“NOTHING LESS THAN INDISPENSABLE”: 
THE EXPANSION OF FEDERAL MAGISTRATE JUDGE AUTHORITY AND UTILIZATION IN THE PAST QUARTER CENTURY

Douglas A. Lee* & Thomas E. Davis**

INTRODUCTION ................................................................. 847

I. 25TH ANNIVERSARIES .......................................................... 848
   A. The Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee .......... 849
   B. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 ................................. 852
      1. Civil Justice Reform Act ........................................ 852
          a. CJRA and Magistrate Judges .............................. 852
          b. Federal Court Study Committee Implementation Act of 
             1990 ................................................................. 853
              i. Change of Title to “Magistrate Judge” .......... 854
              ii. Relaxation of Judicial Notification of Consent to 
                   Trial By Magistrate Judges in Civil Actions ...... 854
          c. Authorization of Additional District Judgeships .......... 855
   C. Peretz v. United States .............................................. 858
   D. Three Anniversaries ................................................ 862

II. EXPANSION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE AUTHORITY ..................... 863

* Douglas A. Lee has worked as a senior attorney at the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts since October 1989. He is currently the Special Advisor for Magistrate Judges in the Judicial Services Office, Department of Program Services. He received his B.A. magna cum laude from Brown University in 1979 and his J.D. from the University of Pennsylvania Law School in 1983, where he was a member of the law review. Prior to working at the Administrative Office, he was in private practice in the Philadelphia area.

** Thomas E. Davis has worked as a senior attorney at the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts since October 1997. He received his B.S.F.S. from Georgetown University in 1976, an M.A. from New York University in 1984, and his J.D. from the University of Memphis Cecil C. Humphreys School of Law in 1988. Prior to working at the Administrative Office he served as a law clerk to Senior Judge Robert M. McRae, Western District of Tennessee, from 1989–1994, and to Magistrate Judge Diane K. Vescovo, Western District of Tennessee, from 1995–1997.
A. Supreme Court Cases Discussing Magistrate Judge Authority
   Since Peretz ................................................................. 863
   1. Roell v. Withrow .................................................... 863
   2. Gonzalez v. United States ........................................ 867
B. Judicial Expansion of Magistrate Judge Authority ............ 869
   1. Felony Guilty Plea Proceedings Under Federal Rule of
      Criminal Procedure 11 .............................................. 869
      a. Report and Recommendation with the Defendant’s
         Consent ................................................................. 871
         i. United States v. Williams ................................... 872
         ii. United States v. Reyna-Tapia I & II .................... 874
         iii. United States v. Harden .................................... 877
      b. Magistrate Judge’s Acceptance of Guilty Plea ......... 878
         i. United States v. Ciapponi .................................. 879
         ii. United States v. Benton ..................................... 880
         iii. United States v. Woodard & Brown v. United States 881
      c. Conclusion ............................................................ 884
   2. Issues in Civil Consent Cases .................................... 884
      a. Magistrate Judge Authority in Class Action Consent
         Cases to Issue Rulings that Are Binding on Non-
         Consenting Parties ................................................. 885
         i. Williams v. General Electric Capital Auto Lease,
            Inc. ........................................................................ 885
         ii. Dewey v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft ............... 886
         iii. Day v. Persels & Associates, LLC ....................... 887
         iv. Stackhouse v. McKnight ....................................... 889
      b. Authority in Habeas Corpus Cases Under 28 U.S.C.
         §§ 2254–2255 .............................................................. 890
         i. Federal Habeas Corpus Cases Under § 2255 ......... 891
            (a) United States v. Johnston ............................... 891
            (b) Brown v. United States ................................. 893
         ii. State Habeas Corpus Petitions Under § 2254 ....... 895
      c. “Opt Out” Consent Procedures ................................. 897
C. Remaining Issues Under Article III of the Constitution .... 900
   1. Does Civil Consent Authority Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)
      Violate Article III of the Constitution? ....................... 900
      a. Stern v. Marshall .................................................. 901
         i. Case Summary .................................................... 902
         ii. Potential Application of Stern Reasoning to
             Magistrate Judge Authority .................................. 906
      b. Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif ......... 908
         i. Case Summary .................................................... 908
“NOTHING LESS THAN INDISPENSABLE” 847

ii. Significance of Wellness for Magistrate Judge Authority .................................................. 912


   a. Congressional Expansion of Magistrate Judge Contempt Authority.......................... 919
   b. Constitutional Questions.................................................. 921

III. THE EXPANSION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE UTILIZATION SINCE 1990.. 925
   A. Magistrate Judge Utilization: An Introduction....................... 925
   B. National Policies Favoring Flexibility and Innovation ............ 928
   C. Expansion of Duties of Magistrate Judges from 1990 to 2014 .... 930
      1. Caseload ........................................................................ 931
      2. Magistrate Judge Resources ........................................ 932
      3. More Duties and a Broader Range of Duties .................... 934
         a. Civil Cases: Pretrial Matters and Additional Duties..... 935
         b. Felony Cases: Pretrial Matters and Additional Duties .. 936
         c. Initial Proceedings in Criminal Cases.................... 938
   D. Growth Trends in Utilization of Magistrate Judges for Specific Types of Proceedings ................................................. 939
      1. Felony Guilty Pleas ..................................................... 939
      2. Search Warrants .......................................................... 940
      3. Civil Consent Cases .................................................... 942
   E. Questions Relating to Effective Utilization of Magistrate Judges ........................................................................ 943
      1. Reports and Recommendations .................................... 944
      2. The Specialist-Generalist Question ................................ 946

CONCLUSION ............................................................................. 947

INTRODUCTION

“Given the bloated dockets that district courts have now come to expect as ordinary, the role of the magistrate in today’s federal judicial system is nothing less than indispensable.” 1

Almost twenty-five years have passed since Justice Stevens wrote these words. Justice Sonia Sotomayor recently reaffirmed the importance of the

1 Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 928 (1991) (emphasis added) (quoting Virgin Islands v. Williams, 892 F.2d 305, 308 (3d Cir. 1989)).
United States magistrate judges in her majority opinion in Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, where she wrote:

Congress has also authorized the appointment of bankruptcy and magistrate judges, who do not enjoy the protections of Article III, to assist Article III courts in their work. The number of magistrate and bankruptcy judgeships exceeds the number of circuit and district judgeships. And it is no exaggeration to say that without the distinguished service of these judicial colleagues, the work of the federal court system would grind nearly to a halt.

Indeed, the organization of this conference, Magistrate Judges and the Transformation of the Federal Judiciary, with numerous distinguished contributors, further highlights the significant role that United States magistrate judges play in the operation of the federal district courts.

This conference provides us with an opportunity to share our perspectives on how the authority and utilization of magistrate judges have expanded over the past quarter century. By happy coincidence, this conference occurs twenty-five years after several events that profoundly shaped how magistrate judges exercise their authority and are utilized throughout the district courts. As senior attorneys for the Judicial Services Office in the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (Administrative Office), we have had a unique opportunity to observe the evolution of magistrate judge authority and utilization in the federal district courts that arose directly from those events.

Part I of the paper will discuss several twenty-fifth anniversaries that occurred in 2015 and 2016 that proved to have a major impact on the expansion of magistrate judge authority and utilization. Part II will examine in depth numerous Supreme Court and circuit court cases that reflect how magistrate judge authority expanded over the past twenty-five years. Part III will discuss how magistrate judge utilization has expanded in the same period.

I. 25th Anniversaries

In 1990 and 1991, several events occurred that had a significant impact on the federal magistrate judges system and led to the expansion of the magistrate judge authority and utilization throughout the United States district courts. The final report of the Federal Court Study Committee in 1990, the enactment of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, and the issuance of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Peretz v. United States in 1991 are discussed below.

---

3 Id. at 1938–39 (footnote omitted).
4 The authors would like to thank James Duff, Director of the Administrative Office of U.S Courts, Laura Minor, Associate Director, Department of Program Services, and Michele Reed, Chief, Judicial Services Office, for graciously giving us the opportunity to participate in this conference and to write this paper.
5 Peretz, 501 U.S. 923.
A. The Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee

Congress created the Federal Courts Study Committee (FCSC) in 1988 as an entity within the Judicial Conference of the United States.\(^6\) Congress instructed the Committee to “recommend revisions to be made to laws of the United States as the Committee, on the basis of such study, deems advisable.”\(^7\) Chief Justice Rehnquist appointed the FCSC’s fifteen members.\(^8\) Twenty-five years ago, on April 2, 1990, the FCSC issued its final report.\(^9\) This is the first anniversary we will discuss.

Although the FCSC’s final report made several recommendations concerning the federal magistrates system,\(^10\) two recommendations had particular significance for the development of magistrate judge authority and utilization in the years to come. First, the FCSC recommended that “Congress should amend 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(2) to allow district judges . . . to remind parties of the possibilities of consent to civil trials before magistrates.”\(^11\) Noting that the existing language of § 636(c) specifically prohibited district judges and magistrates from discussing consent with parties after they received the initial consent notice,\(^12\) the FCSC recommended allowing district judges and magistrates to further advise parties and counsel of the right to consent later in the case, while mandating that parties be told there would be no adverse consequences if they refused to consent.\(^13\) This proposed amendment to the Federal Magistrates Act,


\(^7\) Id. § 105, 102 Stat. at 4645.


\(^9\) See id.

\(^10\) The full history of the proposals submitted to the FCSC by the Committee on the Administration of the Magistrates System (Magistrates Committee) and the complete list of the FCSC’s final recommendations concerning the magistrates system are set forth in Magistrate Judges Div., Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, A Guide to the Legislative History of the Federal Magistrate Judges System 79–87 (2009) [hereinafter Legislative History].


\(^12\) The relevant language in § 636(c) stated,

the clerk of the court shall, at the time [an] action is filed, notify the parties of their right to consent to the exercise of such jurisdiction. . . . Thereafter, neither the district judge nor the magistrate shall attempt to persuade or induce any party to consent to reference of any civil matter to a magistrate.

Id. at 79–80.

\(^13\) Id. at 80. The specific statutory language suggested by the FCSC stated, “Thereafter either the district judge or the magistrate may again advise the parties of that right but, in so doing,
enacted in the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, relaxed the civil consent provision and cleared the way for innovative methods that would be utilized by district courts to encourage litigant consent to disposition of civil cases by magistrate judges.\textsuperscript{14}

The second significant recommendation of the FCSC was to request that the Judicial Conference “authorize a study of the constitutional limits of United States magistrates’ possible jurisdiction and catalog their duties.”\textsuperscript{15} In particular, the FCSC stated that “[s]ome district courts have been reluctant to expand the role of magistrates because of confusion over magistrates’ constitutional and statutory authority.”\textsuperscript{16} Noting with concern that the Supreme Court’s decisions in \textit{Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.},\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg},\textsuperscript{18} and \textit{Gomez v. United States}\textsuperscript{19} had raised “serious questions about what matters non-Article III judicial officers may handle,” the FCSC further stated:

District judges should have available an analysis of the legislative history of the Magistrates Act and a list of those duties which bear “some relation to the specified duties,” as Gomez dictates. . . . This study should include all cases and statutes (in addition to 28 U.S.C. § 636) that discuss duties magistrates may perform, so that the district court will have a full compilation of the magistrates’ statutory jurisdiction, with a description of the presumption of validity and standard of review by the district court.\textsuperscript{20}

After receiving the FCSC’s recommendations, the Judicial Conference authorized the Committee on the Administration of the Magistrate Judges System (Magistrate Committee) to conduct a study of the magistrate judges system and compile a catalog of magistrate duties.\textsuperscript{21} The Magistrate Committee distributed

\begin{itemize}
  \item shall also advise the parties that they are free to withhold consent without fear of adverse substantive consequences.” \textit{Id.}
  \item \textit{Fed. Courts Study Comm., supra} note 8, at 80.
  \item Id.
  \item See \textit{N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v Marathon Pipe Line Co.}, 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
  \item \textit{Fed. Courts Study Comm., supra} note 8, at 80.
\end{itemize}
the first part of its study, the *Inventory of United States Magistrate Judge Duties* (the *Inventory*), in December 1991, with updated editions issued in 1995, 1999, and 2013. The *Inventory* provides district courts with a quick guide to, and catalog of, the types of duties that magistrate judges may perform under statutory and case law as suggested by the FCSC. In June 1993, the Magistrate Committee published the second part of its study, *A Constitutional Analysis of Magistrate Judge Authority* (*Constitutional Analysis*), which “analyzes various Supreme Court and circuit court opinions examining the constitutional limits of magistrate judge authority [and] reviews pertinent Supreme Court opinions discussing the authority of other non-Article III judicial officers, including bankruptcy judges.” The third part of the study, *A Guide to the Legislative History of the Federal Magistrate Judges System* (*Legislative History*), constituted the legislative analysis recommended by the FCSC of the Federal Magistrates Act and other statutes, and was originally published in February 1995. An updated edition of the *Legislative History* was issued in September 2009.

In preparing these publications, the staff at the Administrative Office, which supports the Magistrate Judges Committee, monitored, collected, and summarized court decisions that involved magistrate judge authority. The staff of the Administrative Office, which includes the authors of this paper, continue to do so up to the present. In the process, they observed the changes and expansions of magistrate judge authority that have occurred over the past twenty-five years and were often asked to advise the Magistrate Judges Committee on these changes. Similarly, Administrative Office staff have also monitored the various ways district judges have utilized magistrate judges over the past quarter century and are often asked to describe and analyze such utilization techniques for the Committee and for federal judges seeking information on different ways to utilize magistrate judges. Expansion of magistrate judges’ authority and utilization were further facilitated, often in unanticipated ways, by Congress when it passed the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990.

---

Constitutional Analysis, supra, at 1–2.


23 Legislative History, supra note 10, at 92; see Constitutional Analysis, supra note 21.

24 See Legislative History, supra note 10, at 92.

25 The name was changed to the Committee on the Administration of the Magistrate Judges System from the Committee on the Administration of the Magistrates System after the official title of the office was changed to United States magistrate judge in a provision of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990. See infra Section I.B.1.a. For a more detailed explanation of the role of the Magistrate Judges Committee, the Judicial Conference, and the Administrative Office in the administration of the federal magistrate judges system, see Pro & Hnatowski, supra note 21, at 1507–10.

B. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990


1. Civil Justice Reform Act

On January 25, 1990, Senators Joseph Biden and Strom Thurmond initially introduced the CJRA as S. 2027.28 “The stated purpose of the S. 2027 was to improve access to the courts by reducing costs and delays in civil litigation.”29 The proposed legislation was based upon recommendations set forth in a report issued by the Brookings Institution in 1989.30

a. CJRA and Magistrate Judges

In its original form, “S. 2027 would have required that ‘a mandatory discovery-case management conference, presided over by a judge and not a magistrate, be held in all cases,’” and in other ways would have explicitly limited the role of magistrate judges in the civil pretrial process.31 “In testimony before the [Senate] Judiciary Committee, several witnesses, including the Judicial Conference’s representative, favored reinstatement of a pretrial role for magistrate judges.”32

On May 17, 1990, after several discussions between members of Congress and members of the Judicial Conference (including an April 1990 meeting between Chief Justice Rehnquist and Senator Biden) concerning Judicial Conference objections to the legislation, the bill was revised and resubmitted as S. 2648.33 In his statement introducing the bill, Senator Biden observed that S. 2648 contained numerous changes from the original proposed legislation.34 In

27 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 87.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 87–88.
30 Id. at 88 n.288; see BROOKINGS INST., JUSTICE FOR ALL: REDUCING COSTS AND DELAY IN CIVIL LITIGATION 12–33 (1989).
33 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 88.
34 Id.
particular, the revised legislation permitted magistrate judges to be involved in civil pretrial practice in response to concerns conveyed by the Conference and by witnesses who testified during the Judiciary Committee’s first hearing on the bill.\footnote{See 136 CONG. REC. S6473 (daily ed. May 17, 1990). For a more detailed discussion of the Judicial Conference’s objections to the Civil Justice Reform Act and its response to the proposed legislation, see LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 88–89.}

The Committee’s report on the bill gave several reasons for authorizing magistrate judges to take part in the preliminary phases of civil cases. First, the Committee expressed concern that fewer cases might settle if district judges were required to conduct all pretrial conferences because parties would be reticent to reveal all aspects of their case to the judge who would finally resolve the matter at trial.\footnote{Id. at 89 & n.292.} Second, allowing magistrate judges to handle civil case management duties would provide district judges with more time to conduct other adjudicatory matters.\footnote{Id. at 89 n.292 (quoting S. REP. NO. 101-416, at 20 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 6823 n.10).} Finally, noting that district courts faced growing civil and criminal caseloads, and that magistrate judges had increasingly impressive credentials as judges, the Committee set forth its view that magistrate judges should be given significant authority to conduct pretrial and case management duties in civil cases.\footnote{LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 89; see Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5104 (1990).} Interestingly, the Judiciary Committee, observing that the revised legislation would provide for the exercise of the “full role of magistrates in the pretrial process,” noted that “valid questions had been raised about the full extent of magistrates’ constitutional authority,” and it “therefore endorsed the recommendation of the [FCSC] that the Judicial Conference conduct an in depth study of magistrate judge authority.”\footnote{LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 89.}

The enactment of the CJRA in December 1990 acknowledged the important role of magistrate judges in the pretrial management of civil cases in the federal courts. This explicit acceptance of the use of magistrate judges in pretrial phases of federal civil litigation contributed directly to the expansion of magistrate judge authority in civil cases throughout the nation in the years following the CJRA’s enactment.

b. Federal Court Study Committee Implementation Act of 1990

The Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act appears in Title III of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990.\footnote{LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 89.} The Act’s statement of purpose described the legislation as proposing ‘noncontroversial’ recommendations of the Federal Courts Study Committee.\footnote{Id.} The Federal Courts
Study Committee Implementation Act contained [two] significant amendments to the Federal Magistrates Act."\textsuperscript{42}

\textit{i. Change of Title to “Magistrate Judge”}

Under section 321, the FCSCI Act changed the title from United States magistrate to “United States magistrate judge.”\textsuperscript{43} The section stated:

After the enactment of this Act, each United States magistrate appointed under section 631 of title 28, United States Code, shall be known as a United States magistrate judge, and any reference to any United States magistrate or magistrate that is contained in title 28, United States Code, in any other Federal statute, or in any regulation of any department or agency of the United States in the executive branch that was issued before the enactment of this Act, shall be deemed to refer to a United States magistrate judge appointed under section 631 of title 28, United States Code.\textsuperscript{44}

The title change applied equally to both full-time and part-time magistrate judges.\textsuperscript{45}

