it “cannot counter [the] insidious influence [of irregular and illegal gambling] without help from government authorities and others outside the world of sport.’’).
\item \textsuperscript{56} \textit{IOC Historic Meeting, supra} note 15.
\end{itemize}
violations including betting on a participant’s own competition, manipulating an event, using or disclosing inside information, failing to report a concerned disclosure, and refusing to cooperate with an investigation.\textsuperscript{57} Article 3 of the Olympic Movement Code details the minimum standards of investigation, the rights of the person charged with a violation, and other elements of the disciplinary procedure.\textsuperscript{58} Article 5 provides a blueprint for determining sanctions for violations of the Olympic Movement Code, although it stipulates that only a competent Sports Organization may impose an appropriate sanction, ranging “from a minimum warning to a maximum life ban.”\textsuperscript{59} Further, the Olympic Movement Code requires all members of the OM Unit PMC to recognize and respect decisions “made by any court of competent jurisdiction,” even if the resulting punishment is disproportionate to the wrongdoing.\textsuperscript{60} This precedential effect proves problematic in attempting to regulate betting-related competition manipulation, as the OM Unit PMC has no enforcement power to compel individual member states to inflict penalties on their own athletes.

B. International Authorities

The Council of Europe Convention on the Manipulation of Sports Competition (CECMSC), also known as the Macolin Convention, is currently the only international convention that specifically addresses competition manipulation.\textsuperscript{61} In Article 1, the CECMSC states that its purpose is “to promote national and international co-operation against manipulation of sports competitions between the public authorities . . . as well as with organisations involved in sports and in sports betting.”\textsuperscript{62} The CECMSC came into effect in 2019 and has been signed by over 30 European states and several other countries.\textsuperscript{63} Article 9 of the Convention requires member states to appoint an authority to be responsible for the implementation and application of sports betting regulations to combat competition manipulation.\textsuperscript{64} The measures to be taken by state authorities mandate collaboration with sports organizations and betting operators to prevent global sports participants from breaching applicable betting rules.\textsuperscript{65} Although the Olympic Movement Code is modeled after the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{57} \textit{Olympic Movement Code}, supra note 55, at 4–5.
\item \textsuperscript{58} \textit{Id.} at 7–8.
\item \textsuperscript{59} \textit{Id.} at 9.
\item \textsuperscript{60} See generally \textit{id.} at 10.
\item \textsuperscript{61} \textit{IOC Historic Meeting}, supra note 15.
\item \textsuperscript{64} C.E.T.S., supra note 62, at art. 9.
\item \textsuperscript{65} \textit{IOC Historic Meeting}, supra note 15.
\end{itemize}
Macolin Convention, the Macolin Convention extends to domestic and international sports competitions and is not limited to Olympic events.\(^{66}\)

Another international operational response to sports corruption that specifically addresses betting-related competition manipulation is the INTERPOL Match-Fixing Task Force (IMFTF).\(^{67}\) The IMFTF brings together around 100 law enforcement agencies across the world that focus on collaborative investigations and monitoring of individuals involved in illegal gambling and criminal exploitation of sports.\(^{68}\) Although IMFTF is independent of the Olympics, it works closely with the IOC to provide training for law enforcement officers, betting operators and regulators, and government agencies on how to best detect, contain, and prevent domestic competition manipulation.\(^{69}\) This training is intended to thwart illegal activity in local areas before they emerge as global trends.\(^{70}\) With so many actors involved in combatting betting-related manipulation in the Olympics, it is reasonable to assume that there would be less corruption in the Games. However, the speed at which countries are legalizing sports betting has created more complexities for governing bodies attempting to stymie global competition manipulation.

Unrelated to IOC efforts, INTERPOL continues to independently collaborate with other sports organizations to combat match-fixing.\(^{71}\) One of INTERPOL’s most successful attempts to monitor competition manipulation is its Soccer Gambling (SOGA) operations.\(^{72}\) With help from FIFA, SOGA operations have led to over 7,000 arrests, closures of illegal gambling rings handling greater than $2 billion worth of bets, and seizures of over $27 million.\(^{73}\) Whereas soccer organizations are making progress in identifying illegal sports gambling early on, other sports organizations are slower to realize the benefits of preempting betting-related competition manipulation.\(^{74}\) Although many


\(^{67}\) Id.

\(^{68}\) Id.

\(^{69}\) See id.

\(^{70}\) See id.

\(^{71}\) See Corruption in Sport, supra note 66.

\(^{72}\) See generally id.


governing bodies would prefer to hold criminals responsible for engaging in the act, there are a variety of reasons why countries remain reluctant to do so.

IV. CHALLENGES IN CREATING AND ENFORCING EFFICIENT SPORTS BETTING REGULATIONS

The Olympics faces an enormous hurdle in attempting to stamp out betting-related competition manipulation. Tracking illegal gambling, alone, is extraordinarily complex. There are countless obstacles that make tracking and monitoring illegal gambling on a global scale nearly impossible. The primary challenges in achieving successful international regulation include the (A) lack of recorded history and legal precedent for the crime of match-fixing; (B) rapid legalization of sports gambling around the world; (C) expedited growth in technology facilitating sports betting; (D) lack of established frameworks for regulating betting-related competition manipulation; (E) general reluctance to enforce established sports betting laws; and (F) targeting of vulnerable individuals by the illegal gambling industry.

A. Lack of History and Legal Precedent Criminalizing Match Fixing

Although match-fixing has existed for hundreds of years,75 history detailing how law enforcement and the judicial system have treated match-fixers is sparse.76 Much of the available information about match-fixing comes from documents in legal proceedings.77 However, match-fixing was not historically a crime; thus, any public court documents regarding the matter are relatively recent.78 The criminal offense was usually prosecuted as a crime of conspiracy or fraud, which makes examining the evolution of competition manipulation over time particularly difficult.79 Further, many of the decisions to penalize match-fixing were made by sports organizations, which rarely, if ever, recorded disciplinary actions.80 It is easy to imagine how the lack of case law concerning this crime withholds vital insights as to how match-fixing occurs, which actors may be involved, and what signs to look for when monitoring a specific sport.81 Without an understanding of how match-fixing infiltrated sport and in which

76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 See id.
80 See generally Huggins, supra note 75, at 128–29.
81 See id. at 128.
ways actors were punished, sports authorities will continue to inconsistently enforce regulations and punish wrongdoers.82

B. Expedited Legalization of Sports Gambling

In 1992, President George H.W. Bush implemented PASPA, which made sports betting illegal in any state that had not already legalized sports betting.83 As a result, Nevada was the only state in which Americans could legally gamble on athletic events.84 Twenty-seven years later, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down PASPA, leaving it up to the states to enforce their own sports gambling laws without federal oversight.85 In 2018, the first online sportsbook outside of Nevada was created,86 and gross sports betting revenue skyrocketed.87 In 2021, sports-betting revenue in the U.S. reached $4.33 billion,88 showing a 179.7% increase from 2020.89 This comes as no surprise as thirty-five states have legalized sports gambling and nearly one in five U.S. adults wagered money on a sports competition in 2022.90

The legalization of the sports betting industry is expanding far beyond U.S. borders. In fact, 41% of Europe’s projected $94 billion online gambling revenue derives from sports betting.91 Yet, neither Europe nor North America can top the online sports betting industry in the Asia-Pacific region, which accounts for 30% of the global market.92 The value of illegal and legal betting-

83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id. Bonesteel, * supra* note 82.
89 Bonesteel, * supra* note 82.
related match-fixing in the Asian market is estimated at $500 billion.\textsuperscript{93} It is important to note that illegal sports betting is different from irregular sports betting. Whereas illegal sports betting refers to betting activity facilitated by an operator that lacks legal authorization in the applicable jurisdiction, irregular sports betting is betting activity that is inconsistent with projected patterns in a given market or within a specific sports competition.\textsuperscript{94} This means that one-half trillion dollars derives from a market that is wholly unregulated by Asian regulatory bodies. Further, it is estimated that 80\% of all bets in the global sports betting market are illegal.\textsuperscript{95} The ease and accessibility of the illegal sports betting market explains why Asia is a hotspot for betting-related match-fixing.\textsuperscript{96}

To illustrate wide-spread corruption in the Asian sports market, one need not look further than the sport’s world-shattering match-fixing scandal known as “Asiagate.”\textsuperscript{97} From 2007 to 2010, Asian gambling syndicates paid each member of the Zimbabwe national soccer team to purposefully lose matches against Asian teams, including China, Thailand, Vietnam, and Singapore.\textsuperscript{98} The Zimbabwean authorities’ involvement in the scandal was extensive, with senior officials and even the CEO of Zimbabwe International Football Association (ZIFA) playing a pivotal role in the corruption.\textsuperscript{99} Each of the high-ranking soccer officials received a minimum of $10,000 for each loss from Wilson Raj Perumal, a convicted betting agent, a wanted criminal, and a world-renowned match-fixer.\textsuperscript{100} Perumal was able to facilitate the scandal through use of Asia’s hierarchical agent system and loosely regulated jurisdictions;\textsuperscript{101} the same reasons why Asia is home to the most lucrative betting market in the world.\textsuperscript{102}


\textsuperscript{96} See id.


\textsuperscript{98} Id.

\textsuperscript{99} See id.

\textsuperscript{100} Id.


\textsuperscript{102} See id.
Unlike other countries with more exacting regulations, unregulated bets in Asia are often anonymously collected on the streets or via telephone call.\footnote{Id.} However, many of these bets can still end up in the largest licensed sportsbooks in Asian countries with lax regulations, such as the Philippines.\footnote{Id.} By the time this occurs, all previous traces of the illegal bet are obscured, and it becomes nearly impossible to identify those involved in the original crime.\footnote{Id.} Further, twenty-first century technology allows gambling to be conducted anywhere at any time, which has resulted in illegal betting operators inundating the sports-betting black market in Asia.\footnote{Id.} These technological advancements create further issues for governments to legislate and enforce new, effective regulations.\footnote{Id.}

C. Technological Advancements Facilitating Sports Betting

In addition to increasing market deregulation, the growing dependence on the Internet allows sports betting operators to offer bets all around the world often without a license.\footnote{See Andreff, supra note 95, at 3.} The expansion of online gambling grants participants easier access to both financial and emotional engagement of virtually any sporting event.\footnote{See generally id.} The “risk free” or “no brainer” bets provided by online sportsbooks create the impression of a no-consequence means of engaging in a sporting competition and socializing with friends.\footnote{Id.} As demand for mobile and online betting platforms grows, sportsbooks continue to create unlimited kinds of wagering.\footnote{Id.} The sheer variety of wagers allows users to bet on nearly every aspect of a team or player’s performance, which increases the likelihood of continued gambling.\footnote{Id.} By offering opportunities to bet on discrete events in a sporting event (e.g., number of fouls in the first quarter of a basketball game), the usual time lag between bet and reward is reduced.\footnote{Id.} This decreased time between risk and reward escalates the frequency of gambling and thus heightens bettors’ chances of developing problematic and addictive behavior.\footnote{Id.}
cyclical desire for high-risk gambling, bettors may seek out betting opportunities that can only be found on the illegal sports-betting market.\textsuperscript{115} Sportsbooks can easily engage in predatory marketing tactics primarily through the use of social media.\textsuperscript{116} These tactics are concerning for two principal reasons. First, betting advertisements often target a younger audience that is more likely to develop gambling problems and addictive behaviors than adults.\textsuperscript{117} A 2018 study shows that 75\% of students under the age of 18 have placed a bet on a sports competition at least once in their lives.\textsuperscript{118} As online sports betting becomes more popular and socially acceptable among younger generations, negative consequences, such as addiction, will only intensify over time.\textsuperscript{119} Second, the convenience and privacy of online gambling makes it more difficult for those with betting addictions to limit or eliminate access to sportsbooks.\textsuperscript{120} Although platforms have no legal obligation to ensure their advertising and marketing campaigns do not exacerbate gambling addictions, the lack of oversight and regulation for these campaigns raise genuine concern for those vulnerable to developing unhealthy gambling habits.\textsuperscript{121}