“The committee report noted that the title “judge” is commonly assigned to non-Article III adjudicators in the federal court system, and that the new title of magistrate judge is consistent with that of other judicial officers such as bankruptcy judges, tax court judges and claims court judges.”\textsuperscript{46} It further stated that “[t]he provision is one of nomenclature only and is designed to reflect more accurately the responsibilities and duties of the office,” and “[i]t is not intended to affect the substantive authority or jurisdiction of full-time or part-time magistrates.”\textsuperscript{47} In June 1991, “the Executive Committee of the Judicial Conference changed the name of the Magistrates Committee to ‘Committee on the Administration of the Magistrate Judges System.’”\textsuperscript{48}

\textit{ii. Relaxation of Judicial Notification of Consent to Trial By Magistrate Judges in Civil Actions}

Under section 308(a), the FCSCI Act “amended 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(2) to permit [district] judges and magistrate judges to advise civil litigants of the op-

\textsuperscript{42} Id. See id. at 89–91 for the procedural history of Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act.
\textsuperscript{44} Id.
\textsuperscript{45} Interestingly, the title change was described in the statute’s legislative history as a “non-controversial” recommendation of FCSC, although the FCSC did not recommend a change in the title and the Judicial Conference did not request that the title of United States magistrate be changed prior to the statute’s enactment. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 85, 89–90.
\textsuperscript{46} Id. at 90.
\textsuperscript{47} Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 101-734, at 31).
\textsuperscript{48} See id.
tion to consent to trial by a magistrate judge.” 49 In the committee report accompanying this provision, Congress expressed concern that its intent in enacting § 636(c) in 1979 was being impeded by the existing language:

Under present provisions, judicial officers may not attempt to persuade or induce any party to consent to reference of a civil matter to a magistrate. Many judges refrain entirely from mentioning to parties the option to consent to civil trial by a magistrate. Litigants in many jurisdictions often receive little more than a standardized written notification of this option with the pleadings in a civil case. As a result, most parties in civil cases do not consent to magistrate jurisdiction. The present procedures have effectively frustrated the intent of the 1979 amendments to the Federal Magistrates Act which authorized magistrates to try civil consent cases. 50

If the intent of this legislation was to further encourage the use of magistrate judges to dispose of civil cases with the consent of the parties, the effect was also to free district judges to experiment with new and novel ways of expanding the utilization of magistrate judges in civil consent cases.

c. Authorization of Additional District Judgeships

Title II of the Act, known as the Federal Judgeship Act of 1990, authorized additional Article III judgeships for the district courts and the courts of appeals. 51 Specifically, the provisions authorized sixty-one additional district court judgeships and eleven circuit court judgeships. 52 In addition, the legislation converted eight temporary district judgeships into permanent status and converted four judgeships that were split between different districts into four permanent judgeships. 53

The significance of this legislation only became apparent after many years had passed. To date, this has been the last omnibus judgeship bill where Congress authorized a significant number of Article III judgeships. In the subsequent twenty-five years, Congress authorized only twenty-seven additional permanent district judgeships: nine in 1999, ten in 2000, and eight in 2002. 54 In short, the number of Article III judges has remained largely stable over the past quarter century.

To deal with the demands of caseloads that continued to grow after 1990, district courts increasingly looked to the Judicial Conference to authorize addi-

49 Id.; see H.R. Rep. No. 101-734, at 27.
53 Id.
tional full-time magistrate judge positions. Between fiscal years 1990 and 2016, the Judicial Conference authorized 234 new full-time magistrate judge positions, while converting or eliminating 117 part-time magistrate judge positions and 5 clerk/magistrate judge positions. The contrast with the Article III judi-

ciary is startling. The number of full-time magistrate judges has increased by 62 percent in the past twenty-five years. In the same time period, as noted above, the growth in the number of Article III judgeships has been negligible.

At the same time, the role of part-time magistrate judges in the federal courts has declined, with a significant decrease in the number of these positions. In fiscal year 1990, there were 159 part-time magistrate judge positions, while in fiscal year 2014 only 36 part-time positions remained, a decline of 78 percent. Much of this decline can be attributed to the long-standing preference of Congress and the Judicial Conference for establishing a system of full-time magistrate judges where feasible. Indeed, the Magistrates Committee made the following recommendation at its June 1990 meeting for the Judicial Conference’s consideration in September 1990:

Your Committee concluded that it must move faster in achieving a system composed primarily of full-time magistrates. Consequently, your Committee concluded that all part-time magistrate positions should be examined in the near future, with a view towards expediting the process of eliminating, consolidating, or converting the positions. Some part-time magistrate positions will undoubtedly need to be retained at locations where the volume of district court business clearly does not warrant the authorization of a full-time magistrate position, but where other legitimate considerations exist. In this respect, your Committee is of the opinion that geographical considerations and the cost-savings generally as-


58 See Legislative History, supra note 10, at 9–10, 24, 46, 51, 73, 77–78.
associated with part-time magistrate positions are not sufficient in and of themselves to justify retention of individual part-time magistrate positions.\textsuperscript{59}

In response, the Conference reaffirmed its view that the federal magistrates system should as much as possible consist of full-time judicial officers, and therefore endorsed the Committee’s plan “to review each part-time magistrate position on an individual basis with a view towards eliminating as many part-time positions as feasible, either by abolishing them, combining them, or converting them to full-time status.”\textsuperscript{60} This is exactly what happened in the following twenty-five years, with a large number of these part-time positions being converted into full-time magistrate judge positions.\textsuperscript{61}

C. \textit{Peretz v. United States}

The third significant anniversary occurred in 2016. June 27, 2016, was the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Supreme Court’s decision in \textit{Peretz v. United States},\textsuperscript{62} a case that has had an enormous impact on how magistrate judges are used in the district courts. Indeed, much of the expansion of magistrate judge duties in the past twenty-five years has resulted from the Court’s interpretation of § 636(b)(3) and its view that magistrate judges may handle many critical duties in felony and other cases, with the defendant’s consent and with the availability of \textit{de novo} review by an Article III judge.

As in the Court’s earlier decision in \textit{Gomez v. United States},\textsuperscript{63} \textit{Peretz} concerned whether a magistrate judge could preside over \textit{voir dire} in a felony case.\textsuperscript{64} Unlike the petitioner in \textit{Gomez}, however, petitioner Rafael Peretz specifically consented to having a magistrate judge select the jury in his case.\textsuperscript{65} For the majority in \textit{Peretz}, the defendant’s consent to the magistrate judge’s authority was the critical factor that allowed the referral of \textit{voir dire} to a magistrate judge without violating Article III of the Constitution.\textsuperscript{66}

\textsuperscript{59} \textit{Id.} at 77.

\textsuperscript{60} \textit{Id.} at 78; accord JCUS-SEP 1990, \textit{supra} note 55, at 93.

\textsuperscript{61} For example, at its June 2015 meeting the Magistrate Judges Committee voted to recommend “the conversion of the part-time magistrate judge position at Wichita Falls in the Northern District of Texas to a full-time magistrate judge position designated as Wichita Falls or Fort Worth.” JCUS-SEP 2015, \textit{supra} note 55. The recommendation was subsequently adopted by the Judicial Conference at its September 2015 session and the last part-time magistrate judge position in the Fifth Circuit will be discontinued with the appointment of the newly-authorized full-time magistrate judge position. \textit{Id.}


\textsuperscript{63} \textit{Gomez v. United States}, 490 U.S. 858, 874–76 (1989) (holding that § 636(b)(3) did not authorize a magistrate judge to conduct \textit{voir dire} in a felony case as an additional duty if the defendant objected to the magistrate judge’s involvement); see also \textit{CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS}, \textit{supra} note 21, at 12–14.

\textsuperscript{64} \textit{Peretz}, 501 U.S. at 925.

\textsuperscript{65} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{66} See \textit{id.} at 936.
Peretz was charged with importing heroin in the Eastern District of New York.67 At a pretrial conference attended by Peretz and his attorney, the district judge asked Peretz’s attorney if he had any objection to a magistrate judge selecting the jury for the trial.68 Counsel responded, “I would love the opportunity.”69 Before beginning jury selection, the magistrate judge also received assurances from counsel that there was no objection to her involvement.70 The magistrate judge selected the jury, and the district judge was not asked to review any ruling made by the magistrate judge during voir dire.71

The case proceeded to trial and Peretz was convicted.72 Only on appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (and after the Supreme Court had released its opinion in *Gomez*) did the defendant raise an objection to the magistrate judge’s involvement in voir dire.73 The court of appeals rejected the petitioner’s argument and upheld the conviction.74 Recognizing a split in the circuit courts’ interpretations of its *Gomez* decision,75 the Supreme Court granted Peretz’s petition for certiorari.76

Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, began his analysis by declaring, “Our holding in *Gomez* was narrow.”77 Justice Stevens emphasized that the question before the Court in *Gomez* was limited to whether a magistrate judge could conduct felony voir dire over a defendant’s objection.78 Even while the Court had held in *Gomez* that felony voir dire without the defendant’s consent was not an “additional duty” that could be delegated to magistrate judges under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3), it also recognized that magistrate judges “play an integral and important role in the federal judicial system.”79

The petitioner’s consent changed everything in *Peretz*. Unlike *Gomez*, where the Court deduced “an alternative interpretation of the additional duties clause” from the context of the statutory scheme to avoid constitutional ques-

67 Id. at 925.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 *See, e.g.*, United States v. Musacchia, 900 F.2d 493, 494 (2d Cir. 1990), *vacated*, 955 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Wey, 895 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1990); Virgin Islands v. Williams, 892 F.2d 305 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Lopez-Pena, 912 F.2d 1542 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Vanwort, 887 F.2d 375, 382–83 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. France, 886 F.2d 223, 226 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Mang Sun Wong, 884 F.2d 1537, 1544 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. Ford, 824 F.2d 1430, 1430–31 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc).
76 *Peretz*, 501 U.S. at 927.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 927–28 (quoting *Gomez* v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 869 (1989)).
petitioner’s consent in Peretz removed many of the perceived constitutional difficulties. Justice Stevens declared, “The absence of any constitutional difficulty removes one concern that motivated us in Gomez to require unambiguous evidence of Congress’ intent to include jury selection among a magistrate’s additional duties.” Consent thus provided the Court with greater latitude to construe the “additional duties” clause and Congress’ intent.

Under the majority’s reasoning, the reduction of constitutional concerns allowed the Court to focus on the Federal Magistrate Act’s more general purpose of aiding the judiciary. The Act’s purpose thus became paramount to the Court:

The generality of the category of “additional duties” indicates that Congress intended to give federal judges significant leeway to experiment with possible improvements in the efficiency of the judicial process that had not already been tried or even foreseen. If Congress had intended strictly to limit these additional duties to functions considered in the committee hearings or debates, presumably it would have included in the statute a bill of particulars rather than a broad residuary clause. Construing this residuary clause absent concerns about raising a constitutional issue or depriving a defendant of an important right, we should not foreclose constructive experiments that are acceptable to all participants in the trial process and are consistent with the basic purposes of the statute.

Although the Court acknowledged the importance of voir dire as a critical phase of a felony trial, the Court again viewed consent as the key factor. The Court revisited its statutory analysis in Gomez to determine whether there was a connection between consensual felony voir dire and other duties referred to magistrate judges under the Act.

The Court noted that “[b]ecause the specified duties that Congress authorized magistrates to perform without the consent of the parties were not comparable in importance to supervision of felony trial voir dire . . . , we did not waver from our conclusion that a magistrate cannot conduct voir dire over the defendant’s objection.” Justice Stevens concluded, “However, with the parties’ consent, a district judge may delegate to a magistrate supervision of entire civil and misdemeanor trials. These duties are comparable in responsibility and importance to presiding over voir dire at a felony trial.” Accordingly, felony voir dire with the defendant’s consent was a permissible additional duty under § 636(b)(3).

Consent was also crucial to the Court’s constitutional analysis. Justice Stevens began by stating flatly that “[t]here is no constitutional infirmity in the delegation of felony trial jury selection to a magistrate when the litigants con-

---

80 Gomez, 490 U.S. at 864.
81 Peretz, 501 U.S. at 932.
82 Id. at 932–33.
83 Id. at 931.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 932.
86 Id. at 933.
87 Id.
sent.”

This position was based on a two-step Article III analysis. First, the majority observed that the Court in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, United States v. Gagnon, and other decisions had held that a litigant may waive his or her right to an Article III judge, as well as other fundamental rights in both civil and criminal cases. Accordingly, the Court concluded that with his consent the defendant in Peretz had waived any personal constitutional right to a district judge at voir dire.

Second, even if the “structural” protections of Article III, which guarantee the separation of powers between the three branches of the government, could not be waived by an individual litigant, the Court concluded that the district court’s procedures in supervising magistrate judges allayed any fears that Article III had been violated. A district court’s overall control of its magistrate judges through its powers of appointment and removal, the referral of duties, and its ultimate power to review the magistrate judge’s actions in conducting the voir dire satisfied any separation of powers concerns regarding the independence of the Judiciary from the other branches.

To reach its conclusion, the majority adopted Justice Blackmun’s concurring opinion in United States v. Raddatz, where he concluded that the district court’s supervisory authority over magistrate judges satisfied lingering constitutional questions:

Under these circumstances, I simply do not perceive the threat to the judicial power or the independence of judicial decisionmaking that underlies Art. III . . . [W]e confront a procedure under which Congress has vested in Art. III judges the discretionary power to delegate certain functions to competent and impartial assistants, while ensuring that the judges retain complete supervisory control over the assistants’ activities.

The majority finally addressed the issue of the appropriate standard of review applicable to § 636(b)(3) that had troubled the Court in Gomez. While acknowledging that the statutory provision contained no express standard of review to be applied by the supervising court, the Court again cited Raddatz for the proposition that any standard of review under § 636(b) is only invoked when a party objects to the magistrate judge’s decision. Because Peretz did not object to the magistrate judge’s handling of voir dire at trial, the issue of the applicable standard of review did not arise in the case at bar. The Court noted,
however, that if review was requested, “nothing in the statute precludes a district court from providing the review that the Constitution requires.” By implication, the Court suggested that de novo determination might be applicable.

The majority’s opinion in Peretz,99 with its emphasis on litigant consent and its reaffirmation of Congress’ purpose in enacting the Federal Magistrates Act to allow for constructive experimentation in referring duties to magistrate judges, would prove to have a significant impact on magistrate judge authority and utilization in succeeding years. As we shall explore in greater detail, district courts have repeatedly applied the reasoning in Peretz as a basis for expanding magistrate judge utilization in a variety of innovative ways.

D. Three Anniversaries

Taken together, the FCSC’s final report in April 1990, the enactment of the Judicial Improvements Act in December 1990, and the Supreme Court’s opinion in Peretz in June 1991 set the stage for the significant expansion of magistrate judge authority and utilization that occurred in the following years. For the first time, pursuant to the FCSC’s recommendation, district judges and magistrate judges were provided with reference materials, particularly the Inventory, which provided a catalog of duties that could be referred to magistrate judges.100 As we shall discuss in greater depth, the CJRA specifically encouraged district courts to use magistrate judges in pretrial case management.101 In addition, the FCSC implementation provisions enacted in 1990 changed the official title of the office to “magistrate judge” and made it easier for district judges and magistrate judges to discuss with litigants the option of consenting to have a magistrate judge dispose of civil cases under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).102 A year later, the Supreme Court in Peretz permitted magistrate judges to conduct critical duties in felony cases with the parties’ consent, and reaffirmed a basic purpose of the Federal Magistrates Act to encourage district courts to experiment with innovative ways with using magistrate judges.103

Finally, although not recognized until years later, Congress’s reluctance to authorize significant numbers of Article III judgeships in the years following the Federal Judgeship Act of 1990 led district courts to seek the authorization of large numbers of additional magistrate judge positions to deal with growing caseloads.104 The result was profound growth in the authority and utilization of

98 Id.
99 For a more detailed examination of the Peretz decision, including discussion of the dissenting opinions in the case, see CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 21, at 16–21.
100 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
102 See FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., supra note 8, at 79–80.
103 See Peretz, 501 U.S. at 940.
104 See supra Part I.A.
magistrate judges in the subsequent twenty-five years. The following parts of our paper will describe examples of how courts expanded magistrate judge utilization and the various ways federal courts extended the authority of magistrate judges.

II. EXPANSION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE AUTHORITY

A. Supreme Court Cases Discussing Magistrate Judge Authority Since Peretz

Since the Peretz decision, the Supreme Court has decided two more cases dealing with magistrate judge authority under 28 U.S.C. § 636: Roell v. Withrow, concerning litigant consent in civil cases referred to magistrate judges under § 636(c), and Gonzalez v. United States, concerning consent to a magistrate judge presiding over felony voir dire as an “additional duty” under § 636(b)(3). While neither case deals directly with the constitutionality of magistrate judge authority under Article III, both cases have facilitated the expansion of magistrate judge authority in the district courts in recent years.

1. Roell v. Withrow

In Roell, the Supreme Court, in a five to four decision, held that consent to disposition of a civil case by a magistrate judge may be inferred in certain circumstances “from a party’s conduct during litigation.”

Respondent Jon Withrow, a Texas state prisoner, filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the Southern District of Texas against several prison officials, alleging that the officials “deliberately disregarded his medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment.” At a preliminary hearing, a magistrate judge informed Withrow that he could choose to have the magistrate judge rather than a district judge preside over the case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

Withrow consented orally to disposition by the magistrate judge. But an attorney from the Texas attorney general’s office, who was not permanently assigned to the case, stated that she would need to talk to the attorneys assigned to the case concerning consent.

The district judge subsequently referred the case to the magistrate judge, indicating that “all defendants [would] be given an opportunity to consent” to disposition by the magistrate judge and that the referral would be withdrawn if

105 See supra Part I.A.
108 Roell, 538 U.S. at 582.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 582–83.
111 Id. at 583.
112 Id.
any of the defendants did not consent. After the clerk of court sent the referral order to all the defendants, which included a “summons directing them to include [i]n their answer” a statement either that the defendants consented or did not consent to disposition by the magistrate judge, only one defendant gave written consent, while defendants Roell and Garibay filed answers that were silent about consent.

The case proceeded to a jury trial before the magistrate judge and all of the parties voluntarily participated without raising any objections to the magistrate judge’s authority. After a verdict was reached in favor of the defendants, Withrow appealed to the Fifth Circuit. The circuit court sua sponte remanded the case, instructing the district court to determine whether all the parties had consented to trial before the magistrate judge. Only at this time did defendants Roell and Garibay file formal written consents with the district court. The district judge referred the remanded case back to the magistrate judge. The magistrate judge issued a report finding that, although Roell and Garibay “by their actions [had] clearly implied their consent” to the magistrate judge’s jurisdiction, under Fifth Circuit precedent, consent to disposition by a magistrate judge could not be implied by the parties’ conduct. The magistrate judge therefore concluded that she did not have authority to try the case. After the district judge adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, the defendants again appealed to the Fifth Circuit. The appellate court concluded that (1) consent to disposition by a magistrate judge under § 636(c) must be express; (2) consent could not be implied by conduct; and (3) the two defendants’ post-judgment consent did not satisfy the statutory consent requirement. After the court affirmed the district court’s ruling, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Justice Souter, writing for the majority, began by analyzing the text of § 636(c) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73(b):

The procedure created by 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(2) and Rule 73(b) thus envisions advance, written consent communicated to the clerk, the point being to preserve the confidentiality of a party’s choice, in the interest of protecting an objecting party against any possible prejudice at the magistrate judge’s hands later on.
After acknowledging that what occurred in Withrow’s case did not conform to these procedures, the majority stated:

Nonetheless, Roell and Garibay “clearly implied their consent” by their decision to appear before the Magistrate Judge, without expressing any reservation, after being notified of their right to refuse and after being told that she intended to exercise case-dispositive authority. The only question is whether consent so shown can count as conferring “civil jurisdiction” under § 636(c)(1), or whether adherence to the letter of § 636(c)(2) is an absolute demand. 126

The Court closely examined the text of § 636(c), noting the provision merely requires “the consent of the parties” for disposition of a case before a full-time magistrate judge. 127 The Court contrasted this language with the provision allowing for consent to trial before part-time magistrate judges, noting that the statute required “specific written consent” in that situation. 128 Focusing on this distinction, the majority reasoned that while the procedures set forth in § 636(c) and Rule 73(b) should not be considered merely advisory, a defect in the referral of a civil consent case to a magistrate judge would not “eliminate that magistrate judge’s ‘civil jurisdiction’ under § 636(c)(1) so long as the parties have in fact voluntarily consented.” 129

The Court then emphasized Congress’s practical concerns in relieving civil caseloads and granting “improve[d] access to the courts” as justification for permitting a defendant’s implied consent in certain circumstances. 130 Balancing these considerations, Justice Souter noted that “the virtue of strict insistence on the express consent requirement embodied in § 636(c)(2) is simply the value of any bright line: here, absolutely minimal risk of compromising the right to an Article III judge.” 131 He also noted, however, that application of such a rule ran the risk of wasting “a full and complicated trial . . . at the option of an undeserving and possibly opportunistc litigant.” 132 Justice Souter reasoned that because “Withrow consented orally and in writing to the Magistrate Judge’s authority following notice of his right to elect trial by an Article III district judge,” the plaintiff received the protection intended by the Federal Magistrates Act, and therefore Withrow did not deserve to receive an advantage from some of the defendants’ failure to expressly consent to the magistrate judge’s authority. 133

Under the situation in this case, the majority concluded,

The bright line is not worth the downside. We think the better rule is to accept implied consent where, as here, the litigant or counsel was made aware of

126 Id. at 586–87 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
127 Id. at 587.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 588.
131 Id. at 589–90.
132 Id. at 590.
133 Id.
the need for consent and the right to refuse it, and still voluntarily appeared to try the case before the Magistrate Judge. Inferring consent in these circumstances thus checks the risk of gamesmanship by depriving parties of the luxury of waiting for the outcome before denying the magistrate judge’s authority. Judicial efficiency is served; the Article III right is substantially honored.\textsuperscript{134}

Concluding that “Roell’s and Garbay’s general appearances before the Magistrate Judge” after being informed of their right to adjudication by a district judge was sufficient to constitute consent to the magistrate judge’s authority under § 636(c), the Court reversed the appellate court’s judgment.\textsuperscript{135}

The Court’s reasoning in \textit{Roell} has significantly altered the meaning of consent under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Whereas before, courts had routinely held that a party’s consent to disposition of a civil case by a magistrate judge had to be “clear, unambiguous, explicit,” and on the record, if not necessarily in writing,\textsuperscript{136} \textit{Roell} opened the door to the ambiguities of implied consent. Courts are still wrestling with the implications raised by \textit{Roell}.\textsuperscript{137} Moreover, as we shall see, the majority’s reasoning in \textit{Roell} was a major factor in the Supreme Court’s recent decision concerning the consensual authority of bankruptcy judges in \textit{Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif}.\textsuperscript{138}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{134} Id. \\
\textsuperscript{135} Id. at 591. \\
\textsuperscript{136} Lovelace v. Dall, 820 F.2d 223, 223 (7th Cir. 1987); see, e.g., Am. Suzuki Motor Corp. v. Bill Kummer, Inc., 65 F.3d 1381 (7th Cir. 1995); Hall v. Sharpe, 812 F.2d 644 (11th Cir. 1987); Archie v. Christian, 808 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc); Ambrose v. Welch, 729 F.2d 1084 (6th Cir. 1984) (per curiam). \\
\textsuperscript{137} See, e.g., Yeldon v. Fisher, 710 F.3d 452 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that a pro se plaintiff in a prisoner civil rights case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, who explicitly indicated on the consent form at the beginning of his case that he did not consent to disposition of his case by a magistrate judge, could not be found to have impliedly consented to the magistrate judge’s authority under the reasoning of \textit{Roell}, even though he participated in subsequent litigation before the magistrate judge); Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that a prisoner plaintiff’s execution of the district court’s form consenting to disposition by “a United States magistrate judge” was sufficient to constitute consent to have the case disposed of by another magistrate judge after the case was reassigned from the magistrate judge who originally received the referral, and that the plaintiff’s conduct during litigation before the second magistrate judge also constituted implied consent to disposition of the case by the magistrate judge under the Supreme Court’s reasoning in \textit{Roell}, even if the consent form signed by the plaintiff was in some way defective); Chambless v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 481 F.3d 1345 (11th Cir. 2007) (applying the reasoning in \textit{Roell} and holding the plaintiff’s original consent to disposition of her Title VII case by a magistrate judge under § 636(c), combined with her conduct during pretrial proceedings before the magistrate judge in her second, related civil rights employment case, together would be construed to constitute consent to having the magistrate judge dispose of the second case); Phillips v. Beierwaltes, 466 F.3d 1217 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding magistrate judge did not have authority to make a final ruling on a foreign party’s application for assistance in obtaining discovery from non-party witnesses under 28 U.S.C. § 1782, where there was no evidence that the parties consented to the magistrate judge’s authority, and where there was no notification to the defendants or their counsel of the need to consent or the right to refuse consent, \textit{Roell} does not permit the court to infer consent to the magistrate judge’s authority to act for the district court). \\
\textsuperscript{138} 135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015). For a detailed analysis of the \textit{Wellness} decision, see infra Section II.C.1.b.
\end{flushright}
2. Gonzalez v. United States

In Gonzalez v. United States, the Supreme Court held, in an eight to one decision, that the express consent by a defendant’s attorney is sufficient to permit a magistrate judge to preside over jury selection in a felony trial under § 636(b)(3).139

As in Gomez and Peretz, the Supreme Court focused on magistrate judge authority to conduct felony voir dire proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) to explore the nature of litigant consent to a magistrate judge.140 Defendant Homero Gonzalez was charged in the Southern District of Texas with felony drug offenses.141 During the selection of the jury at trial, Gonzalez’s counsel consented on the defendant’s behalf to have a magistrate judge preside over voir dire.142 Gonzalez made no objection and was subsequently convicted on all charges.143 On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, Gonzalez contended “for the first time” that the district court erred in not obtaining his personal consent to have the magistrate judge preside over voir dire.144 The appellate court concluded that there was no error, holding that the right to have a district judge preside over jury selection could be waived by a defendant’s attorney, and thus affirmed the convictions.145 The Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari to resolve a split among courts of appeals on this issue.146

Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy began by examining the Federal Magistrates Act, particularly the “additional duties” provision at 28 U.S.C. § 636(b).147 Restating the Court’s earlier reasoning in Gomez and Peretz, he framed the question before the Court as follows:

Taken together, Gomez and Peretz mean that “the additional duties” the statute permits the magistrate judge to undertake include presiding at voir dire and jury selection provided there is consent but not if there is an objection. We now consider whether the consent can be given by counsel acting on behalf of the client but without the client’s own express consent.148

The majority acknowledged that there are some instances in federal criminal proceedings where only the defendant can waive the right in question, citing as the primary example the felony plea colloquy under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, where the presiding judge must determine whether the defendant understands the rights he or she is waiving by pleading guilty.149

---

140 Id. at 243.
141 Id. at 244.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 244–45.
147 Id. at 245.
148 Id. at 246.
149 Id. at 247.
Court also noted that some statutes mandate explicit consent by the defendant, such as the waiver of adjudication by a district judge in Class A misdemeanor cases under 18 U.S.C. § 3401(b). Noting that 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) lacks such clarity, the majority observed that “for now it suffices to note that we have acknowledged that some rights cannot be waived by the attorney alone.”

At the same time, however, the Court also observed that other rights in a criminal trial may be waived by a defendant’s attorney as a matter of trial management. After noting the pragmatic necessity for counsel to make many decisions at trial on behalf of their clients, the Court observed that the question of who should preside over voir dire in a felony trial was similar to other tactical decisions that the Court had recognized could be left to the attorney without the defendant’s express consent. The majority thus concluded “that express consent by counsel suffices to permit a magistrate judge to preside over jury selection in a felony trial, pursuant to the authorization in § 636(b)(3).”

The Court further observed:

Although a criminal defendant may demand that an Article III judge preside over the selection of a jury, the choice to do so reflects considerations more significant to the realm of the attorney than to the accused. Requiring the defendant to consent to a magistrate judge only by way of an on-the-record personal statement is not dictated by precedent and would burden the trial process, with little added protection for the defendant.

The Court therefore held that, under § 636(b)(3), a magistrate judge may preside over voir dire in a felony case where either the defendant or his counsel consented. After noting that it did not decide the question of whether such consent might be inferred from either the party’s or his or her counsel’s failure to raise an objection to participation by the magistrate judge, the Court affirmed the court of appeal’s ruling.

The Gonzalez decision is significant because it reaffirmed the Court’s earlier reasoning in Peretz that a defendant’s consent was sufficient to permit a magistrate judge to conduct a critical stage of a felony criminal trial as an “additional dut[y]” under § 636(b)(3). Moreover, in rejecting the defendant’s argument that consent under § 636(b)(3) must be express and personal, the Court also reaffirmed its holding in Roell that a party may authorize the disposition of his civil case by a full-time magistrate judge via implied consent. Lower

---

150 Id.
151 Id. at 247–48.
152 Id. at 249.
153 Id. at 250.
154 Id. at 250.
155 Id. at 253.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 246.
159 Id. at 252.
courts have applied the Court’s reasoning in *Gonzalez* to permit counsel to consent on behalf of defendants in other critical stages of a felony case.160

**B. Judicial Expansion of Magistrate Judge Authority**

The Judicial Improvements Act of 1990161 did not end congressional expansion of magistrate judge authority. In the years following 1990, Congress on several occasions amended the Federal Magistrates Act to increase magistrate judge authority in both civil and criminal cases.162 Nevertheless, federal courts have remained at the forefront in expanding magistrate judge authority (and debating the nature of such expansion), often in ways unanticipated when the Act was first enacted.

1. *Felony Guilty Plea Proceedings Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11*

Perhaps the most dramatic expansion of magistrate judge authority in the past twenty-five years has been in the referral of guilty plea colloquies in felony cases under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 to magistrate judges. Applying the Supreme Court’s holding in *Peretz* that critical stages in felony cases may be referred to magistrate judges under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) with the defendant’s consent, district judges throughout the country began to refer guilty plea proceedings to magistrate judges in increasing numbers.163

It is notable that courts increased the referral of felony Rule 11 plea proceedings to magistrate judges despite early disapproval of the practice by the Magistrate Judges Committee. At its December 1991 meeting, the members of the Committee expressed the “strong view that judicial duties in critical stages of a felony trial, particularly the acceptance of guilty pleas and conducting sen-

---

160 See, e.g., United States v. Gamba, 541 F.3d 895, 900 (9th Cir. 2008) (applying *Gonzalez* and holding that defense counsel’s consent to having a magistrate judge preside over closing arguments in a felony trial without the defendant’s express personal consent was lawful).

161 See supra Part I.B.

162 For detailed discussion of amendments to the Federal Magistrates Act that expanded magistrate judges’ authority after 1990, see LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 93–97.

tencing proceedings, as well as presiding over the felony trial itself, are fundamental elements of the authority district judges under Article III of the Constitution."164 The Committee further stated that felony guilty plea proceedings should not be referred "to magistrate judges as a matter of policy, regardless of whether the parties consent to the delegation."165 This position concerning felony guilty pleas "was originally proposed for Judicial Conference consideration, but was withdrawn for further consideration at the Committee’s June 1992 meeting."166

At its June 1992 meeting, the Magistrate Judges Committee, in an information item in its report to the September 1992 session of the Judicial Conference, reiterated its earlier position “that judicial duties in certain ‘critical stages of felony cases, including accepting guilty pleas, conducting sentencing proceedings, and presiding over the trial of a felony case,’” are fundamental elements of the “authority of Article III judges and, therefore, were not appropriate for delegation to magistrate judges,” regardless of whether a defendant consents to a Magistrate Judge’s involvement.167 Nevertheless, “[t]he Committee did not seek Judicial Conference endorsement of its position at that time.”168

During long-range planning discussions, the majority of the Committee’s members stated that the parties’ consent to magistrate judge authority in felony proceedings reduced constitutional questions about such authority. By contrast, a smaller number of the Committee’s members disagreed with this view and reiterated concerns about the constitutionality of magistrate judges conducting certain critical proceedings in felony cases.169 Accordingly, “the Committee agreed that ‘it would be prudent to proceed cautiously, expanding the involvement of magistrate judges in felony matters on an experimental basis.’”170 After sessions devoted to the discussion of long-range planning for the federal magistrate judges system, the Committee issued a report, where the Committee wrote, “[t]he projected growth of the criminal caseload of the federal courts makes the delegation of expanded consensual felony authority to magistrate judges an increasingly acceptable alternative for courts attempting to manage growing felony and civil dockets.”171 The Committee therefore suggested that pilot programs might be set up in certain district courts where magistrate judges would be permitted to conduct guilty plea proceedings and sentence felony de-

---

164 See CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 21, at 56–57.
165 Id. at 57.
166 Id.
167 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 66 (quoting JCUS-MAR 1992, supra note 55, at 16–17); accord CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 21, at 57.
168 See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 66.
169 Id.
171 Id. at 66 (quoting MAGISTRATE JUDGES PLAN, supra note 170, at 4–6).
fendants, with the parties’ consent and under the supervision and control of district judges. It also recommended that if federal courts found these programs to be constitutional, “an additional experimental pilot program be established to permit magistrate judges to try felony cases with consent.”

The Committee, however, included these recommendations merely as information items to the September 1994 session of the Judicial Conference, and the full Conference did not express any views on them. In addition, although these recommendations were included in the Supplement to the Long Range Plan, no district court set up any pilot programs. But the referral of felony guilty plea proceedings to magistrate judges expanded in numerous courts regardless of the changing views of the Committee.

Every circuit court of appeals that has examined the issue of the referral of felony guilty plea proceedings to magistrate judges has concluded that the practice does not violate the Constitution and that “plea colloquies under [Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure] 11 in felony cases are additional duties that may be delegated to magistrate judges under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) with the defendants’ consent.” At the same time, however, courts have disagreed over whether the magistrate judge may only issue a report recommending whether or not the plea should be accepted by the district judge, or whether the magistrate judge may actually accept the defendant’s plea. Cases on both sides of this disagreement are analyzed below.

a. Report and Recommendation with the Defendant’s Consent

Most circuit courts have held that a magistrate judge may conduct a felony guilty plea proceeding under Rule 11 with the defendant’s consent, after which the magistrate judge must prepare a report recommending whether the district judge should accept the defendant’s plea. Several of these cases are discussed below.

172 Id. at 66–67.
173 Id. at 67.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 See infra Part III.D.1 for further analysis of the utilization of magistrate judges in felony guilty plea proceedings.
177 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 67 n.228; see United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d 424, 433 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v. Vega-Martinez, 425 F.3d 15, 18 (1st Cir. 2005); United States v. Woodard, 387 F.3d 1329, 1329 (11th Cir. 2004); United States v. Reyna-Tapia (Reyna-Tapia II), 328 F.3d 1114, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc); United States v. Torres, 258 F.3d 791, 791–92 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Dees, 125 F.3d 261, 269 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Ciapponi, 77 F.3d 1247, 1251 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Williams, 23 F.3d 629, 629 (2d Cir. 1994); see also United States v. Harden, 758 F.3d 886, 891 (7th Cir. 2014) (addressing the defendant’s statutory, not constitutional, claim).
178 See Harden, 758 F.3d at 891; Reyna-Tapia II, 328 F.3d at 1122; Torres, 258 F.3d at 796; Dees, 125 F.3d at 269; Williams, 23 F.3d at 634.
i. United States v. Williams

In 1994, the Second Circuit, in United States v. Williams, became the first federal appellate court to address whether a magistrate judge could constitutionally be referred a felony guilty plea proceeding with the defendant’s consent on a report and recommendation basis. The Second Circuit held that a magistrate judge could administer the colloquy under Rule 11 to accept a defendant’s guilty plea in a felony case with the defendant’s consent without violating Article III of the Constitution or the Federal Magistrates Act. The court further endorsed a procedure whereby the magistrate judge conducted the Rule 11 allocution with the defendant’s consent and submitted a recommendation to the district judge regarding whether to accept the guilty plea.

After defendant Lloyd Williams was arrested in 1991 and charged with felony drug importation offenses in the Eastern District of New York, he consented in writing to have a magistrate judge conduct the proceeding to accept his guilty plea. Following the district’s standard practice, a magistrate judge conducted the plea allocution, made a finding that the guilty plea was made knowingly and voluntarily by the defendant, and submitted a recommendation to the district judge that Williams’s guilty plea be accepted. The district court agreed, accepted Williams’s guilty plea, and sentenced him to 292 months of imprisonment. Williams appealed to the Second Circuit, arguing that allowing a magistrate judge to conduct the guilty plea colloquy under Rule 11 violated Article III of the Constitution and the Federal Magistrates Act, notwithstanding his consent to the procedure.