Rapid growth of the Internet and the rise of the Darknet have permitted sports bettors involved in competition manipulation to more easily avoid detection.\textsuperscript{122} The Darknet has provided online bettors with anonymity from law enforcement and regulators who investigate suspicious betting activity.\textsuperscript{123} Savvy online bettors can hide behind a different Internet Protocol (IP) address or Virtual Private Network (VPN) to make themselves nearly untraceable.\textsuperscript{124} Further, the use of modern electronic payment methods such as e-wallets and digital currencies have also facilitated anonymity for those involved in fixing a competition.\textsuperscript{125} Although betting syndicates have not historically accepted digital currencies, a recent betting-related, match-fixing scandal involving a series of cricket matches in South Africa was entirely operated through use of

\textsuperscript{115} See generally id.
\textsuperscript{116} Id.
\textsuperscript{117} NCPG, supra note 112.
\textsuperscript{118} Id.
\textsuperscript{119} See generally id.
\textsuperscript{120} Id.
\textsuperscript{121} See generally id.
\textsuperscript{122} Global Report on Corruption in Sport, supra note 19, at 19.
\textsuperscript{123} See id.
\textsuperscript{124} See, e.g., Chris Stobing, How to Unblock DraftKings Fantasy Sports with a VPN, COMPARITECH, https://www.comparitech.com/blog/vpn-privacy/unblock-draftkings-with-vpn/ (last updated Jan. 9, 2024) (“Using a VPN, you can hide your real location and make it appear that you’re elsewhere by switching your IP address to another part of the United States, or another country entirely.”).
\textsuperscript{125} Global Report on Corruption in Sport, supra note 19.
cryptocurrency.126 With the recent addition of esports to the Olympic Games,127 it is crucial for the IOC and other governing authorities to understand how technology and the Internet are utilized to conceal betting-related competition manipulation and hinder investigatory and regulatory efforts.128

On the other hand, more legal gambling options may provide sports organizations, like FIFA, with an enhanced ability to monitor and identify match-fixing.129 Because match-fixing increasingly involves illegal gambling providers, legal options may actually reduce ties to criminal betting rings.130 Although creating more legal providers will make betting-related competition manipulation easier to regulate, the problem will remain as long as illegal gambling syndicates continue to operate.131 Eliminating match-fixing cannot be achieved by INTERPOL or any sports organization without national governments allocating appropriate resources necessary to identify match-fixing and establish a stable regulatory framework.132

D. Lack of Regulatory Frameworks

The high rate of illicit bets is partly attributed to nonrestrictive or nonexistent betting regulations and the complexity of new age betting.133 In 2021, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the IOC published their Legal Approaches to Tackling of Sport Competitions resource guide, which provides an instructional approach for national governments to effect legislation that combats transnational issues of competition manipulation.134 Despite significant resources supporting legislative and enforcement efforts, illegal betting is still not a priority for the majority of

126 Id.
128 Global Report on Corruption in Sport, supra note 19, at 19.
129 Katarzyna Kordas, Dropping the Ball: How Can FIFA Address the Match-Fixing Problem Facing Profession Football, 23 SPORTS L. J. 107, 133 (2016).
130 Id.
131 See id.
132 See id. (fewer illegal gamblers in addition to enforcement by FIFA and Interpol will merely “help” eliminate the ability to profit from match-fixing).
133 See generally id. at 131.
national governments.\textsuperscript{135} Indeed, only a few countries currently classify betting-related competition manipulation as a mere misdemeanor.\textsuperscript{136} Further, most nations depend solely on sports organizations to impose sanctions and disciplinary actions,\textsuperscript{137} which makes enforcing penalties against violators inconsistent. Over 100 sports are facilitated and governed by International Sport Federations, few of which have adopted serious guidelines for discouraging competition manipulation.\textsuperscript{138} As a result, bettors remain undeterred by the consequences of their wrongdoings. For countries and sports with ineffective regulation and irregular punishment, competition manipulation remains a low-risk, high-reward activity.

There are several reasons for the delayed response in addressing competition manipulation through means of illegal betting. One of the primary factors for reluctance to act is that countries were only recently forced to come to terms with match-fixing as a widespread, transnational issue during the COVID-19 Pandemic.\textsuperscript{139} Just as engagement in other forms of online entertainment skyrocketed during the Pandemic, so did participation in online gambling.\textsuperscript{140} In response, the United Nations (UN), the Council of Europe, and INTERPOL have taken steps to reform current regulatory frameworks and “catch up” to organized global crime networks and other actors involved in competition manipulation.\textsuperscript{141} Yet, classifying match-fixing as an offense and drafting legislation remains the sole responsibility of individual sovereign states.\textsuperscript{142} This classification means that nations that fail to recognize and mend legal and regulatory loopholes in their laws will continue to indirectly contribute to betting-related competition manipulation.\textsuperscript{143} Not only does the failure to acknowledge a need to remedy loopholes hinder the efforts of other nations to combat match-fixing, but it also prevents law enforcement agencies and judicial authorities from furthering necessary frameworks on a national and an international level.\textsuperscript{144}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{136} Id.
\bibitem{137} Id.
\bibitem{138} Id.
\bibitem{140} Anthony Quinn et al., \textit{COVID-19 and Resultant Restrictions on Gambling Behaviour}, 143 NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REV. 1, 1 (2022).
\bibitem{141} Carpenter, \textit{supra} note 135.
\bibitem{142} Id.
\bibitem{143} Id.
\bibitem{144} Id.
\end{thebibliography}
The lack of amendment to current legislation is in part due to the misconception that sports governing bodies (SGBs) are the proper entities to navigate match-fixing. Although these entities may be the appropriate governing bodies to recommend and draft specific changes to national and international regulations, SGBs lack jurisdictional authority over organized criminals and other non-sports participants that are targeted in competition manipulation. Additionally, SGBs lack the power to obtain evidence and the expertise to investigate allegations of corruption. Entrusting only SGBs to solve betting-related competition manipulation is like commissioning law enforcement agencies in individual countries to eliminate international organized crime. To make competition manipulation regulations meaningful, there must be a single governing body that has jurisdiction to impose penalties and enforce regulations across national borders.