The appellate court first examined whether the referral of felony guilty plea proceedings to magistrate judges was permissible under the Federal Magistrates Act. Noting that 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) was the provision of the Act that applied in this case, the court acknowledged it was bound by Gomez and Peretz. The court further stated:

In order for a Rule 11 allocation properly to fall within the sphere of “additional duties” authorized by Congress in the Magistrates Act, it must bear some relationship to those duties already assigned to magistrates by the Act. An allocution is an ordinary garden variety type of ministerial function that magistrate judges commonly perform on a regular basis. The catechism administered to a defendant is now a standard one, dictated in large measure by the comprehensive provisions of Rule 11 itself, which carefully explain what a court must inquire

---

179 See Williams, 23 F.3d 629.
180 Id. at 630.
181 Id. at 634.
182 Id. at 630.
183 Id. at 631.
184 Id.
185 Id. at 632.
186 Id.
187 Id.
about, what it should advise a defendant and what it should determine before accepting a plea. Further, administering an allocation is less complex than a number of duties the Magistrates Act specifically authorizes magistrates to perform. For example, such judicial officers may hear and determine pretrial matters, other than eight dispositive motions. In addition, a magistrate may conduct hearings, including evidentiary hearings, and submit to the district court recommended findings of fact for the eight dispositive motions, and do the same with habeas petitions.\textsuperscript{188}

The court also noted that even if guilty plea proceedings were of greater importance than other duties specifically assigned to magistrate judges, “the consent requirement—fulfilled in this case—saves the delegation. Consent is the key.”\textsuperscript{189} The panel therefore held “that the ‘additional duties’ clause of the Magistrates Act authorizes a district court judge in a felony prosecution to delegate to a magistrate judge the task of administering a Rule 11 allocution, provided the defendant consents.”\textsuperscript{190}

Turning to the defendant’s constitutional argument, the court again relied on the Supreme Court’s analysis in Peretz to conclude that the defendant’s consent was crucial to the constitutional analysis “because a defendant may waive even his most basic rights.”\textsuperscript{191} The panel also cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor\textsuperscript{192} to conclude the structural protections of Article III are not implicated. Because the district court remains in control of the proceeding, and the matter is reported to that court for its approval, there should be no concern that the use of a magistrate judge to allocute a defendant accused of a felony will tend to devitalize Article III courts.\textsuperscript{193}

The court observed that the district judge was free to review the transcript of the Rule 11 colloquy and could re-administer the allocution if infirmities were discovered.\textsuperscript{194} The court therefore concluded that the referral of the felony guilty plea proceeding to the magistrate judge in Williams’s case did not contravene Article III of the Constitution and affirmed the district court’s judgment.\textsuperscript{195}

As the first court of appeals case to address the issue of whether felony guilty plea proceedings could be referred to magistrate judges without violating the Federal Magistrates Act or the Constitution, the Williams decision has been

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{188} Id. at 632–33 (citations omitted).
\item \textsuperscript{189} Id. at 633.
\item \textsuperscript{190} Id. at 634.
\item \textsuperscript{191} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{192} 478 U.S. 833 (1986). See \textit{Constitutional Analysis}, supra note 21, at 32–37, for a detailed analysis of Schor.
\item \textsuperscript{193} Williams, 23 F.3d at 634.
\item \textsuperscript{194} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{195} Id. at 634, 636.
\end{itemize}
cited by almost all the courts of appeals that have addressed the question.196 Indeed, the Second Circuit’s analysis has served as a template for other courts examining the issue.

ii. United States v. Reyna-Tapia I & II

The panel of the Ninth Circuit that issued the first opinion in United States v. Reyna-Tapia (Reyna-Tapia I), came close to effectively ending the referral of felony guilty plea proceedings to magistrate judges in the Ninth Circuit by requiring district judges to conduct de novo review every time a magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation after conducting a Rule 11 plea colloquy, even in cases where the defendant did not object to the recommendation.197 On rehearing en banc, however, the Ninth Circuit backed away from the original panel’s view and held that de novo review was only required when an objection was made.198 Both decisions are discussed below.

In Reyna-Tapia I, a panel of the Ninth Circuit held that a magistrate judge could, with the defendant’s consent, conduct a Rule 11 plea colloquy and recommend that a district judge accept a defendant’s guilty plea in a felony case, provided that the district court conducted de novo review of the proceeding.199

Defendant Jose Reyna-Tapia was charged in the District of Arizona with illegal re-entry into the United States after being deported in 1999.200 After agreeing to plead guilty to this charge, the defendant agreed to have a magistrate judge administer the Rule 11 plea colloquy.201 The magistrate judge conducted the proceeding and recommended that the defendant’s plea be accepted. The district judge reviewed the record de novo before accepting the defendant’s plea.202 After sentencing, Reyna-Tapia appealed to the Ninth Circuit, arguing that the district court erred in permitting a magistrate judge to conduct the Rule 11 colloquy proceeding.203

The panel affirmed, but not without voicing numerous concerns about the referral of felony guilty plea colloquies to magistrate judges. Noting that the Supreme Court had observed in Gomez that the Federal Magistrates Act provides no jurisdiction for a magistrate judge to preside over an entire felony trial

---

196 See, e.g., United States v. Harden, 758 F.3d 886, 891 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d 424, 431 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v. Woodard, 387 F.3d 1329, 1331 (11th Cir. 2004); Reyna-Tapia II, 328 F.3d 1114, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc); United States v. Torres, 258 F.3d 791, 795 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Dees, 125 F.3d 261, 263 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Ciapponi, 77 F.3d 1247, 1250 (10th Cir. 1996).
197 United States v. Reyna-Tapia (Reyna-Tapia I), 294 F.3d 1192, 1201 (9th Cir. 2002), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated by 315 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 2002).
198 Reyna-Tapia II, 328 F.3d at 1122.
199 Reyna-Tapia I, 294 F.3d at 1201.
200 Id. at 1194.
201 Id. at 1194–95.
202 Id. at 1195.
203 Id. at 1194–95.
simply because a defendant consents to that authority, the Ninth Circuit stated that “a felony plea colloquy constitutes a sensitive and critical stage of a criminal prosecution where the same rights are at stake as with felony trials and the court must exercise similar discretion.” Emphasizing the importance of a judge’s observations and impressions of a defendant in evaluating voluntariness of the defendant’s guilty plea, the panel noted, “De novo review, which entails a reading of a cold transcript, acts as a poor substitute for these first-hand impressions.” It further opined that “[c]onsent may be insufficient to cure the problems involved with the delegation of Rule 11 duties to a non-Article III judge.”

The court was particularly concerned with the delegation of the duty to inquire into the factual basis of the guilty plea under Rule 11(f):

Rule 11(f) is designed to protect defendants who do not realize that their conduct does not actually fall within the charge. Only the sentencing judge has the benefit of the presentence report, which may reveal additional facts showing that the defendant’s conduct does not fall within the charge to which he is pleading. To delegate this responsibility to a magistrate judge, who will conduct the inquiry without the benefit of the presentence report, dilutes the important safeguard in Rule 11(f).

In light of these concerns, the court placed particular importance on having the district judge conduct de novo review in all circumstances where a magistrate judge conducted the Rule 11 colloquy. Even with these reservations, the court acknowledged that four other circuits had already concluded that the duty of conducting a Rule 11 plea colloquy was a duty comparable in responsibility to other duties assigned to magistrate judges under the Federal Magistrates Act. The panel however specifically departed from the reasoning used by the Second Circuit in Williams to justify the referral of felony guilty plea proceedings to magistrate judges:

We disagree with the Second Circuit that a Rule 11 plea colloquy is a “garden variety ministerial function.” . . . [A] plea colloquy is a highly critical stage of a criminal prosecution. However, we recognize the weight of authority holding that magistrate judges may perform this function with the defendant’s consent, and we join our sister circuits in acknowledging that Congress intended to give district courts significant leeway to experiment with the use of magistrate judges. Therefore, we hold that, when a defendant explicitly consents, a magistrate judge may administer the Rule 11 plea colloquy in a felony case, so long as the district court reviews the proceedings de novo.

205 Reyna-Tapia I, 294 F.3d at 1199.
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 Id. at 1200 (citations omitted).
209 Id. at 1201.
210 See id. at 1200.
211 Id. at 1200–01.
The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, concluding that Reyna-Tapia had not provided an adequate reason for withdrawing his plea and that the district court’s referral of Rule 11 duties to the magistrate judge “was proper under the circumstances of this case.” Nevertheless, the court appeared to mandate that de novo review must occur whenever a magistrate judge conducted a Rule 11 guilty plea proceeding.

The Ninth Circuit panel’s decision in Reyna-Tapia I cast doubt on the efficacy of district judges referring felony guilty plea proceedings to magistrate judges by emphasizing the need for de novo review every time a magistrate judge conducted a Rule 11 colloquy, even when a defendant did not object. By suggesting that de novo determination was mandatory in all cases, the panel undermined the time-saving rationale for such referrals. If a district judge was required to conduct de novo review of every plea allocution handled by a magistrate judge, what was the purpose of, or efficiency in, delegating such duties? While we do not know whether these concerns were brought to the attention of the judges of the Ninth Circuit, six months after the panel issued the opinion in Reyna-Tapia I, the Ninth Circuit en banc granted rehearing of the case and vacated the first decision.

In May 2003, the Ninth Circuit issued its en banc opinion in United States v. Reyna-Tapia (Reyna-Tapia II). The court held that Rule 11 plea colloquies in felony cases are additional duties that may be delegated to magistrate judges under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) for findings and recommendations with the defendants’ consent. The court further held that de novo review of the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations in a guilty plea proceeding is mandated only when a party specifically objects to them.

Noting that a defendant has at least three procedural safeguards available when a magistrate judge conducts a guilty plea proceeding (consent to the magistrate judge, objections to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, and the right to withdraw the guilty plea prior to its acceptance by the district court), the court reasoned:

"It merits re-emphasis that the underlying purpose of the Federal Magistrates Act is to improve the effective administration of justice. A rule requiring automatic de novo review of findings and recommendations to which no one objects would not save time or judicial resources. It would do just the opposite, and defeat the whole purpose of referring the plea to the magistrate judge."
Summer 2016] “NOTHING LESS THAN INDISPENSABLE”

The Ninth Circuit once again affirmed the district court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

iii. United States v. Harden

The Seventh Circuit, in *United States v. Harden*, is the latest court to address the issue of referring felony guilty plea proceedings to magistrate judges.218 In *Harden*, the court held that a magistrate judge conducting a Rule 11 guilty plea colloquy could not accept the defendant’s guilty plea at the conclusion of the colloquy, but was required to issue a report to the district judge recommending whether to accept the plea.219

Defendant Stacy Harden agreed to plead guilty in the Southern District of Illinois to a drug charge and consented to a magistrate judge conducting the plea colloquy.220 Following the colloquy, the magistrate judge accepted Harden’s guilty plea.221 The district judge then conducted a sentencing hearing and imposed a within-guidelines sentence.222 Harden appealed his conviction, raising for the first time his objection to the magistrate judge’s authority to accept a guilty plea in a felony case.223

The Seventh Circuit concluded that the taking of a felony guilty plea is “too important to be considered a mere ‘additional duty’ permitted” under the Federal Magistrates Act.224 Because of the importance of this task, the court held that the Act “cannot be stretched to reach acceptance of felony guilty pleas, even with a defendant’s consent.”225 Noting that its view of the Act conflicted with several other circuits,226 the Seventh Circuit nonetheless concluded:

[T]he prevalence of guilty pleas does not render them less important, or the protections waived through them any less fundamental. A felony guilty plea is equal in importance to a felony trial leading to a verdict of guilty. And without explicit authorization from Congress, the district court cannot delegate this vital task.227

Noting that the conflicting authority had emphasized the Supreme Court’s statement in *Peretz* that “Congress intended to give federal judges significant leeway to experiment with possible improvements in the efficiency of the judicial process,”228 the Seventh Circuit closed its decision by stating:

218 United States v. Harden, 758 F.3d 886 (7th Cir. 2014).
219 Id. at 891.
220 Id. at 887.
221 Id.
222 Id.
223 Id. at 887–88.
224 Id. at 888.
225 Id.
226 Id. at 891 (citing United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d 424, 432–32 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v. Woodard, 387 F.3d 1329, 1332–33 (11th Cir. 2004); United States v. Ciapponi, 77 F.3d 1247, 1250–52 (10th Cir. 1996)).
227 Id.
The desire to make more efficient the district courts’ management of large criminal caseloads is understandable. These days, over 97% of criminal convictions are the result of guilty pleas. Truly, “criminal justice today is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.” . . . A felony guilty plea is equal in importance to a felony trial leading to a verdict of guilty. And without explicit authorization from Congress, the district court cannot delegate this vital task. The authority to experiment set forth in Peretz is bounded; the Court has never suggested that magistrate judges, with the parties’ consent, may perform every duty of an Article III judge, regardless of the duty’s importance.229

Acknowledging efficiency concerns, the appellate court held that a magistrate judge may conduct a Rule 11 guilty plea colloquy, but that the judge must issue a report to the district court with a recommendation on the plea.230 The court agreed with other circuits that “this is a permissible practice.”231 Because the magistrate judge in Harden had actually accepted his plea, the court reversed the judgment of the district court.232

The main thrust of the decision in Harden was a rejection of the view that a magistrate judge may accept the defendant’s plea in a felony case after the Rule 11 colloquy. Since Harden, other circuits have continued to adhere to their precedent that magistrate judges may accept a felony guilty plea.233 The Seventh Circuit’s Harden decision emphatically highlights the disagreement existing among the courts of appeals as to whether a magistrate judge can accept a defendant’s guilty plea in a felony case.

b. Magistrate Judge’s Acceptance of Guilty Plea

At present, two courts of appeals have taken the position that magistrate judges not only may conduct felony guilty plea proceedings under Rule 11 with the consent of the defendant, but also that magistrate judges may accept defendants’ pleas without preparing a report and recommendation to the district judge.234 The Ciapponi and Benton decisions are discussed below.

229 Harden, 758 F.3d at 891–92 (citations omitted) (quoting Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012)).
230 Id. at 891.
231 Id.
232 Id. at 892.
233 See, e.g., United States v. Shropshire, 608 F. App’x 143, 143 (4th Cir. 2015); United States v. Farmer, 599 F. App’x 525, 526 (4th Cir. 2015); United States v. Ross, 602 F. App’x 113, 114 (4th Cir. 2015).
234 See United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d 424 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v. Ciapponi, 77 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 1996).
i. United States v. Ciapponi

The Tenth Circuit was the first court of appeals to endorse the view that a magistrate judge may accept a felony defendant’s guilty plea with the defendant’s consent. 235

Defendant George Ciapponi was arrested in the District of New Mexico and charged with possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute. 236 When Ciapponi agreed to a plea agreement, the district judge referred the guilty plea proceeding to a magistrate judge. 237 After being informed that he had a right to appear before a district judge, Ciapponi, with the advice of counsel, executed a written consent to have his plea accepted by the magistrate judge. 238 The magistrate judge then conducted a Rule 11 plea colloquy and accepted the defendant’s guilty plea. 239 At the later sentencing proceeding before the district judge, Ciapponi did not object to the magistrate judge’s acceptance of the plea. 240

The defendant’s first objection to the plea proceeding was raised on appeal, where he argued that the magistrate judge’s acceptance of the guilty plea violated the Federal Magistrates Act and Article III of the Constitution. 241 The Tenth Circuit rejected both arguments. The court observed that the defendant’s failure to object or otherwise request review of the plea in the district court undercut his claim of a constitutional violation and that the court would review Ciapponi’s claim under the plain error standard. 242 Citing with approval the Second Circuit’s reasoning in United States v. Williams, 243 the court held that “[c]onsistent with Peretz and Williams, . . . with a defendant’s express consent, the broad residuary ‘additional duties’ clause of the Magistrates Act authorizes a magistrate judge to conduct a Rule 11 felony plea proceeding, and such does not violate the defendant’s constitutional rights.” 244

The court further concluded that the district judge’s failure to conduct de novo review of the plea proceeding was insignificant, reasoning that “neither the Magistrates Act nor Article III requires that a referral be conditioned on subsequent review by the district judge, so long as a defendant’s right to demand an Article III judge is preserved.” 245 The court noted that the right to Article III review in a felony guilty plea proceeding is protected by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(d), which allows a defendant to move to withdraw a

235 See Ciapponi, 77 F.3d 1247.
236 Id. at 1249.
237 Id.
238 Id.
239 Id.
240 Id.
241 Id.
242 Id. at 1249–50.
243 23 F.3d 629 (2d Cir. 1994).
244 Ciapponi, 77 F.3d at 1251.
245 Id. at 1251–52.
guilty plea prior to sentencing. The Tenth Circuit concluded that the availability of the Rule 32 withdrawal procedure adequately protected a defendant’s rights under Article III. The court therefore held that the magistrate judge did not err in accepting Ciapponi’s guilty plea and affirmed the district court’s judgment.

ii. United States v. Benton

In United States v. Benton, the Fourth Circuit agreed with the Eleventh Circuit in holding that a magistrate judge had the authority to accept a defendant’s felony guilty plea with the consent of the defendant without the preparation of a report and recommendation.

After defendant Cedric Benton was arrested in the Western District of North Carolina on drug charges, he entered into a plea agreement where he agreed to allow a “duly-qualified federal Magistrate Judge” to conduct his Rule 11 plea colloquy. At the plea hearing, Benton affirmatively consented to the magistrate judge’s authority. He also stipulated that there was a factual basis for the plea and agreed to defer the district court’s confirmation of this stipulation until the sentencing hearing before a district judge. After conducting the plea colloquy, the magistrate judge “accepted Benton’s plea, finding it to be both knowing and voluntary.” After the guilty plea proceeding, however, Benton changed counsel and moved to withdraw his guilty plea. The district judge denied Benton’s motion, concluding that the defendant “had not established a fair and just reason for withdrawing his plea.” The district judge entered a final judgment of conviction and sentenced Benton to 262 months in prison and a ten-year term of supervised release. Benton appealed to the Fourth Circuit.

On appeal, Benton argued that the magistrate judge did not have authority to “accept” his guilty plea under Rule 11 and that therefore the district court should have allowed him to withdraw his guilty plea for “any reason or no rea-
“NOTHING LESS THAN INDISPENSABLE”

son” under Rule 11(d)(1). The Fourth Circuit reviewed for plain error, noting that Benton failed to raise this argument before the district court.

Applying the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Peretz, the court held that “magistrate judges possess the authority to bind defendants to their plea for the purposes of Rule 11, so long as district judges retain the authority to review the magistrate judge’s actions de novo.” On the question of whether a magistrate judge may actually accept the defendant’s plea, rather than issuing a report and recommendation, the court opined that the “distinction between plea colloquy and plea acceptance does not appear to necessitate different results under Peretz. . . . [T]he acceptance of a plea is merely the natural culmination of a plea colloquy.”