E. Lack of Enforcement of Established Sports Betting Laws

Even when there is a legal framework for combatting match-fixing manipulation, enforcing laws prove challenging for some law enforcement agencies. Like legislatures, police often do not fully understand the criminal threat or connection of match-fixing to other crimes. Because match-fixing is inherently linked to other offenses, such as money laundering, human trafficking, and duress, it often goes unacknowledged by law enforcement. This unawareness is partly a result of law enforcement agencies’ general lack of knowledge about how the sports betting market functions both domestically and abroad. Without adequate training and resources devoted to targeting criminals that illegally bet on sports, combatting match-fixing remains a non-priority for many nations. In turn, the necessary amount of global cooperation required to impede betting-related competition is further impaired and illegal betting continues to run rampant throughout sport.

In 2013, the Court of Honour of the Autonomous Sports Confederation of Guatemala independently overturned previous life bans of three players, including two of the nation’s highest-paid players. FIFA warned Guatemala that overturning the life bans “constituted [a] third-party interference in a sporting matter,” which violates FIFA statutes concerning the independence of

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145 Id.
146 Carpenter, supra note 135.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Carpenter, supra note 135.
152 Id.
members and non-interference by third parties.\footnote{Id.} By failing to follow proper procedures and defer to the proper sporting jurisdiction, Guatemala was suspended from FIFA from 2014 to 2018.\footnote{See id.; see also Daniel Karell, FIFA Lifts Ban on Guatemala Ahead of 2026 World Cup Vote, NBCSPORTS (June 1, 2018, 8:30 AM), https://soccer.nbcspor ts.com/2018/06/01/fifa-lifts-ban-on-guatemala-ahead-of-2026-world-cup-vote/.} When one nation refuses to hold its players and citizens to the IOC’s ethical and moral standards, all participating nations suffer. FIFA’s decision to hold Guatemala accountable for failing to adhere to international guidelines and bylaws demonstrates the need for a single governing body to lead the fight against betting-related competition manipulation. However, even if all nations were to agree to act under a sole authority, every nation, sports organization, and team would need to understand and acknowledge the extent to which illegal gambling obstructs the integrity of sport.

\section*{F. Illegal Gambling Industry’s Targeting of Vulnerable Actors}

Given that manipulation often occurs on the “field of play,” officials and athletes “are at [greater] risk of being approached to manipulate or to carry out the manipulation of a competition.”\footnote{Handbook, supra note 94, at 19.} Further, particular competitions and sports participants are more at risk for betting-related competition manipulation than others.\footnote{See, e.g., id. (Friendly competitions and athletes that lack confidence or have low salaries are especially at risk.).}

Manipulators are more likely to target sports events with outcomes that are of little social significance.\footnote{Global Report on Corruption in Sport, supra note 19, at 10.} For example, youth and women’s sports are often targeted by illegal sports betting rings because they do not receive as much exposure as men’s sports.\footnote{Id. at 13.} Although international and elite national sporting events are closely monitored, mid-to-lower tier sports receive little to no oversight.\footnote{See id. at 17.} According to SportsRadar, “[33\%] of suspicious domestic matches” derive from sporting competitions in the third tier or lower.\footnote{Id. at 13.} In fact, second-tier matches account for nearly half of the total number of suspicious matches.\footnote{Id.} Although amateur leagues, like youth football, receive some monitoring through fraud detection systems, an estimated $110 billion is wagered on these lower-level matches.\footnote{Global Report on Corruption in Sport, supra note 19, at 17.}
The IOC has contributed the widespread manipulation of youth and women’s sports to the use of data scouts. 164 Data scouts are individuals hired to attend lower-tier events and transmit live sports data, which is then used to facilitate a betting market on specific competitions. 165 Because amateur and female athletes take part in lower-generating revenue sports, they are more inclined to participate in competition manipulation, betting-related or not, as a way to supplement their low incomes. 166 According to the UN, more equitable salaries may reduce the risk of temptation to manipulate. 167

Exhibition matches are similarly at risk of betting-related match-fixing. 168 High-profile teams often compete in these “friendly” matches in order to test the skills of young players or as a means of preparation for their seasons. 169 However, because exhibition matches involve elite athletes and major sponsors, there is still significant desire to wage bets on their outcomes. 170 In addition, the structure of these matches are often loosely organized, resulting in a general lack of clarity about which federation or organization is responsible for monitoring betting on events. 171 In 2019 alone, the UNODC flagged twenty-nine friendly football matches as “suspicious” for potential manipulation. 172

There are also non-financial factors that make certain participants more vulnerable to being targeted by competition manipulators. 173 Studies suggest athletes are much more likely to struggle with addictive behaviors and to engage in risk-taking behavior compared to the general population. 174 Although betting may begin as a way of expressing their competitiveness, problem gambling among athletes far exceed non-athletes. 175 Athletes that are more inclined to develop an addiction to, or proclivity for, gambling are perfect recruits for groups looking to engage in competition manipulation. Additionally, athletes who have gambling debts and receive a lack of recognition, feel social pressure to succeed