The court summarized its ruling:

We thus find that the district court did not commit error in refusing to allow Benton to withdraw his plea “for any or no reason.” . . . [A]cceptance of a plea is a duty that does not exceed the responsibility and importance of the more complex tasks a magistrate [judge] is explicitly authorized to perform, the parties have consented to the procedure, and the ultimate control of the district judge over the plea process alleviates any constitutional concerns. And just as a practical matter, allowing magistrate judges to accept pleas for the purposes of Rule 11 preserves judicial resources—the very goal underlying the creation of the office of magistrate judge—and prevents litigants from exploiting bifurcated plea procedures.

The court affirmed the district court’s judgment and Benton’s conviction and sentence.

As noted earlier, the Fourth Circuit has recently reaffirmed its holding in Benton in three decisions issued after the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Harden.

iii. United States v. Woodard & Brown v. United States

Eight years after the Ciapponi decision, the Eleventh Circuit also endorsed a procedure where a magistrate judge accepts the defendant’s guilty plea after conducting the Rule 11 colloquy. In United States v. Woodard, the court held that § 636(b)(3) authorized a magistrate judge to conduct a Rule 11 proceeding with the defendant’s consent and to accept the defendant’s guilty plea, and that the delegation of the authority to conduct such proceedings did not offend the principles of Article III. Ten years later, however, the Eleventh Circuit, in a

---

258 Id.
259 Id. at 429.
260 Id.
261 Id. at 431.
262 Id. at 433.
263 Id. at 435.
264 See supra note 233.
265 United States v. Woodard, 387 F.3d 1329, 1329 (11th Cir. 2004).
footnote in Brown v. United States, clarified its holding in Woodard to conclude that a felony guilty plea proceeding conducted by a magistrate judge should always be considered “akin to a report and recommendation rather than a final adjudication of guilt.” Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit has become the only circuit court to change its position concerning felony guilty plea proceedings from permitting magistrate judges to accept felony guilty pleas to requiring the issuance of a report and recommendation in such proceedings. Both cases are discussed below.

Defendant David Woodard was charged in the Southern District of Florida with being a felon in possession of a firearm. After Woodard signed a plea agreement, a magistrate judge conducted a change of plea hearing under Rule 11. After Woodard expressly consented, the magistrate judge accepted his guilty plea and adjudged Woodard guilty of the firearm offense. When a district judge later sentenced him, Woodard did not object to the sentence or to having the plea colloquy conducted by a magistrate judge. On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, however, Woodward asserted for the first time that, although he had specifically consented to having the magistrate judge conduct the guilty plea proceeding, the magistrate judge had no statutory or constitutional authority to accept Woodward’s guilty plea or to adjudicate him guilty of a felony.

The Eleventh Circuit held that 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) authorized a magistrate judge, with the defendant’s consent, to conduct a Rule 11 colloquy in a felony case and to accept the defendant’s guilty plea. Noting that several courts of appeals had addressed the statutory issue, the court noted:

Like our sister circuits, we find that conducting a Rule 11 proceeding is comparable to the [Federal Magistrates Act]’s enumerated duties. Therefore, we join our sister circuits in similarly holding that a magistrate judge has the authority under the “additional duties” clause of [the Act] to conduct Rule 11 proceedings when the defendant consents.

Turning to Woodward’s constitutional argument, the court applied the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Peretz, focusing on whether delegating certain duties to a magistrate judge would offend the structural protections provided by Article III. It noted that in Peretz, the Court held the structural protections of Article III are not jeopardized when magistrate judges conduct voir dire because district judges still exert ultimate control over magistrate judges. The Court explained that because district judges have supervisory power over magistrate judges, “there is no danger that use of

266 See Brown v. United States, 748 F.3d 1045, 1071 n.53 (11th Cir. 2014). See infra Part II.B.2.b.(b) for a detailed analysis of the Brown decision.
267 Woodard, 387 F.3d at 1330.
268 Id. at 1330–31.
269 Id. at 1331.
270 Id. at 1333.
271 Id.
the magistrate involves a congressional attempt[t] to transfer jurisdiction [to non-
Article III tribunals] for the purpose of emasculating constitutional courts.”

The court further applied the Peretz analysis to conclude that the possibility of de novo review by a district judge removed any suggestion that Article III authority was being undermined when particular matters were referred to mag-
istrate judges. In response to Woodard’s argument that the procedure used in
his case was improper because the magistrate judge accepted his guilty plea rather than issuing a report and recommendation, the Eleventh Circuit observed
that the critical factor in all cases examining the referral of guilty plea proceed-
ings to magistrate judges “was that a district court, as a matter of law, retained
the ability to review the Rule 11 hearing if requested.” Woodard did not re-
quest that the district judge review the guilty plea proceeding and therefore “the
magistrate judge did not appropriate the district judge’s ultimate decision-
making authority.” The appellate court thus concluded that “there was no
plain error, statutory or constitutional, with the magistrate judge accepting the
Woodard’s guilty plea and adjudicating him guilty.”

Although the Eleventh Circuit panel that decided Brown held that a federal
habeas corpus case arising under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 was not a civil matter that
could be disposed of by a magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the court,
in a lengthy footnote at the end of its opinion, clarified its holding in Woodard
regarding the procedures to be followed when magistrate judges conduct felony
guilty plea proceedings.

Noting that the panel in Woodard had “described somewhat imprecisely
the circumstances giving rise to the appeal, which thus slightly muddled our
constitutional holding,” the court further reasoned,

We held in Woodard that “there was no error, statutory or constitutional, in
the magistrate judge accepting Woodard’s guilty plea and adjudicating him
guilty.” But that holding overlooked the mechanics of the district court’s actions
in that case. For although the magistrate judge purported to adjudge the defend-
ant guilty, it was the district court that actually entered judgment. That is, the
magistrate judge did not make the final adjudication of guilt.

We noted in Woodard that different magistrate judges categorized their ac-
tions as an acceptance of a plea or a report and recommendation, “reveal[ing]
a lack of uniformity in the language used by magistrate judges.” We believe
that there is value in uniformity; thus we clarify today that the magistrate judge’s

272 Id. at 1333–34 (alterations in original) (quoting Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923,
937 (1991)).
273 Id. at 1334.
274 Id.
275 Id.
276 Id.
277 Brown v. United States, 748 F.3d 1045, 1071 n.53 (11th Cir. 2014). See infra Part
II.B.2.b.i(b) for a detailed discussion of the holding and reasoning in Brown.
action in such proceedings are akin to a report and recommendation rather than a final adjudication of guilt.278

The Eleventh Circuit therefore appeared to back away from its earlier holding in Woodard that seemed to validate a procedure where a magistrate judge could accept a felony defendant’s guilty plea after conducting the Rule 11 colloquy with the defendant’s consent. It became the first circuit court to change its position on this issue. Interestingly, the court chose to do this in a footnote in a case that did not involve guilty plea proceedings under Rule 11. Moreover, to date this language has only been cited in one unpublished decision from the Eleventh Circuit.279 While the court intended to clarify the practical procedures to be followed by magistrate judges when referred Rule 11 proceedings, it remains unclear to what extent magistrate judges are aware of this change in the court’s law.

c. Conclusion

Despite the disagreement among the courts of appeals concerning whether a magistrate judge may accept a defendant’s felony guilty plea after conducting the Rule 11 colloquy, the referral of felony guilty plea proceedings to magistrate judges under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) is a widely accepted practice across the country. Of course, district judges do not uniformly favor this practice and there remain principled arguments against the delegation of these duties to magistrate judges. Nevertheless, the cases analyzed above demonstrate the wide application of the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Peretz to justify a significant expansion of magistrate judge authority throughout the nation.

2. Issues in Civil Consent Cases

Setting aside for a moment the broader issue of whether the civil consent authority of magistrate judges under 28 U.S.C. § 626(c) violates Article III of the Constitution,280 courts have also dealt with several issues regarding the extent of magistrate judge authority in civil consent cases, including whether magistrate judges have authority to rule on issues involving parties who have not consented to the magistrate judge’s authority under § 626(c), whether magistrate judges may dispose of federal and state habeas corpus cases with consent, and whether district courts may use “opt out” procedures, where the liti-

278 Brown, 748 F.3d at 1071 n.53 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
280 For a detailed discussion of the appellate cases dealing with the constitutionality of 28 U.S.C. § 626(c) that were issued after the initial enactment, see CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 21, at 41–54. For a detailed discussion of two recent Supreme Court cases dealing with the constitutionality of bankruptcy judge authority under Article III, see Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015), Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011), and infra Section II.C.1.
gants’ failure to act may be deemed to be implied consent to disposition by a magistrate judge.

\[a. \text{ Magistrate Judge Authority in Class Action Consent Cases to Issue Rulings that Are Binding on Non-Consenting Parties}\]

Several appellate courts have considered whether a magistrate judge presiding in a class action case with the consent of the parties has the authority to issue rulings that are binding on litigants that have not individually consented to disposition of the case by the magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). These cases are reviewed below.

\[i. \text{ Williams v. General Electric Capital Auto Lease, Inc.}\]

In Williams v. General Electric Capital Auto Lease, Inc., the Seventh Circuit held that where the representative plaintiff in a class action case consented to a magistrate judge disposing of the case, the presiding magistrate judge had the authority to enjoin related litigation begun by an absent class member in another district.\(^{281}\)

Plaintiff Stacey Williams filed a class action suit against General Electric Capital Automobile Lease, Inc (GECAL) in the Northern District of Illinois challenging provisions of automobile leases issued by GECAL under the Consumer Leasing Act.\(^{282}\) The named parties consented to have the case disposed of by a magistrate judge.\(^{283}\) The magistrate judge certified a national class and eventually approved a settlement.\(^{284}\) Unnamed plaintiffs filed a virtually identical class action suit against GECAL in the Middle District of Florida.\(^{285}\) GECAL moved in the Northern District of Illinois to enjoin further prosecution of the case in Florida.\(^{286}\) The magistrate judge granted the injunction, and the Florida plaintiffs appealed.\(^{287}\)

On appeal, the Florida plaintiffs argued that the magistrate judge did not have the authority under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) to enjoin them because they had not consented to have the magistrate judge preside over the case.\(^{288}\) The Seventh Circuit, while noting that unanimous and voluntary consent is the constitutional “linchpin” to magistrate judge authority under § 636(c), concluded that the Florida plaintiffs, as unnamed members of the class, were not full “parties”

\(^{281}\) Williams v. General Elec. Capital Auto Lease, Inc., 159 F.3d 266, 269–70 (7th Cir. 1998).
\(^{282}\) Id. at 268.
\(^{283}\) Id.
\(^{284}\) Id.
\(^{285}\) Id.
\(^{286}\) Id.
\(^{287}\) Id.
\(^{288}\) Id. at 272.
to the Illinois lawsuit because they could not direct the litigation. Thus, the named class representative plaintiff’s consent to the magistrate judge’s authority was binding on other members of the class. The unnamed members did not challenge the class representative’s consent to magistrate judge disposition even after receiving notice of a proposed settlement that named the magistrate judge as the presiding judge. Accordingly, the court held that the magistrate judge had authority to enter the injunction and that the appellate court had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The court also concluded that the injunction was properly granted on its merits.

ii. Dewey v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft

In Dewey v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, the Third Circuit held that a magistrate judge who was presiding over a class action in the District of New Jersey with the consent of the parties under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) did not abuse her discretion by denying an absent class member’s motion to intervene in the case to challenge the magistrate judge’s authority in the case, even though the absent class member had not personally consented to disposition of the case by the magistrate judge.

Numerous plaintiffs brought a class action lawsuit against defendants Volkswagen and Audi for alleged design defects in vehicles manufactured by the defendants that resulted in leaking sunroofs. After the magistrate judge initially approved a settlement of the class action and calculated attorney’s fees, the case was appealed to the Third Circuit and subsequently reversed and remanded. On remand, the magistrate judge approved a revised settlement agreement of the class action and once again calculated the attorney’s fees award. Absent class member Peter Braverman moved to intervene in the case to challenge the magistrate judge’s authority to approve the settlement and to award attorney’s fees. The magistrate judge denied the motion to intervene, and Braverman appealed to the Third Circuit. The appellees argued that Braverman should have objected to the magistrate judge’s ruling in the district court and had therefore waived the argument on appeal. Two other class

---

289 Id. at 268–69.
290 Id. at 269.
291 Id. at 274–75.
292 Id. at 270, 275.
293 Id. at 275.
295 Id. at 194.
296 Id. at 194–95.
297 Id. at 195.
298 Id. at 194–95.
299 Id. at 195.
300 Id. at 198.
members also appealed, challenging the magistrate judge’s calculation of attorney’s fee.\textsuperscript{301}

The Third Circuit began its analysis by noting that Braverman had not consented to the magistrate judge’s authority and, following circuit precedent, had applied to the district judge originally assigned to the case to hear his motion to intervene under Rule 24(a).\textsuperscript{302} Nevertheless, the appellate court concluded that the magistrate judge had the authority under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) to rule on Braverman’s motion even absent the consent of the parties.\textsuperscript{303} The court, assuming without deciding that Braverman had not waived his right to appeal, further held that the magistrate judge did not err in denying the motion because Braverman failed to rebut the presumption that his interests were aligned with those of the named plaintiffs.\textsuperscript{304} The court reasoned, “The mere fact that he objected is insufficient to rebut the presumption of aligned interests.”\textsuperscript{305} The court also noted that Braverman could point to nothing in the record to suggest that there was “any conflict of interest between the plaintiffs and class counsel.”\textsuperscript{306} The magistrate judge’s denial of the motion to intervene was therefore not an abuse of discretion, and Braverman’s lack of consent to the magistrate judge’s authority under § 636(c) did not prevent the magistrate judge from ruling on the motion.\textsuperscript{307}

iii. \textit{Day v. Persels & Associates, LLC}

In \textit{Day v. Persels & Associates, LLC}, the Eleventh Circuit held that a magistrate judge in the Middle District of Florida had authority under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) to approve a settlement agreement and dispose of a class action case involving approximately 125,000 consumers, even though absent class members did not consent to disposition of the case by the magistrate judge.\textsuperscript{308}

Plaintiff Miranda Day brought a class action lawsuit in the Middle District of Florida on behalf of herself and a class of 10,000 similarly situated Florida residents against several debt management companies and associated legal service providers.\textsuperscript{309} The class alleged violations of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, the Credit Repair Organization Act, and other common law provisions.\textsuperscript{310} Day and the legal service providers “consented to have a magistrate judge conduct all proceedings and . . . to enter a final judgment”

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{301} \textit{Id.} at 195–96.
\item \textsuperscript{302} \textit{Id.} at 198 & n.6.
\item \textsuperscript{303} \textit{Id.}
\item \textsuperscript{304} \textit{Id.} at 199.
\item \textsuperscript{305} \textit{Id.}
\item \textsuperscript{306} \textit{Id.}
\item \textsuperscript{307} \textit{Id.}
\item \textsuperscript{308} \textit{Day v. Persels & Assoc., LLC,} 729 F.3d 1309, 1316, 1324 (11th Cir. 2013).
\item \textsuperscript{309} \textit{Id.} at 1313.
\item \textsuperscript{310} \textit{Id.}
\end{itemize}
under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).\textsuperscript{311} After Day filed an amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), Day and the legal service providers “notified the court that they had reached an agreement in principle on the resolution of the case.”\textsuperscript{312} The final settlement agreement “defined the class as all persons in the United States who had entered into agreements for legal advice concerning debt with the legal service defendants on or after April 28, 2008, except those consumers who were class members in a class action pending in the Eastern District of Washington.”\textsuperscript{313} The class included over 125,000 absent plaintiffs.\textsuperscript{314}

The settlement agreement limited the legal service defendants’ ability to collect fees from class members, placed other duties on these defendants, required the defendants to pay the costs of administering the settlement, provided for a $5,000 incentive payment to Day, and required the defendants to pay attorney’s fees up to $300,000.\textsuperscript{315} However, the agreement provided no monetary relief to the absent plaintiffs and released any claims by absent plaintiffs against the legal service defendants.\textsuperscript{316} Although five class members objected to the settlement, the magistrate judge, after a fairness hearing, approved the settlement agreement, “certified the class, awarded class counsel $300,000, and awarded Day $5,000.”\textsuperscript{317} The magistrate judge also made findings that six of the defendants were financially unable to satisfy the judgment.\textsuperscript{318} The magistrate judge’s judgment was subsequently appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.\textsuperscript{319}

The appellate court concluded that the consent of the representative party in the class action was binding on the absent class members and that the magistrate judge’s disposition of the class action case with the consent of representative parties did not violate Article III of the Constitution.\textsuperscript{320} The court rejected an argument that § 636(c) is unconstitutional under the Supreme Court’s reasoning in\textit{Stern v. Marshall}, the 2011 case holding that a bankruptcy judge could not rule on a state court counterclaim arising in a “core” proceeding, which will be analyzed later in this paper.\textsuperscript{321} However, the panel further held that the magistrate judge had abused his discretion by concluding that six of the seven defendants were unable to satisfy the judgment.\textsuperscript{322} The court therefore

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{311} Id.
\textsuperscript{312} Id.
\textsuperscript{313} Id. at 1313–14.
\textsuperscript{314} Id. at 1314.
\textsuperscript{315} Id. at 1314.
\textsuperscript{316} Id.
\textsuperscript{317} Id. at 1314, 1316.
\textsuperscript{318} Id. at 1312, 1326–27.
\textsuperscript{319} Id. at 1316.
\textsuperscript{320} Id. at 1324.
\textsuperscript{321} See id. at 1323–24. For a detailed analysis of the \textit{Stern} case, see \textit{infra} at Section II.C.1.a.
\textsuperscript{322} \textit{Day}, 729 F.3d at 1326–27.
\end{footnotesize}
vacated the final judgment and remanded the case to the magistrate judge for further proceedings.\footnote{Id. at 1328.}

One panel member sitting by designation, Senior Judge Philip Pro from the District of Nevada, issued a lengthy opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.\footnote{See id. at 1328 (Pro, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).} He would have held that consent by the absent plaintiffs was required under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c):

Day did not have the authority to consent to a magistrate judge on behalf of the unnamed class members before class certification. Following conditional class certification, Day consented to the magistrate judge on her own behalf through her litigation conduct by voluntarily appearing before the magistrate judge at the fairness hearing. Of the 125,011 class members, Day was the only non-objecting class member to appear personally or through counsel. However, Day’s post-certification implied consent to the magistrate judge did not bind the unnamed class members because, upon certification, unnamed class members become later-added “parties” whose consent is required under § 636(c)(1).\footnote{Id. at 1338 (citation omitted).}

Judge Pro also stated that he “would hold that the unnamed class members became ‘parties’ upon certification whose express or implied consent was required under § 636(c)(1),” and that “the magistrate judge lacked authority to approve the class action settlement because Day’s post-certification implied consent to the magistrate judge operated only on her own behalf, and the unnamed class members did not satisfy § 636(c)(1)’s consent requirement.”\footnote{Id. at 1339.}

At least one academic commentator focused on Judge Pro’s dissenting opinion in \textit{Day} to argue that magistrate judges should not be involved in class action cases with the parties’ consent under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).\footnote{See Elizabeth French, \textit{Respecting the Linchpin: Why Absentee Consent Should Limit Magistrate Judge Jurisdiction}, 3 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 32, 35 (2015).}

\textbf{iv. Stackhouse v. McKnight}

By contrast with decisions in the Third, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits, the Second Circuit, in \textit{Stackhouse v. McKnight}, held that a magistrate judge did not have authority to rule on a motion to intervene in a class action case where the parties seeking to intervene had not consented to disposition of the case by a magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).\footnote{Stackhouse v. McKnight, 168 F. App’x 464, 466 (2d Cir. 2006).}

The plaintiffs brought a class action lawsuit in the Eastern District of New York asserting unfair lending practices in violation of federal and state statutes.\footnote{Id. at 465.} After the parties reached a proposed agreement to settle the law suit, they consented to have the case disposed of by a magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C.
U.S.C. § 636(c). The presiding magistrate judge subsequently issued an order preliminarily approving of the settlement agreement and gave class members over two months to submit objections to the settlement. In response, several class members moved to intervene in the case and also moved to vacate the consensual reference of the case to the magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). The magistrate judge denied the motions and the case was appealed to the Second Circuit.

The Second Circuit concluded that it could not review the magistrate judge’s decision because it was not a final judgment. Citing circuit precedent, the court reaffirmed, “A magistrate judge’s decision can constitute a final judgment only on the consent of all parties to the dispute.” When only the original parties in a case have consented to disposition by a magistrate judge, “a district judge must rule on a motion to intervene brought by a third party.”

Examining the record, the court could not conclude that the objectors had given their consent to the disposition of their motion to intervene by a magistrate. Although the court acknowledged that the objectors did not specifically object to the fact that the magistrate judge had made findings, it concluded—based on Roell—that “this by itself does not evidence consent.” The court thus concluded that the magistrate judge’s order on the motion to intervene was the equivalent of a report and recommendation subject to de novo review by the district judge, not a final judgment that could be reviewed by the appellate court.

The Second Circuit therefore vacated and remanded the magistrate judge’s judgment to the district court for further proceedings.


While the constitutionality of civil consent authority under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) was affirmed by all courts of appeals that considered the issue in the years following the amendment of the Federal Magistrates Act in 1979, some

330 Id.
331 Id.
332 Id.
333 Id.
334 Id. at 467.
335 Id. at 466.
336 Id.
337 Id.
338 Id. (“At best . . . the evidence is inconclusive with respect to the parties’ intent. This is not enough to demonstrate consent.”).
339 Id. at 467.
340 Id.

341 See Bell & Beckwith v. United States, 766 F.2d 910, 912 (6th Cir. 1985); Gairola v. Va. Dep’t of Gen. Servs., 753 F.2d 1281, 1285 (4th Cir. 1985); D.L. Auld Co. v. Chroma Graphics Corp., 753 F.2d 1029, 1033 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (finding an appeal that challenged the constitutionality of § 636(c) “abusive of the judicial process” and grounds for an award of
judges continue to express concerns about the constitutionality of magistrate judge consent authority with regard to federal habeas corpus petitions arising under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254 and 2255. Decisions in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits demonstrate particular unease with magistrate judges disposing of motions to vacate sentences imposed by a district judge under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 with the consent of the parties. These cases are discussed below.

i. Federal Habeas Corpus Cases Under § 2255

(a) United States v. Johnston

In United States v. Johnston, the Fifth Circuit held that the consensual disposition of a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 by a magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) violated the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers set forth in Article III of the Constitution.\(^{342}\)

Defendant Edward Johnston was convicted in federal court on felony drug charges in the Southern District of Texas.\(^{343}\) After his conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, Johnston filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 challenging the validity of his trial and sentence.\(^{344}\) Both Johnston and the government consented to have a magistrate judge dispose of the matter.\(^{345}\) “Johnston timely filed a notice of appeal” after “[t]he magistrate judge issued a memorandum and order denying Johnston’s § 2255 motion.”\(^{346}\) “The magistrate judge construed the notice of appeal as a motion for a [Certificate of Appealability] and denied it . . . .”\(^{347}\) Johnston then filed another motion for a Certificate of Appealability with the Fifth Circuit.\(^{348}\)

The Fifth Circuit sua sponte raised the issue of whether the magistrate judge had proper jurisdiction to dispose of the § 2255 motion.\(^{349}\) The court first

\(^{342}\) United States v Johnston, 258 F.3d 361, 363 (5th Cir. 2001).
\(^{343}\) Id.
\(^{344}\) Id.
\(^{345}\) Id.
\(^{346}\) Id.
\(^{347}\) Id.
\(^{348}\) Id.
\(^{349}\) See id. at 363–64. Although federal habeas corpus petitions arising under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 are described as motions to vacate, set aside, or correct a criminal sentence, they are
explored the issue of whether motions under § 2255 should be considered civil or criminal matters, and held that, “for purposes of § 636(c), a § 2255 proceeding is a civil matter over which Congress intended magistrate judges to exercise jurisdiction upon consent of the parties.” The court then confronted the constitutional issue of whether the delegation of § 2255 matters to magistrate judges with consent violated Article III. Applying the Supreme Court’s holding set forth in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, that Article III protects both litigants’ rights and structural guarantees that ensure respect for separation-of-powers principles, the court recognized that the parties had waived their personal rights to Article III protection through their consent. The Fifth Circuit therefore concluded that the only issue before it was “whether the delegation of the § 2255 motion pursuant to § 636(c) offended the structural guarantees of Article III.”

The court began by noting that “a § 2255 motion does not easily comport with the average civil case or even another quasi-civil proceeding such as a § 2254 petition and, consequently, presents three major problems” under Article III. First, unlike other civil matters, “a § 2255 motion directly questions the validity of a prior federal court ruling.” The court found this troubling: “If the parties to a § 2255 motion consent to proceed before a magistrate judge, that magistrate judge could attack the validity of an Article III judge’s rulings. Such an act clearly raises Article III concerns because judges without lifetime tenure and undiminishable compensation would have controlling authority.”

The second problem the court articulated was the fact that the consensual disposition of a § 2255 motion by a magistrate judge may embroil the magistrate judge in an integral part of a federal felony trial, namely sentencing, which is not ministerial in nature, and “may need the shield of independence afforded Article III jurists.” Finally, the court, noting that only the court of appeals can review a magistrate judge’s ruling in a case heard with consent, concluded that the district court lacked sufficient supervision and control over the magistrate judges’ rulings in § 2255 matters heard on consent.

generally considered to be civil rather than criminal proceedings. See id. at 364 (citing Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770 (1987)). While magistrate judges have the authority to dispose of any civil matter with consent under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), there is no similar statutory consent provision concerning criminal proceedings in the Federal Magistrates Act besides magistrate judge authority to dispose of Class A misdemeanor cases under 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(5) and 18 U.S.C. § 3401(b). See generally LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10.

350 Johnston, 258 F.3d at 366.


352 Johnston, 258 F.3d at 367.

353 Id.

354 Id. at 368.

355 Id.

356 Id. at 369.

357 Id. at 370.

358 Id. at 371 & n.6.
In view of these problems, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the consensual delegation of § 2255 proceedings “exact[s] a deadly blow” to an independent judiciary and was thus unconstitutional.\(^{359}\) The court reasoned that the delegation to magistrate judges would violate the separation of powers as it would give Congress “the capability to direct the affairs of Article III courts” through its legislative powers over “the term, the salary, the qualifications, the duties, and the establishment of magistrate judges.”\(^{360}\)

The court therefore vacated the magistrate judge’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.\(^{361}\) Judge Higginbotham wrote a concurring opinion, stating that the court did not need to reach the constitutional issue, but also calling into question the very practice of referring any civil cases to magistrate judges under § 636(c) in an era where the number of trials conducted by district judges has declined.\(^{362}\)

(b) Brown v. United States

Thirteen years after the Johnston decision, the Eleventh Circuit, in Brown v. United States, held that a federal habeas corpus petition arising under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is not a “civil matter” under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and therefore could not be disposed of by a magistrate judge with the parties’ consent.\(^{363}\) The court invoked the canon of constitutional avoidance in reaching this holding.\(^{364}\) In dicta, however, the court went further to express “serious concerns as to the facial constitutionality of § 636(c),” particularly whether the civil consent authority of magistrate judges and the petty offense jurisdiction of magistrate judges under 18 U.S.C. § 3401 violate Article III of the Constitution as exercises of “the judicial Power of the United States” by non-Article III judicial officers.\(^{365}\)

In 2005, petitioner James Brown pled guilty in the Southern District of Florida to “using a computer . . . to knowingly persuade, induce, entice and coerce an individual who had not attained the age of eighteen years, to engage in sexual activity under circumstances [that] would constitute a criminal offense . . . in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b).”\(^{366}\) As a career offender, he was sentenced to a term of 235 months imprisonment.\(^{367}\) In March 2011, Brown moved under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to have the district court vacate his conviction and sentence.\(^{368}\) In April 2011, both Brown and the government consented to have a
magistrate judge dispose of the matter under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). 369 In July 2011, the magistrate judge denied Brown’s § 2255 motion for failure to state a basis for granting relief and later denied Brown’s motion for reconsideration. 370 After appealing both rulings to the court of appeals, Brown moved to have the magistrate judge vacate his order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4), arguing that, under the Fifth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Johnston, 371 “the consensual delegation of § 2255 motions to magistrate judges violates Article III of the Constitution.” 372 Although the magistrate judge denied Brown’s motion to vacate, the magistrate judge issued a Certificate of Appealability on this question. 373

The court of appeals began its analysis of Brown’s appeal with an exhaustive review of the history of the Federal Magistrates Act and the earlier United States commissioner system, stating in summary,

[M]agistrate judges (and their predecessors, the commissioners) are not—and have never purported to be—Article III judges. Instead, magistrate judges “draw their authority entirely from an exercise of Congressional power under Article I of the Constitution.” Although Congress considered magistrate judges to be “adjunct[s] of the United States District Court, appointed by the court and subject to the court’s direction and control,” the fact is that when magistrate judges exercise their authority to try petty offenses and to enter final judgment in civil cases, they are exercising the essential attributes of “judicial Power.” They do not function as mere adjuncts. They are puisne judges acting as courts. But Article III is clear . . . . As previously recounted, magistrate judges do not hold life tenure, nor is their compensation undiminishable. Therefore, these puisne judges cannot exercise “the judicial Power of the United States.” Thus, a magistrate judge who exercises final judgment on a § 2255 motion implicates a potentially serious constitutional problem. 374

The court further suggested that earlier decisions directly or indirectly upholding the constitutionality of § 636(c) under Article III, including the Supreme Court’s ruling in Roell, 375 and its own recent opinion, Day, 376 had been called into question by the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Stern. 377 The Eleventh Circuit therefore invoked the doctrine of constitutional avoidance to resolve the issue, concluding that “although § 636(c) could plausibly be read to authorize a

369 Id.
370 Id.
371 258 F.3d 361 (5th Cir. 2001). See supra Section II.B.2.b.i(a) for an analysis of Johnston.
372 Brown, 748 F.3d at 1048–49.
373 Id. at 1049.
374 Id. at 1057–58 (second alteration in original) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted) (first quoting Thomas v. Whitworth, 136 F.3d 756, 758 (11th Cir. 1998); then quoting H.R. Rep. No. 96–287, at 8 (1979); and then quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1).
376 See Day v. Persels & Assocs., LLC, 729 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2013); supra Section II.B.2.a.iii.
377 See Brown, 748 F.3d at 1072. For an analysis of Stern, see infra Section II.C.1.a.
magistrate judge to enter final judgment in a § 2255 proceeding, to avoid Article III concerns we hold that it does not because such a reading is equally plausible.” Accordingly, the court held that 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) does not authorize magistrate judges to enter final judgments on § 2255 motions because such motions are not “civil matters” under § 636(c).

Because the Eleventh Circuit panel deliberately avoided making a decision on the constitutionality of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and based its holding on statutory grounds, the opinion’s lengthy discussion of the panel’s “serious concerns” about whether aspects of magistrate judge authority violate Article III is dicta. Nevertheless, the court expressed doubts about the constitutionality of § 636(c) and even suggested that a magistrate judge’s authority in a petty offense case under 18 U.S.C. § 3401 may violate Article III. The dicta in Brown is a striking reminder that some judges retain doubts about the constitutionality of expanded magistrate judge authority under the Federal Magistrates Act.

ii. State Habeas Corpus Petitions Under § 2254

Prior to the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Johnston, at least two appellate courts had held that magistrate judges could dispose of state habeas corpus petitions arising under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 with the parties consent. After Johnston, however, there were attempts to apply the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning to argue that magistrate judges also were not permitted to dispose of habeas corpus matters under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. To date, however, courts have rejected these arguments.

For example, in White v. Thaler, the Fifth Circuit held that a magistrate judge had authority to dispose of a state habeas corpus petition with the consent of the parties and that this authority did not violate the separation of powers under Article III.

After petitioner Wendell White was convicted of murder and aggravated assault charges in a Texas state court, he filed a petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the Southern District of Texas, claiming that his attorney at trial rendered ineffective assistance. After White and attorneys for the State of Texas consented to disposition of the case by a magistrate judge, the magistrate judge denied White’s petition, concluding that the trial court’s decision was not objectively unreasonable under federal law. The magistrate

378 Brown, 748 F.3d at 1072.
379 Id.
380 See id. at 1057–58. For further discussion of constitutional arguments concerning the authority of magistrate judges to dispose of petty offense cases without the defendant’s consent, see infra Section II.C.2.
381 See Norris v. Schotten, 146 F.3d 314, 326 (6th Cir. 1998); Orsini v. Wallace, 913 F.2d 474, 483 (8th Cir. 1990).
382 White v. Thaler, 610 F.3d 890, 898 (5th Cir. 2010).
383 Id. at 892, 894–95.
384 Id. at 895.
judge also granted White’s request for a Certificate of Appealability to the Fifth Circuit only on the issue “whether counsel was ineffective.” 385

On appeal, the Fifth Circuit sua sponte addressed the issue of “whether the consensual delegation of a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 proceeding to a magistrate judge violates Article III of the Constitution,” noting that it had previously held in Johnston that the consensual delegation of a proceeding under § 2255 to a magistrate judge for disposition violated Article III. 386 The court acknowledged, however, that it had distinguished between § 2254 and § 2255 matters in Johnston in that a § 2255 motion “questions the validity of a prior federal court ruling,” while a § 2254 proceeding attacks a state court’s judgment. 387 After noting that three other circuits had concluded that the consensual delegation of petitions under § 2254 to magistrate judges under § 636(c) did not violate the Constitution, the court concluded that, as a § 2254 proceeding does not raise separation of powers concerns, the consensual delegation of these matters to magistrate judges did not violate Article III. 388

Turning to the merits of the case, the Fifth Circuit disagreed with the magistrate judge’s findings, concluding that White was prejudiced by the deficient performance of his trial attorney. 389 It therefore reversed “the district court’s judgment denying habeas relief” and remanded the case to the district court “with instructions to grant the writ and require a retrial of White.” 390

In a footnote in her opinion dissenting on the merits of the panel’s decision, then-Chief Judge Edith Jones agreed with the majority’s view that Article III was not violated when the magistrate judge decided the merits of this case on consent, but was nevertheless disturbed by that result:

While I concur in the conclusion that Article III of the Constitution was not violated when the parties consented to proceed in this federal habeas action before a United States Magistrate Judge, this result is somewhat troubling. When federal courts exercise our habeas corpus jurisdiction to overturn the decisions of a state’s highest court, we directly interfere with state sovereignty. Article III judges should assume ultimate responsibility for deciding these consequential cases, although they may choose to accept a report and recommendation from a magistrate judge. 391

Judge Jones’ view that the use of magistrate judges to dispose of state habeas corpus matters under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 with consent is a “troubling” development reflects the unease some judges continue to have with the expansion of magistrate judge authority.

385 Id.
386 Id.
387 Id. at 896.
388 Id. at 896, 898.
389 Id. at 912.
390 Id.
391 Id. at 916 n.2 (Jones, J., dissenting).
Eight years before *White*, the Seventh Circuit, in *Farmer v. Litscher*, also held that the consensual delegation of a state prisoner’s habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for disposition by a magistrate judge did not violate Article III.\(^{392}\)

Appellants James Farmer and Emmett White were state prisoners who filed petitions for writs of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the Eastern District of Wisconsin.\(^{393}\) The parties consented under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), and a magistrate judge denied both “petitions and refused to issue certificates of appealability.”\(^{394}\) After the prisoners appealed to the Seventh Circuit, the court asked the parties to brief the issue of whether “a magistrate judge acting with the parties’ consent ha[d] the authority under § 636(c) to issue a final judgment in a § 2254 proceeding.”\(^{395}\)

The Seventh Circuit noted that answering the question required the court to consider two issues: (1) whether Congress intended to give magistrate judges authority to dispose of § 2254 matters on consent; and, if so, (2) whether the delegation of such authority to magistrate judges violated Article III.\(^{396}\) The court held that because state habeas corpus matters are considered civil cases in federal court, magistrate judges can dispose of them under § 636(c).\(^{397}\) The court rejected the appellants’ argument that § 636(b)(2)(B) limited the reach of § 636(c), concluding that the two sections are “independent provisions that address different circumstances.”\(^{398}\) The Seventh Circuit also concluded that Article III does not prohibit magistrate judges from entering final judgments in § 2254 proceedings with the consent of the parties.\(^{399}\)

c. “Opt Out” Consent Procedures

As noted elsewhere in this paper, district courts have used a variety of approaches and procedures to encourage parties to consent to the disposition of civil cases by magistrate judges.\(^{400}\) One of these procedures is the assignment of a share of civil cases to magistrate judges, rather than district judges, as the presiding judge in the case. In the mid-1990s, however, several district courts implemented “opt out” consent procedures, where, after a case was assigned to a magistrate judge, parties who did not act within a specific time period would be deemed to have consented to disposition of the case by the magistrate judge.

---

\(^{392}\) *Farmer v. Litscher*, 303 F.3d 840, 843 (7th Cir. 2002).