164 Id.
165 Id.
167 Global Report on Corruption in Sport, supra note 19, at 18.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 See generally id.
171 See id.
172 Global Report on Corruption in Sport, supra note 19, at 18.
173 Id.
175 Id.
in their sport, or who already have “fluid moral values” are especially inclined
to participate in match-fixing.176

V. SOLUTIONS FOR CURTAILING INTERNATIONAL SPORTS BETTING-
RELATED COMPETITION MANIPULATION

Although there is still doubt as to whether one governing entity can
effectively contain competition manipulation, there are several international
organizations that have succeeded in regulating certain aspects of sports on a
global scale. For example, implementing JAU policies during the 2012 Olympic
Games resulted in zero betting-related scandals despite the overall sports betting
turnover being ten times higher than the previous Olympic Games in Beijing.177
It is important to note that the 2012 badminton scandal was not betting-related
but rather was a structural flaw in the competition that allowed teams to fix their
positions through the tournament bracket system.178 Although changing the
structural rules for the 2016 Rio Olympics eliminated one incentive to match-fix,
betting-related competition manipulation requires further regulation by a
uniform body with far greater reach than could be exercised by the JAU.179

The IOC offers four solutions for minimizing the risk of illegal betting
in sports, including strong sports governance and improved financial
transparency, a system for combating cyber-criminality, effective information
sharing between organizations, and consistent education and prevention
programs.180 Perhaps, the most obvious and popular solution to curbing betting-
related competition manipulation in international competitions is to implement
uniform global regulations.181 Although the Macolin Convention has created
such a global regulation, some countries and sports organizations remain hesitant
in delegating authority to a single, international agency.182 Some International
Sports Federations may fear that a global agency will overly restrict sport instead
of providing tools that can be used by organizations to independently regulate
the phenomenon.183

Many countries might also be concerned that cracking down on sports
betting will negatively affect their ability to utilize gambling profits to fund
sport.184 For example, Swiss Olympic received half of its $57.4 million budget

176 Handbook, supra note 94, at 22.
177 Carpenter, supra note 93, at 226.
178 Id. at 227.
179 See generally id. at 226–29.
181 See generally id. at 45.
182 See Carpenter, supra note 93, at 223.
184 See, e.g., Marek Pavlík & Filip Hrůza, Lottery as Tool for Financing of Sport –
Comparison of European Countries, (Jan. 1, 2014) (In 2008, Finland allocated
€104 million to sport from lotteries; Spain allocated €116 million to sport from
lotteries; and Germany allocated €361 million to sport from lotteries.)
from Switzerland lottery companies in 2011 and will receive $66.2 million from
the Swiss national lottery system to fund its bid to host the 2030 Olympic
games.185 Without sourcing funds from gambling revenue, countries may be
forced to limit financing of certain sports or shift resources from other national
programs in order to participate in global competitions.

A. Education

Many, if not most, sports organizations consider education a vital tool
in preventing competition manipulation.186 According to the Olympic Movement
Code, sports organizations are responsible for enforcing the Code’s rules in their
own jurisdiction, which includes implementing educational programs.187 The
IOC recommends a system that provides education on integrity risks that begin
at the grassroots level and extends to elite sports.188 Further, all actors, including
athletes, officials, and sports organization representatives, are advised to
participate in training and education.189 From 2015 to 2019, the IOC partnered
with INTERPOL to educate over 1,000 national leaders about betting-related
competition manipulation through tailored workshops offered around the
world.190 However, the COVID-19 Pandemic has seemed to indefinitely halt
these educational efforts, with little certainty about when they will return in the
future.191

Although the IOC has provided recommendations for governments,
sports organizations, and other stakeholders to implement clear guidelines for re-
starting preventative measures, there doesn’t seem to be any kind of prerequisite
education or training for participating in the Olympics.192 The IBIS, like other

185 Swiss Olympic Receives $26M from Switzerland’s Lottery Companies, SPORTS
BUS. J.,
https://www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/Global/Issues/2012/11/15/Finance/Swiss-
Olympic.aspx (Nov. 15, 2023); Rich Perelman, Swiss in for 2030/2034 Winter bid;
von de Vorst elected World Boxing chief; Brazil and U.S. 1-2 as Parapan Am
close in Santiago, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/swiss-20302034-
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 See id.
190 IOC, Protecting the Integrity of Sport is a Team Effort,
https://olympics.com/ioc/prevention-competition-manipulation/capacity-building-
191 See generally id.; See also IOC, INTERPOL and UNODC Show the Way in
Placing Integrity at the Core of Post-COVID-19 Sport (Jul. 1, 2020), INT’L
192 See generally Handbook, supra note 94, at 1-92 (no listed prerequisites to
participate in Olympics).
IOC-led task forces and initiatives, is simply a system for exchanging information that helps International Federations and National Olympic Committees understand the application of measures and procedures.\textsuperscript{193} There certainly are advantages of being a part of an IOC-provided training and educational program, as it provides authorities with useful tools to detect match-fixing and prevent illegal betting.\textsuperscript{194} However, until there is mandated education and good-faith application of those insights and policies, some nations will undoubtedly remain stagnant in a fight that requires active, global cooperation.\textsuperscript{195}

Educational programs are necessary to both improve current trends of competition manipulation and preempt future wrongdoing. The responsibility to provide early education for young, amateur athletes will largely fall on sports organizations. Fortunately, there is no shortage of programs or potential collaborators willing to educate athletes, governments, and other stakeholders. Even private companies, like SportsRadar, have introduced anti-match-fixing platforms that aim to educate participants and teams about their responsibilities to safeguard sports integrity.\textsuperscript{196}