\(^{393}\) *Id.* at 842.

\(^{394}\) *Id.*

\(^{395}\) *Id.*

\(^{396}\) *Id.*

\(^{397}\) *Id.* at 843.

\(^{398}\) *Id.*

\(^{399}\) *Id.*

\(^{400}\) *See supra* Section II.B.2.a.
“Opt out” consent procedures thus allowed for implied consent by the parties by interpreting a litigant’s failure to object as acquiescence to disposition of the case by a magistrate judge.

Beginning in 1994, appellate courts held in several cases that these procedures were impermissible under the Federal Magistrates Act. These cases are discussed below. The Supreme Court’s decision in Roell, however, holding that in some situations a litigant’s actions might constitute consent under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), which was analyzed earlier in this paper, once again raises the question of whether “opt out” procedures might once again be feasible in the district courts.

The Ninth Circuit ruled in three separate opinions that “opt out” procedures implemented in the Northern District of California, the District of Idaho, and the District of Montana violated 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). In Nasca, the Ninth Circuit examined an “opt out” consent procedure adopted by local rule in the Northern District of California, whereby parties were deemed to have consented to disposition of their civil case by the magistrate judge if they did not object to the assignment within a set period of time. The court held that the magistrate judge did not have proper jurisdiction over the case.

The case began “as a divorce proceeding in California Superior Court.” After the husband joined his pension plan, Peoplesoft, as a defendant in the action, Peoplesoft removed the case to the Northern District of California under provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). The magistrate judge assigned to the case remanded it to state court and ordered Peoplesoft to pay the plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees. Peoplesoft appealed these orders to the Ninth Circuit, which raised sua sponte the issue of the magistrate judge’s authority to hear the case.

Restating the reasoning it expressed previously in its Aldrich decision, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the magistrate judge had no jurisdiction to hear the case without the parties’ consent under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73(b). The court stated that consent “must be explicit, clear, unambiguous, and cannot be inferred from the conduct of the parties, and

---

401 See, e.g., Nasca v. Peoplesoft, 160 F.3d 578, 579 (9th Cir. 1998), overruled by Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2012).
402 See id.
403 See Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580 (2003); supra Section II.A.1.
404 See Nasca, 160 F.3d 578 (Northern District of California); Aldrich v. Bowen, 130 F.3d 1364 (9th Cir. 1997) (District of Idaho); Laird v. Chisholm, 85 F.3d 637 (9th Cir. 1996) (unpublished table decision) (District of Montana).
405 Nasca, 160 F.3d at 579.
406 Id. at 578.
407 Id.
408 Id.
409 Id. at 578–79.
410 See Aldrich, 130 F.3d at 1365.
411 Nasca, 160 F.3d at 580.
general orders by the district court to the contrary notwithstanding."\(^{412}\) It held that the general order adopted by the Northern District of California, which provides for “consent by failure to object” to the assignment of the case to a magistrate judge, did not constitute adequate consent under the Federal Magistrates Act.\(^{413}\) Noting that magistrate judge authority is “strictly circumscribed by statute,” the court concluded that “courts, whether by general order or otherwise, are not at liberty to disregard or modify the statutory prerequisites to a magistrate's jurisdiction.”\(^{414}\) Because the magistrate judge had no jurisdiction to enter the remand order or the award of attorney’s fees, the appellate court concluded that it had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal.\(^{415}\) It therefore dismissed the appeal.\(^{416}\)

Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit issued two opinions involving “opt out” procedures in the Southern District of Alabama.\(^{417}\) In Rembert v. Apfel, the Eleventh Circuit held that a magistrate judge presiding in a social security appeal assigned under an “opt out” consent procedure lacked authority to render a judgment and therefore the appellate court did not have jurisdiction to consider the appeal.\(^{418}\)

Plaintiff Rachel Rembert filed a complaint in the Southern District of Alabama contesting the denial of supplemental security income benefits.\(^{419}\) Under a standing order of the court, the case was automatically assigned to a magistrate judge and the parties were notified that unless they requested reassignment to a district judge by returning a form within thirty days, the parties would be deemed to have consented.\(^{420}\) Neither party filed the form and the magistrate judge then entered a final judgment against Rembert.\(^{421}\) On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit “sua sponte asked the parties to address whether they had consented the magistrate's authority, [rendering the] . . . judgment final and appealable.”\(^{422}\)

Citing with approval the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Nasca, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that consent to disposition by a magistrate judge through the district’s “opt out” standing order was not proper.\(^{423}\) Noting that Rembert, “did nothing, either before or after judgment, to indicate her express consent to final disposition of her case before a magistrate judge,” the court treated the magis-

---

412 Id.
413 Id. at 579.
414 Id. at 579–80.
415 Id. at 580.
416 Id.
418 Rembert, 213 F.3d at 1335.
419 Id. at 1333.
420 Id.
421 Id.
422 Id.
423 Id. at 1334–35 (citing Nasca v. Peoplesoft, 160 F.3d 578, 578 (9th Cir. 1998)).
tate judge’s order as “in essence . . . a nonfinal, nonappealable report and recommendation not yet adopted by the district court.”424 It therefore dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.425

The Supreme Court’s opinion in Roell v. Withrow, holding that consent to disposition of a civil case by a magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) may be inferred in certain situations from a party’s conduct during litigation, has cast doubt on the reasoning applied in Nasca, Rembert, and other decisions.426 To the extent that these pre-Roell decisions held that consent under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) must be express and on the record, later decisions by both the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have acknowledged that Roell clearly abrogated the reasoning in those opinions.427 While no court has formally enacted local rules or standing orders reviving “opt out” consent procedures after Roell, some magistrate judges have expressed the view in unpublished opinions that parties, by failing to make timely responses to consent deadlines, have opted to consent to disposition of their case by the magistrate judge.428

C. Remaining Issues Under Article III of the Constitution

1. Does Civil Consent Authority Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) Violate Article III of the Constitution?

As noted earlier, the question of whether the civil consent authority of magistrate judges under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) violates Article III of the Constitution had not been seriously considered by courts since the numerous circuit court opinions issued in the early 1980s.429 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has never directly addressed the question of whether § 636(c) violates Article III. In the early 1980s, however, every court of appeals that had considered the question concluded that 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) did not violate Article III.430 Apart

424 Id.
425 Id.
426 See Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580, 582 (2003); supra Section II.A.
427 See Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1120 (9th Cir. 2012) (“To the extent that we have previously held that we can never infer consent, we have been overruled by the Supreme Court in Roell.” (citing Nasca, 160 F.3d 578)); Chambless v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 481 F.3d 1345, 1350 (11th Cir. 2007) (noting that the reasoning in Rembert has been abrogated by Roell).
428 See, e.g., Little Bend River Co. v. Molpus Timberlands Mgmt., L.L.C., No. CA 05-0450-C, 2005 WL 2897400, at *1 n.1 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 3, 2005) (citing Roell and holding that the parties had implicitly consented to the magistrate judge’s jurisdiction under § 636(c) by failing to object to the referral of the case to a magistrate judge within the time period provided under the district’s consent procedure); Alicea v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 10-1967 (CVR), 2011 WL 4753451, at *1 (D.P.R. Oct. 5, 2011).
429 See CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 21, at 31–36.
430 See Bell & Beckwith v. United States, 766 F.2d 910, 912 (6th Cir. 1985); Gariola v. Va. Dept. of Gen. Servs., 753 F.2d 1281, 1285 (4th Cir. 1985); D.L. Auld Co. v. Chroma Graphics Corp., 753 F.2d 1029, 1033 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (finding an appeal that challenged the constitutionality of § 636(c) “abusive of the judicial process” and grounds for an award of
from the Fifth Circuit’s 2001 decision in Johnston, holding that the consensual disposition of a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 by a magistrate judge under § 636(c) violated Article III, it appeared that this issue was well settled.

The Supreme Court’s opinion in Stern v. Marshall, however, revived questions about the extent that non-Article III judges could handle state common law claims without violating the Constitution. Although Stern involved the authority of bankruptcy judges (and the Court’s majority opinion never mentioned magistrate judges), much of the majority opinion’s language appeared to implicate the authority of magistrate judges, particularly in consent cases.

a. Stern v. Marshall

In Stern, the Supreme Court, in a five to four decision, held that a final judgment issued by a bankruptcy judge on a state law tort counterclaim, defined as a “core proceeding” under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C), violated the separation of powers principles set forth in Article III of the Constitution.

attorney’s fees against the party raising the issue); Fields v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 743 F.2d 890, 893 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d 1037, 1038 (7th Cir. 1984); Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, Inc. v. Clark Oil & Ref. Corp., 739 F.2d 1313, 1315 (8th Cir. 1984); Campbell v. Wainwright, 726 F.2d 702, 704–05 (11th Cir. 1984); Goldstein v. Kelleher, 728 F.2d 34, 34 (1st Cir. 1984); Collins v. Foreman, 729 F.2d 108, 109–10 (2d Cir. 1984); Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. v. Instramedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 540 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc); Wharton-Thomas v. United States, 721 F.2d 922, 923 (3d Cir. 1983); see also CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 21, at 41–53 (analyzing Pacemaker, Wharton-Thomas, Collins, and Geras).

431 See supra Section II.B.2.b.i(a) for a detailed analysis of the Johnston case.


433 As the Supreme Court described in its Wellness decision,

[D]istrict courts have original jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases and related proceedings. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(a), (b). But “[e]ach district court may provide that any or all” bankruptcy cases and related proceedings “shall be referred to the bankruptcy judges for the district.” § 157(a). Bankruptcy judges are “judicial officers of the United States district court,” appointed to 14–year terms by the courts of appeals, and subject to removal for cause. §§ 152(a)(1), (e). “The district court may withdraw” a reference to the bankruptcy court “on its own motion or on timely motion of any party, for cause shown.” § 157(d).

When a district court refers a case to a bankruptcy judge, that judge’s statutory authority depends on whether Congress has classified the matter as a “[c]ore proceeding” or a “[n]on-core proceeding,” §§ 157(b)(2), (4) . . . Congress identified as “[c]ore” a nonexclusive list of 16 types of proceedings, § 157(b)(2), in which it thought bankruptcy courts could constitutionally enter judgment. Congress gave bankruptcy courts the power to “hear and determine” core proceedings and to “enter appropriate orders and judgments,” subject to appellate review by the district court. § 157(b)(1); see § 158. But it gave bankruptcy courts more limited authority in noncore proceedings: They may “hear and determine” such proceedings, and “enter appropriate orders and judgments,” only “with the consent of all the parties to the proceeding.” § 157(c)(2).

Absent consent, bankruptcy courts in non-core proceedings may only “submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law,” which the district courts review de novo. § 157(c)(1).


434 Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2600–01; see Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1959–60.
The majority opinion was written by Chief Justice Roberts, in which Justices Alito, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas joined. Justice Scalia issued a concurring opinion. Justice Breyer issued a dissenting opinion in which Justices Ginsburg, Kagan, and Sotomayor joined.

i. **Case Summary**

The case arose from the well-publicized and convoluted legal dispute between the estates of Vickie Lynn Marshall (Vickie, more famously known as Anna Nicole Smith) and E. Pierce Marshall (Pierce) over the fortune of J. Howard Marshall (J. Howard), Vickie’s deceased husband and Pierce’s father.435

Before J. Howard passed away, Vickie filed suit in Texas state probate court, asserting that Pierce . . . fraudulently induced J. Howard to sign a living trust that did not include her, even though J. Howard meant to give her half his property. . . .

After J. Howard’s death, Vickie filed a bankruptcy petition in the Central District of California. Pierce filed a complaint in that bankruptcy proceeding, contending that Vickie had defamed him by inducing her lawyers to tell members of the press that he had engaged in fraud to gain control of his father’s assets. The complaint sought a declaration that Pierce’s defamation claim was not dischargeable in the bankruptcy proceedings. Pierce subsequently filed a proof of claim for the defamation action, . . . [seeking] to recover damages . . . from Vickie’s bankruptcy estate. Vickie responded to Pierce’s initial complaint by asserting truth as a defense to the alleged defamation and by filing a counterclaim for tortious interference with the gift she expected from J. Howard.436

In 1999, “the Bankruptcy Court issued an order granting Vickie summary judgment on Pierce’s claim for defamation.”437 In making its decision, the bankruptcy court determined an issue of Texas state law that had not yet been addressed by the Texas Supreme Court.438

[A]fter a bench trial, the Bankruptcy Court issued a judgment on Vickie’s counterclaim in her favor, . . . [and] awarded Vickie over $400 million in compensatory damages and $25 million in punitive damages.

In post-trial proceedings, Pierce argued that the Bankruptcy Court lacked jurisdiction over Vickie’s counterclaim. In particular, Pierce renewed a claim he had made earlier in the litigation, asserting that the Bankruptcy Court’s authority over the counterclaim was limited because Vickie’s counterclaim was not a “core proceeding” under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C).439

---

435 See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2601.
436 Id. (citations omitted).
437 Id.
438 See id.
439 Id. (citations omitted).
The bankruptcy court disagreed, “conclud[ing] that Vickie’s counterclaim was ‘a core proceeding’ under § 157(b)(2)(C),” and that it “had the ‘power to enter judgment’ on the counterclaim under § 157(b)(1).”

On appeal, the district court “concluded that a ‘counterclaim should not be characterized as core’ when it ‘is only somewhat related to the claim against which it is asserted, and when the unique characteristics and context of the counterclaim place it outside of the normal type of set-off or other counter-claims that customarily arise.’” Further, the court determined that it was required to treat the Bankruptcy Court’s judgment as “proposed[,] rather than final,” and engage in an “independent review” of the record. Although the Texas state court had by that time conducted a jury trial on the merits of the parties’ dispute and entered a judgment in Pierce’s favor, the District Court declined to give that judgment preclusive effect and went on to decide the matter itself. Like the Bankruptcy Court, the District Court found that Pierce had tortiously interfered with Vickie’s expectancy of a gift from J. Howard, . . . and awarded Vickie compensatory and punitive damages, each in the amount of $44,292,767.33.

On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the court reversed the district court on different grounds, and the Supreme Court subsequently reversed the Ninth Circuit on that issue. On remand from the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit held that § 157 mandated “a two-step approach” under which a bankruptcy judge may issue a final judgment in a proceeding only if the matter both “meets Congress’ definition of a core proceeding and arises under or arises in title 11 . . . .” The court also reasoned that allowing a bankruptcy judge to enter final judgments on all counterclaims raised in bankruptcy proceedings “would certainly run afoul” of [the Supreme] Court’s decision in Northern Pipeline.

The court therefore concluded that “a counterclaim under § 157(b)(2)(C) is properly a ‘core’ proceeding ‘arising in a case under’ the [Bankruptcy] Code only if the counterclaim is so closely related to [a creditor’s] proof of claim that the resolution of the counterclaim is necessary to resolve the allowance or disallowance of the claim itself.”

Under this reasoning, the Ninth Circuit ruled that Vickie’s counterclaim did not constitute a “core” proceeding under § 157(b)(2)(C). The judgment of the Texas probate court was thus “the earliest final judgment entered ‘on

440 Id. at 2602.
442 Id. (first alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting In re Marshall, 264 B.R. at 633).
444 Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Marshall v. Stern (In re Marshall), 600 F.3d 1037, 1057 (9th Cir. 2010)).
445 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting In re Marshall, 600 F.3d at 1058).
446 Id.
matters relevant to this proceeding.’” 447 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit “concluded that the District Court should have ‘afford[ed] preclusive effect’ to the Texas ‘court’s determination of relevant legal and factual issues.’” 448 The Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari. 449

Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts initially ruled that “Vickie’s counterclaim against Pierce for tortious interference [was] in fact a ‘core proceeding’ under the plain text of § 157(b)(2)(C).” 450 Nevertheless, he further concluded that while “§ 157(b)(2)(C) permits the Bankruptcy Court to enter final judgment on Vickie’s counterclaim, Article III of the Constitution does not.” 451

The majority noted that the Court had long recognized a “public rights” exception to the requirements of Article III, 452 first articulated in Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co. 453 The Supreme Court has explained that

“the public rights doctrine reflects simply a pragmatic understanding that when Congress selects a quasi-judicial method of resolving matters that could be conclusively determined by the Executive and Legislative Branches, the danger of encroaching on the judicial powers” [set forth in Article III] is less than when private rights, which are normally within the purview of the judiciary, are relegated as an initial matter to administrative adjudication. 454

Emphasizing the Court’s earlier analysis of bankruptcy courts under the “public rights” exception in Northern Pipeline, 455 Chief Justice Roberts stated:

It is clear that the Bankruptcy Court in this case exercised the “judicial Power of the United States” in purporting to resolve and enter final judgment on a state common law claim, just as the court did in Northern Pipeline. No “public right” exception excuses the failure to comply with Article III in doing so, any more than in Northern Pipeline. 456

447 Id. (quoting In re Marshall, 600 F.3d at 1064–65).
448 Id. at 2602–03 (alteration in original) (quoting In re Marshall, 600 F.3d at 1064–65).
449 Id. at 2603.
450 Id. at 2604.
451 Id. at 2608.
452 Id. at 2611.
453 59 U.S. 272 (1856).
455 N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 69–70 (1982). In Northern Pipeline, a majority of the Supreme Court declared that the portion of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 that conferred Article III powers on bankruptcy judges without the protections of life tenure and irreducible salaries violated Article III of the Constitution. In particular, Justice Brennan defined the “public rights” doctrine as, “matters of public right [that] must at a minimum arise ‘between the government and others’ . . . our precedents clearly establish that only [such] controversies . . . may be removed from Art. III courts and delegated to legislative courts or administrative agencies for their determination.” Id. For a detailed analysis of Northern Pipeline, see CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 21, at 23–30.
456 Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2611.
The majority therefore concluded that “Vickie’s counterclaim cannot be deemed a matter of ‘public right’ that can be decided outside the Judicial Branch,” and her counterclaim did not “fall within any of the varied formulations of the public rights exception in this Court’s cases.” After discussing several Supreme Court decisions that analyzed the authority of particular non-Article III tribunals under Article III, including Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, and Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, Chief Justice Roberts summarized the Court’s Article III analysis:

What is plain here is that this case involves the most prototypical exercise of judicial power: the entry of a final, binding judgment by a court with broad substantive jurisdiction, on a common law cause of action, when the action neither derives from nor depends upon any agency regulatory regime. If such an exercise of judicial power may nonetheless be taken from the Article III Judiciary simply by deeming it part of some amorphous “public right,” then Article III would be transformed from the guardian of individual liberty and separation of powers we have long recognized into mere wishful thinking.