Sports organizations should follow the Union of European Football Associations’ (UEFA) lead in requiring training for its members.\textsuperscript{197} UEFA serves as the governing body for fifty-five national associations and recently launched a new initiative to provide integrity officers with “intelligence-gathering and investigation skills required to identify, investigate and prosecute match-fixing cases.”\textsuperscript{198} The Fight to Fix (FTF) program requires participants to prove their skills in a simulated sports arbitration proceeding.\textsuperscript{199} FTF sessions have proven highly successful in bringing together academics, international sports organizations, law enforcement, and judicial authorities.\textsuperscript{200} Beyond the practical experience that FTF provides, participants from around the world are also given a unique opportunity to share effective methods of detecting and combatting match-fixing.\textsuperscript{201}

\textsuperscript{193} See id. at 41.
\textsuperscript{194} Id. at 81.
\textsuperscript{195} See generally id.
\textsuperscript{197} See, e.g., id. (UEFA requires extensive training regarding investigation and prosecution of competition manipulation.).
\textsuperscript{199} Id.
\textsuperscript{200} Id.
\textsuperscript{201} Id.
B. Collaboration

The 2009 Bochum Competition Manipulation Scandal highlights the importance of international collaboration. The scandal was first uncovered when German police conducted wire taps on a Croatian crime gang. The communication revealed evidence of over 300 suspected incidents of match-fixing in soccer across nine European countries. European and Canadian law enforcement later discovered the sheer extent of the scandal with bets having taken place as far away as Singapore. Each participant in the incident received as much as €100,000 per match, resulting in millions of Euros flooding betting markets.

The funding by Singapore financiers ultimately led officials to organized crime groups in China. The money trail from these groups eventually exposed the Croatian leader of illegal gambling operations, Ante Sapina. Thirteen European law enforcement agencies subsequently carried out extensive investigations of everyone involved in the scandal. INTERPOL then issued international arrest warrants and after conducting criminal trials, issued prison sentences. At the same time, sports disciplinary bodies also promulgated sanctions for those involved. The Swiss Football Association was first to sanction nine of its national league players by imposing a one-year long suspension in 2010. Investigating the suspected match-fixing and doling out appropriate penalties required the combined effort of various European law enforcement agencies, international agencies, and sports organizations. The kind of information sharing that exposed the criminal syndicate could have only been achieved through mutual recognition and respect. Part of that recognition and respect necessitates national regulations that permit conducting inquiries, managing information with relevant partners, and obtaining intel within a specific time frame.

A greater collaborative agency is also pertinent to identifying responsibility for conducting betting-related, match-fixing investigations. Many suspected violations go unaddressed because of countries’ lack of

203 Id.
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 Id.
208 Id.
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 Id.
213 See generally id.
214 See id. at 59.
knowledge concerning the complex nature of international competition.\textsuperscript{215} For example, nations may be confused as to which entity should investigate a match-fixing incident that occurred in Africa but involved a South American referee, a European team, and a Southeast Asian team.\textsuperscript{216} Many governments are often already unfamiliar with the threats to sports integrity posed by gambling.\textsuperscript{217} Thus, it would be unreasonable to assume that they are prepared to diligently carry out procedures to prevent such threats on an international level. Even if a worldwide governing body was created, however, there remains doubt as to whether it would hold any legitimate power until the U.S. and other influential countries take a bold, political stance against the dearth of regulation regarding sports betting.\textsuperscript{218} History demonstrates that a catastrophic event involving betting-related competition manipulation may need to occur on a global stage before there is widespread willingness to submit to one international governing body.\textsuperscript{219}

Former IOC President Jacques Rogge recognized match-fixing as a greater threat than doping in the 2012 Olympic Games.\textsuperscript{220} In Rogge’s perspective, “[d]oping affects one individual athlete, but the impact of match-fixing affects the whole competition.” Accordingly, various stakeholders must work together to prevent the increasing probability that the Olympics will uncover its “first” betting-related scandal.\textsuperscript{221} This kind of global collaboration begins with creating a unified body that is both capable of enacting change and commanding respect and credibility from sports organizations and governments around the world.\textsuperscript{222}

C. Choosing An Effective International Authority

To evaluate examples of regulatory cooperation on an international level, it is critical to understand the Olympic regime’s relationships with other

\textsuperscript{215} See generally id.
\textsuperscript{216} See id. at 56.
\textsuperscript{217} See Carpenter, supra note 93, at 224 (“[A] lot of countries do not have proper laws fighting match manipulation and corruption.”).
\textsuperscript{218} Id. at 228.
\textsuperscript{220} See Carpenter, supra note 93, at 225 (quoting Rogge in stating that “match-fixing was the most significant threat to the games”).
\textsuperscript{221} Id.
\textsuperscript{222} See, e.g., GUARDIANS OF PUBLIC VALUE 23 (Arjen Boin, et al. eds., 2021) (noting that WADA’s success as a global agency is largely attributed to longstanding respect from stakeholders).
sports organizations and national authorities. The Olympics is governed by the IOC, which regulates the Olympic Movement through its own constitution known as the Olympic Charter.\(^\text{223}\) The IOC’s structure for global sports cooperation depends primarily on two institutions: (1) International Federations (IFs) and (2) National Olympic Committees (NOCs).\(^\text{224}\) IFs are non-governmental organizations that ensure compliance with the Olympic Charter and regulate international competition of one or more sports.\(^\text{225}\) All countries that participate in the Games belong to a NOC.\(^\text{226}\) NOCs are responsible for developing their national team and selecting athletes that will represent their nation on the global stage.\(^\text{227}\) National Federations (NFs), which regulate sports on a national level, are interconnected to both IFs and NOCs.\(^\text{228}\) In order to be recognized by an NOC, the NF must be affiliated with an IF that is recognized by the IOC and compliant with both the Olympic Charter and its own regulations.\(^\text{229}\) With such a complex hierarchy of authority, it is necessary to examine how a regulatory framework may successfully implement rules and bylaws. Fortunately, there are two prime examples of international leadership that demonstrate a functional legal framework for eliminating sports-related wrongdoings.

1. **Model Frameworks: The World Anti-Doping Agency**

The World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) shows that an international organization can effectively combat a specific global issue in sport. Despite a call for a similar entity to regulate sports betting from experts in the field, there remains several challenges that national governments may not yet be prepared to tackle.\(^\text{230}\) The greatest obstacle for a global entity that regulates betting-related competition manipulation is the same one that WADA faced before its creation


\(^\text{225}\) Id.

\(^\text{226}\) Id.

\(^\text{227}\) Id.

\(^\text{228}\) Casini, *supra* note 223.


in the late 1990s—global reluctance to provide financial investment.\textsuperscript{231} In fact, nations around the world only agreed to fund WADA after the world-shaking, 1998 doping scandal in cycling.\textsuperscript{232} Despite the decades-long, steroid epidemic in professional sports, it was not until the three top finishers of the Tour de France—each from a different country—tested positive for a banned blood booster, that collective agreements for monitoring performance-enhancing drugs emerged.\textsuperscript{233} This catalytic event suggests that countries may be unwilling to invest in a WADA-equivalent governing body unless a major sports betting-related scandal is uncovered.\textsuperscript{234}

While the world waits on another Tour de France-level crime, illegal gambling rings continue to profit from fixed sports competitions, and the number of future investigations amass.\textsuperscript{235} Current legal frameworks are insufficient to counteract the influence of illegal betting on the integrity of sport. Currently, the only rule of international law concerning competition manipulation is the Macolin Convention.\textsuperscript{236} However, members of the CECMSC are merely signatories of a multi-lateral treaty, in which they have agreed to “encourage” sports organizations to adopt and implement rules that combat basic forms of competition manipulation and to develop disciplinary procedures for violators.\textsuperscript{237} Further, there is no ostensible disadvantage of refraining from signing the Macolin Convention other than not having access to the information-sharing platforms utilized by other nations.\textsuperscript{238} In fact, many nations have refused to become signatories either because the integrity of sport is not a national priority or because the Macolin Convention’s definition of “illegal sports betting” potentially poses a threat to countries’ lucrative gaming industry.\textsuperscript{239}

An ad hoc structure to WADA would prove more successful than the Macolin Convention, as it would set uniform standards across all sports and mandate that sports organizations comply as a prerequisite for participation in the Olympics.\textsuperscript{240} By partnering with the OM Unit PMC, a global agency can work with nations to set up national integrity agencies akin to National Anti-Doping Organizations.\textsuperscript{241} These organizations could ideally implement unified

\textsuperscript{231} Id.
\textsuperscript{232} Tour de France Scandal, supra note 219.
\textsuperscript{233} Id.
\textsuperscript{234} See generally Homewood, supra note 230.
\textsuperscript{235} Id.
\textsuperscript{236} The Macolin Convention, supra note 63.
\textsuperscript{237} Id.
\textsuperscript{238} See generally JEAN-LOUP CHAPPELET & PIM VERSCHUUREN, INTERNATIONAL SPORTS AND MATCH FIXING, THE BUSINESS AND CULTURE OF SPORTS: SOCIETY, POLITICS, ECONOMY, ENVIRONMENT 434 (Joseph Maguire et al. eds., 2019).
\textsuperscript{239} Id.
\textsuperscript{240} Alexandra Veuthey, Match-Fixing and Governance in Cricket and Football: What is the Fix?, 14 INT’L SPORTS L.J. 82, 104 (Jun. 4, 2014).
\textsuperscript{241} Id.
regulations and sanctions outlined by the global agency.\textsuperscript{242} The currently fractioned responsibilities of investigating suspect betting and imposing sanctions would become the sole priority of these national integrity agencies.\textsuperscript{243} By performing these duties in accordance with the global integrity agency, nations can finally begin to apply unified international laws aimed at combating betting-related competition manipulation.\textsuperscript{244} Even if the rules established by this global agency are embedded in private law, and thus, couldn’t formally bind national governments, it could still bind national agencies through an international treaty.\textsuperscript{245}

Creating a unified legal framework for addressing competition manipulation may also encourage nations to introduce specific criminal offenses for sports fraud.\textsuperscript{246} General criminal offenses, such as fraud or corruption, only partially cover conduct that involve manipulation of sports competitions.\textsuperscript{247} In contrast, a New South Wales law specifies a ten-year prison sentence for match-fixing.\textsuperscript{248} Not only does this law work to deter betting-related competition manipulation at any point in the process, but it also encourages sports organizations and betting operators to share information.\textsuperscript{249} Countries can further strengthen their approach to eliminate match-fixing by refusing to fund sports organizations that fail to implement anti-competition manipulation policies.\textsuperscript{250} Although WADA has been demonized for its aggressive, no-tolerance, anti-doping policy, it has nonetheless commanded respect from critics.\textsuperscript{251} Establishing a powerful reputation of this new global integrity agency will certainly require substantial financial investment from the IOC and its members. WADA’s success proves that funding is an outgrowth of earning respect and building trust, both of which would require time and patience.\textsuperscript{252}

Despite the possibility of a promising global structure, however, the IOC continues to insist on “soft” partnerships with “governments, betting regulators, and intergovernmental organizations, such as the Council of Europe and the [UNODC].”\textsuperscript{253} One suspected reason for the IOC’s reluctance to support a new

\textsuperscript{242} Id.
\textsuperscript{243} Id. at 105.
\textsuperscript{244} Veuthey, supra note 240, at 105.
\textsuperscript{245} See, e.g., id. at 106 (The WADA Code is embedded in private law, but national agencies were bound to it through international treaty.).
\textsuperscript{246} Id.
\textsuperscript{247} Id.
\textsuperscript{248} Id.
\textsuperscript{249} Veuthey, supra note 240 at 105.
\textsuperscript{250} Id.
\textsuperscript{251} GUARDIANS OF PUBLIC VALUE, supra note 222, at 195 (noting that WADA’s success as a global agency is largely attributed to longstanding respect from stakeholders).
\textsuperscript{252} Id. at 195–96 (noting that WADA’s success as a global agency is largely attributed to longstanding respect from stakeholders).
\textsuperscript{253} Chappelet & Verschuuren, supra note 238, at 434.
global authority is seemingly the same reason that holds nations back from signing the Macolin Convention or adopting uniform criminal codes—betting-related competition manipulation is simply not a pressing issue, especially in comparison to doping and institutionalized corruption. 254 Match-fixing is considered a secondary discipline that “no longer seems to threaten the viability of major tennis tournaments, football competitions, or the Olympic Games, as it did in previous years.” 255 This is in part due to the issue of match-fixing becoming lost in the broader categories of sports integrity violations. 256 With competition manipulation ranking low on the IOC’s long list of priorities, it is likely that illegal betting will be just one of the many areas sought to be covered in the larger fight against corruption in sport. 257

2. Model Frameworks: FIFA

In response to Asiagate, FIFA joined INTERPOL to develop the Integrity in Sport program, which provided global training and education to prevent illegal sports betting and match-fixing. 258 This ten-year project pledged $27 million to eradicate betting-related corruption within soccer and motivated INTERPOL to provide additional assistance to combat match-fixing in other global sports events. 259 The successful collaboration between the IOC and INTERPOL in the 2012 London Games 260 compelled a closer examination of existing competition manipulation policies. 261 Around this time, FIFA also banned and removed two members from its Executive Committee and devised a new committee that would consist of members from “politics, finance, business, and culture.” 262 This restructuring demonstrates that FIFA understands the importance and need for seeking help from outside agencies and regulatory bodies. 263 Further, the association has openly enlisted the help of its players. 264 By involving athletes in the conversation, FIFA was better able to stay up to date with untoward dealings that may be happening on the field or in the locker room. FIFA’s success in preventing further match-fixing scandals is largely attributed to the early warning system (EWS), a legally independent company

254 Id. at 436.
255 Id.
256 Id. at 437.
257 Id.
258 Carpenter, supra note 73, at 8.
259 Kordas, supra note 129, at 127.
260 Carpenter, supra note 73, at 8.
262 Blackshaw, supra note 261, at 950.
263 Id. at 951.
264 Id.
that has formed partnerships with over 400 national and international bookmakers to share information concerning suspicious betting activities.\textsuperscript{265} This innovative approach takes advantage of betting operators’ shared concern regarding illegal betting in sport competitions.\textsuperscript{266} After all, “operators are the first to lose out if matches are fixed because in the short term they are likely to lose directly on the bets and long term lose indirectly if the market decreases because people lose faith in the sport.”\textsuperscript{267} Any international authority that leads the anti-competition manipulation movement would be wise to take advantage of betting operators’ willingness to share acquired information. Operators believe illegal betting to be such an overarching threat to their businesses that many European betting operators have created their own EWS, through which they share information between themselves and send intel to sports organizations at no cost.\textsuperscript{268} These systems would offer free labor and intelligence, thus partially alleviating concerns over the financial investment required to establish and maintain a hypothetical global agency.

One of FIFA’s defining characteristics in its approach to match-fixing is its acknowledgment of the problem of match-fixing as a serious threat to the integrity of sport.\textsuperscript{269} Following Asiagate, FIFA became so concerned with betting-related match-fixing that its President and Head of Security traveled to Zimbabwe to oversee the proceedings and to “step in” if there was a miscarriage of justice.\textsuperscript{270} FIFA went beyond mere recognition of the problem and immediately invested in its purported interest to eradicate match-fixing.\textsuperscript{271} For example, FIFA created integrated teams consisting of police, prosecutors, and international bodies and pledged €17.5 million to its ten-year plan.\textsuperscript{272} Its dedicated resources partially funded a FIFA Anti-Corruption Training Wing in Singapore and a global corruption training program that educates players, referees, and officials.\textsuperscript{273}

Despite being one of the most powerful sports governing bodies in the world, FIFA has admitted that it lacks sufficient participation and aid to reach its full potential.\textsuperscript{274} FIFA is actively requesting greater collaboration specifically with Asian governments and stakeholders in international competitions.\textsuperscript{275} Progress in building meaningful relationships with some Asian countries will be particularly difficult as nations, like the Philippines and Thailand, receive significant revenue from maintaining lax sports betting regulations and

\textsuperscript{265} Carpenter, supra note 261, at 21.
\textsuperscript{266} Id. at 22.
\textsuperscript{267} Id. at 21–22 (internal quotations omitted).
\textsuperscript{268} Id. at 22.
\textsuperscript{269} See Carpenter, supra note 261, at 21, 24.
\textsuperscript{270} Id. at 15.
\textsuperscript{271} Id. at 24.
\textsuperscript{272} Id.
\textsuperscript{273} Id.
\textsuperscript{274} See generally Carpenter, supra note 261, at 23.
\textsuperscript{275} See generally id. at 24.
enforcement.276 This reality further supports the creation of a global integrity agency that will compel countries to comply with minimum ethical standards as a prerequisite for participation in the Olympics and international competitions.

VI. CONCLUSION

Creating a successful international body to regulate any activity is a complex task. It becomes a nearly insurmountable undertaking when the activity to be regulated predates documented sports history.277 To be effective, nations should first focus their efforts on creating educational and training programs regarding competition manipulation and illegal betting. With greater knowledge and preparation, countries will be forced to recognize that betting-related competition manipulation poses a threat to the integrity of sport and to their national security. Finally, a successful international regulatory body must prioritize and enhance global cooperation, which requires establishing a real-time, information-sharing platform for all member nations.

276 See Carpenter, supra note 93, at 224.
277 See generally Prevention of Competition Manipulation, supra note 17.