The Court further rejected Vickie’s argument that the bankruptcy court’s final judgment was constitutional because bankruptcy courts under the Bankruptcy Act of 1984 were deemed “adjuncts” of the district courts, stating that “a bankruptcy court can no more be deemed a mere ‘adjunct’ of the district court than a district court can be deemed such an ‘adjunct’ of the court of appeals.” It also noted that its Article III analysis was not affected by the fact that judges of an Article III court, rather than the President, appoint that bankruptcy judges, concluding: “If . . . the bankruptcy court itself exercises ‘the essential attributes of judicial power [that] are reserved to Article III courts,’ it does not matter who appointed the bankruptcy judge or authorized the judge to render final judgments in such proceedings. The constitutional bar remains.”

The majority concluded by summarizing its holding:

Article III of the Constitution provides that the judicial power of the United States may be vested only in courts whose judges enjoy the protections set forth in that Article. We conclude today that Congress, in one isolated respect, exceeded that limitation in the Bankruptcy Act of 1984. The Bankruptcy Court below lacked the constitutional authority to enter a final judgment on a state law counterclaim that is not resolved in the process of ruling on a creditor’s proof of claim.

The Court therefore affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s judgment.

457 Id. at 2611, 2614.
458 Thomas, 473 U.S. 568.
459 Schor, 478 U.S. 833.
461 Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2615.
462 Id. at 2619.
463 Id. (second alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Schor, 478 U.S. at 851).
464 Id. at 2620.
ii. Potential Application of Stern Reasoning to Magistrate Judge Authority

The majority’s ruling in Stern applied only to the “core” jurisdiction of bankruptcy judges under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C). Chief Justice Roberts described the Court’s holding as applying only in “one isolated respect” where Congress exceeded the limitations of Article III in the Bankruptcy Act of 1984. As noted above, magistrate judges were not mentioned in the majority or concurring opinions, and were only mentioned in passing in Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion. Nevertheless, the Stern majority’s analysis of Article III arguably could be applied to limit the authority of magistrate judges.

Prior to Stern, analysis of whether expansions of magistrate judge authority implicated separation of powers concerns under Article III had focused on the Supreme Court’s decision in Peretz. As noted earlier, the Court stated in Peretz that a defendant’s right to have an Article III judge adjudicate certain proceedings in a felony case (in that case, voir dire) could be waived by the defendant, and that referring such duties to a magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) did not violate Article III of the Constitution. In particular, the Court adapted its Article III analysis of the Federal Magistrates Act in Peretz from the analysis set forth in Schor.

In Peretz and Schor, the Supreme Court set forth a two-part analysis to determine whether a statutory scheme granting judicial duties to non-Article III judicial officers violates Article III of the Constitution. Under that analysis, Article III protects two sets of values: (1) an individual’s right to have a claim adjudicated by an Article III judge, and (2) the court’s “structural” interest in maintaining an independent judiciary within the constitutional scheme of tripartite government. A statute must adequately protect both values to survive scrutiny under the Court’s Article III analysis.

The continuing validity of the constitutional analysis set forth in Peretz and Schor was called into question by the Supreme Court’s decision in Stern. Although the majority in Stern cited the Court’s earlier opinion in Schor as one of several Supreme Court opinions analyzing Article III challenges to non-Article III tribunals since the Northern Pipeline decision, it did not emphasize the sev-

465 Id.
466 See id. at 2627 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[A]lthough Congress technically exercised its Article I power when it created bankruptcy courts, functionally, bankruptcy judges can be compared to magistrate judges, law clerks, and the Judiciary’s administrative officials, whose lack of Article III tenure and compensation protections do not endanger the independence of the Judicial Branch.”).
467 See supra Part I.C.
469 See Constitutional Analysis, supra note 21, at 18.
470 See id.
471 Id.
eral factors of the balancing test set forth in Schor in its analysis. Instead, the majority explicitly reasserted the narrower interpretation of the “public rights” exception to Article III originally stated in Northern Pipeline to conclude that a bankruptcy judge, as a non-Article III judicial officer, did not have authority to rule on the state law counterclaim at issue in the case. It was therefore unclear whether the balancing test in Schor, previously applied by the Court in Peretz and Gonzalez, would still be used by the Court in the future.

A significant question left unresolved by the Court in Stern was whether litigant consent to the authority of a bankruptcy judge in a state common law claim might satisfy Article III concerns. Chief Justice Roberts noted that Pierce’s failure to consent to having the bankruptcy court resolve Vickie’s tortious interference counterclaim was one factor in concluding that the bankruptcy court’s exercise of jurisdiction violated Article III: “Pierce did not truly consent to resolution of Vickie’s claim in the bankruptcy court proceedings. He had nowhere else to go if he wished to recover from Vickie’s estate.” In the footnote following this assertion, the majority emphasized this point:

Contrary to the claims of the dissent, Pierce did not have another forum in which to pursue his claim to recover from Vickie’s prebankruptcy assets, rather than take his chances with whatever funds might remain after the Title 11 proceedings. That is why, as we recognized in Granfinanciera, the notion of “consent” does not apply in bankruptcy proceedings as it might in other contexts.

At the time that the Court issued the Stern opinion, it remained to be seen whether litigant consent to disposition of a case by a magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) would constitute one of the “other contexts” suggested in footnote eight that would satisfy Article III concerns under this reasoning. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals sua sponte raised the issue of whether § 636(c) violated Article III under the reasoning in Stern three months after the decision was issued. That court, however, ultimately held that it was bound by its earlier precedent holding that 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) did not violate the Constitution. Uncertainties about the constitutionality of § 636(c), however, ap-

473 Id. at 2614–15.
474 Id. at 2614.
475 Id. at 2615 n.8 (citation omitted).
476 See Tech. Automation Servs. Corp. v. Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp., 673 F.3d 399, 401 (5th Cir. 2012). On September 9, 2011, a panel of the Fifth Circuit sua sponte ordered the parties in an appeal of a civil case disposed of by a magistrate judge in the Southern District of Texas to submit letter briefs addressing whether the reasoning in Stern applied to magistrate judges. In particular, the Fifth Circuit requested briefing on whether, under Stern, a magistrate judge can enter a final judgment in a case tried to a magistrate judge by consent under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) where jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship and state law provides the rule of decision. Id.
477 See id. at 405 (citing Puryear v. Ede’s Ltd., 731 F.2d 1153, 1154 (5th Cir. 1984)).
pear to have been removed by the Court’s 2015 decision in Wellness International Network v. Sharif.\textsuperscript{478}

\textit{b. Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif}

On May 26, 2015, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Wellness.\textsuperscript{479} In a six to three decision written by Justice Sotomayor, the Court held that Article III of the Constitution “is not violated when the parties knowingly and voluntarily consent to adjudication by a bankruptcy court.”\textsuperscript{479}

\textit{i. Case Summary}

The case arose from a litigant’s repeated attempts to enforce a judgment.\textsuperscript{480} Petitioner Wellness, a manufacturer of health and nutrition products, entered into an agreement with respondent Richard Sharif whereby Sharif would distribute Wellness products.\textsuperscript{481} After the business arrangement soured, Sharif sued Wellness in the Northern District of Texas.\textsuperscript{482} “Sharif repeatedly ignored Wellness’ discovery requests and other litigation obligations,” so the court entered default judgment and imposed sanctions against Sharif in the amount of $650,000.\textsuperscript{483} In February 2009, Sharif filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in the Northern District of Illinois, listing Wellness as a creditor.\textsuperscript{484} When Wellness discovered that Sharif had listed more than $5 million in assets on a 2002 loan application, Sharif responded that the assets were controlled by the Soad Wattar Living Trust (Trust), an entity he administered on behalf of his mother and for his sister’s benefit.\textsuperscript{485} When Sharif failed to respond to requests for information about the Trust, “Wellness filed a five-count adversary complaint against Sharif in the Bankruptcy Court.”\textsuperscript{486} The first four counts of the complaint objected to the discharge of Sharif’s debts on the grounds that he “had concealed property by claiming that it was owned by the Trust.”\textsuperscript{487} In the fifth count of the complaint, Wellness sought a declaratory judgment that the Trust was in fact Sharif’s alter ego and its assets should be included as part of the bankruptcy estate.\textsuperscript{488} In his answer to the complaint, Sharif conceded that the adversary proceeding was a “core” proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) over

\begin{footnotesize}

\textsuperscript{479} \textit{Id.} at 1939.

\textsuperscript{480} \textit{Id.} at 1940.

\textsuperscript{481} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{482} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{483} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{484} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{485} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{486} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{487} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{488} \textit{Id.}
\end{footnotesize}
which the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction, and requested a judgment in his favor on all counts.489

After Sharif again refused to respond to discovery requests, Wellness moved to compel discovery and for sanctions.490 Although the bankruptcy court warned Sharif that a default judgment might be entered against him if he did not comply with the court’s orders compelling discovery, Sharif failed to produce any documents regarding the Trust.491 The bankruptcy court subsequently ruled that Sharif had violated the court’s discovery order, “denied Sharif’s request to discharge his debts and entered a default judgment against him in the adversary proceeding.”492 In particular, the bankruptcy court ruled that the Trust’s assets at issue in the fifth count of the complaint were in fact the property of Sharif’s bankruptcy estate.493

Sharif appealed the bankruptcy court’s rulings to the district court.494 Six weeks before Sharif filed his opening brief, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Stern.495 “Sharif did not cite Stern in his opening brief. Rather, after the close of briefing, Sharif moved for leave to file a supplemental brief,” arguing that under Stern and In re Ortiz, the bankruptcy court’s ruling should be treated as a report and recommendation by the district court.496 After the district court denied Sharif’s motion as untimely and affirmed the bankruptcy court’s judgment, Sharif appealed to the Seventh Circuit.497

The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. While acknowledging that Sharif’s Stern claim was untimely, the court held that it must nonetheless consider the claim because it “concerned ‘the allocation of authority between bankruptcy courts and district courts’ under Article III” of the Constitution.498 It therefore concluded “that ‘a litigant may not waive’ a Stern objection.”499 As to the merits of the claim, the court agreed that the bankruptcy court had properly resolved the first four counts in Wellness’s adversary complaint.500 It further held, however, that the fifth count of the complaint (reassigning the Trust’s assets to Sharif’s bankruptcy estate) alleged a Stern claim, and that the bankruptcy court lacked constitutional authority to enter a final

489 Id. at 1941.
490 Id.
491 Id.
492 Id.
493 Id.
494 Id.
495 Id.
496 Id.; see Ortiz v. Aurora Health Care, Inc. (In re Ortiz), 665 F.3d 906, 915 (7th Cir. 2011).
497 Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1941.
498 Id.
499 Id.
500 Id.
judgment on that claim.\textsuperscript{501} The Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari.\textsuperscript{502}

Writing for the majority, Justice Sotomayor stated: “This case presents the question whether Article III allows bankruptcy judges to adjudicate [\textit{Stern} claims] with the parties’ consent. We hold that Article III is not violated when the parties knowingly and voluntarily consent to adjudication by a bankruptcy judge.”\textsuperscript{503}

The majority relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in three cases: \textit{Schor},\textsuperscript{504} \textit{Gomez},\textsuperscript{505} and \textit{Peretz}.\textsuperscript{506} Applying the reasoning in these three cases to the case at bar, the majority stated:

The question here, then, is whether allowing bankruptcy courts to decide \textit{Stern} claims by consent would “impermissibly threat[en] the institutional integrity of the Judicial Branch.” And that question must be decided not by “formalistic and unbending rules,” but “with an eye to the practical effect that the practice ‘will have on the constitutionally assigned role of the federal judiciary.’ The Court must weigh

the extent to which the essential attributes of judicial power are reserved to Article III courts, and, conversely, the extent to which the non-Article III forum exercises the range of jurisdiction and powers normally vested only in Article III courts, the origins and importance of the right to be adjudicated, and the concerns that drove Congress to depart from the requirements of Article III.\textsuperscript{507}

In its application of the \textit{Schor} and \textit{Peretz} factors, the majority determined that parties in bankruptcy cases could waive their rights to adjudication of \textit{Stern} claims by an Article III judge without undermining the basic constitutional authority of Article III courts.\textsuperscript{508} In particular, it noted that “[b]ankruptcy judges, like magistrate judges, ‘are appointed and subject to removal by Article III judges,’ . . . ‘serve as judicial officers of the United States district court,’ and collectively ‘constitute a unit of the district court’ for that district.”\textsuperscript{509} Moreo-

\textsuperscript{501} Id. at 1941–42.
\textsuperscript{502} Id. at 1942.
\textsuperscript{503} Id. at 1939.
\textsuperscript{504} Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. \textit{Schor}, 478 U.S. 833, 834–35 (1986) (holding that a litigant’s consent to have claims disposed of by a non-Article III tribunal did not violate Article III and was at most a “de minimis” infringement of the prerogatives of the federal court); \textit{see also} CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 21, at 32–37.
\textsuperscript{505} \textit{Gomez} v. United States, 490 U.S. 858 (1989) (holding that a magistrate judge could not conduct \textit{voir dire} in a felony case as an additional duty under § 636(b)(3) if the defendant objected to the magistrate judge’s involvement); \textit{see also} CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 21, at 12–14.
\textsuperscript{506} \textit{Peretz} v. United States, 501 U.S. 923 (1991); \textit{see also} CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 21, at 16–21.
\textsuperscript{507} Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1944 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting \textit{Schor}, 478 U.S. at 851).
\textsuperscript{508} Id. at 1944–45.
\textsuperscript{509} Id. at 1945 (citations omitted).
ver, just as in Peretz the majority noted that the district court made the overriding decision to refer a matter to a magistrate judge in the first place, the Court here observed that bankruptcy courts only hear bankruptcy matters because district courts refer those cases to them, and that the district court retains the authority to withdraw such references sua sponte or at the request of a party under 28 U.S.C. § 157(d). The majority therefore concluded, “‘[S]eparation of powers concerns are diminished’ when, as here, ‘the decision to invoke [a non-Article III] forum is left entirely to the parties and the power of the federal judiciary to take jurisdiction’ remains intact.”

The majority further observed there was “no indication that Congress gave bankruptcy courts the ability to decide Stern claims in an effort to aggrandize itself or humble the Judiciary.” Quoting language from the Peretz decision, the Court stated that “[b]ecause the entire process takes place under the district court’s total control and jurisdiction, there is no danger that use of the [bankruptcy court] involves a congressional attempt to transfer jurisdiction to [non-Article III tribunals] for the purpose of emasculating constitutional courts.”

The majority rejected an expansive reading of the Court’s Stern decision, stating that Stern “turned on the fact that the litigant ‘did not truly consent to’ resolution of the claim against it in a non-Article III forum.” The Court further reasoned that “[b]ecause Stern was premised on nonconsent to adjudication by the Bankruptcy Court, the ‘constitutional bar’ it announced simply does not govern the question whether litigants may validly consent to adjudication by a bankruptcy court.”

The majority summarized the governing Supreme Court decisions on litigant consent to disposition of claims by a non-Article III tribunal:

In sum, the cases in which this Court has found a violation of a litigant’s right to an Article III decisionmaker have involved an objecting defendant forced to litigate involuntarily before a non-Article III court. The Court has never done what Sharif and the principal dissent would have us do—hold that a litigant who has the right to an Article III court may not waive that right through his consent.

Noting Chief Justice Roberts’ strong dissent to the majority’s interpretation of Stern, the majority stated:

The principal dissent warns darkly of the consequences of today’s decision. To hear the principal dissent tell it, the world will end not in fire, or ice, but in a bankruptcy court.

---

510 Id.
511 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Schor, 478 U.S. at 855).
512 Id.
513 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 937 (1991)).
514 Id. at 1946 (quoting Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2614).
515 Id. (citation omitted).
516 Id. at 1947.
Adjudication based on litigant consent has been a consistent feature of the federal court system since its inception. Reaffirming that unremarkable fact, we are confident, poses no great threat to anyone’s birthrights, constitutional or otherwise.\textsuperscript{517}

The majority finally held that consent to adjudication by a bankruptcy court need not be express. Relying squarely on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in \textit{Roell},\textsuperscript{518} the majority concluded that the implied consent of the parties was sufficient to provide the bankruptcy court with authority to dispose of a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 157, provided the consent was also “knowing and voluntary.”\textsuperscript{519} After determining that the lower court record was insufficient to decide whether the implied consent of Sharif was knowing and voluntary, the majority reversed the Seventh Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.\textsuperscript{520}

\textit{ii. Significance of Wellness for Magistrate Judge Authority}

Although the majority opinion in \textit{Wellness} is of particular importance to bankruptcy judges, the decision has constitutional significance for magistrate judges. Notably, the majority opinion relies on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in \textit{Peretz},\textsuperscript{521} thereby reaffirming the Court’s view that the consent of parties may overcome constitutional concerns when certain matters are referred to magistrate judges. Moreover, the majority relied heavily on the Court’s reasoning in \textit{Roell} when it held that knowing and voluntary consent to disposition of \textit{Stern} claims by a bankruptcy judge may be implied by the litigants’ conduct.\textsuperscript{522} The majority opinion in \textit{Wellness} thus clearly reaffirms that the reasoning set forth in \textit{Peretz} and \textit{Roell} remain the governing standards for evaluating whether the referral of particular matters to magistrate judges comply with the strictures of Article III.\textsuperscript{523}

It is also significant that the Court acknowledged, in a footnote, that “[c]onsistent with our precedents, the Courts of Appeals have unanimously upheld the constitutionality of § 636(c).”\textsuperscript{524} This footnote is the closest the Supreme Court has come to an express declaration that 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) does not violate Article III.

\textsuperscript{517} \textit{Id.}


\textsuperscript{519} \textit{Wellness,} 135 S. Ct. at 1948.

\textsuperscript{520} \textit{Id.} at 1949.


\textsuperscript{522} \textit{Wellness,} 135 S. Ct. at 1948.

\textsuperscript{523} See, e.g., United States v. Underwood, 597 F.3d 661 (5th Cir. 2010) (applying the reasoning in \textit{Roell} and holding a defendant’s consent to have a magistrate judge conduct a guilty plea proceeding in a felony case under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) could be inferred from the defendant’s conduct when he failed to object to the magistrate judge conducting the plea colloquy).

\textsuperscript{524} \textit{Wellness,} 135 S. Ct. at 1948 n.12. (emphasis added).
After Wellness, the constitutionality of magistrate judge authority to dispose of civil consent cases under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) under Article III appears to be secure. With every circuit court to have considered the issue agreeing that § 636(c) is constitutional, it appears unlikely that there will be a circuit split on the issue that would bring it before the Supreme Court for ultimate resolution.

Nevertheless, there remain at least two areas of magistrate judge authority under the Federal Magistrates Act where the constitutionality of particular provisions of the Act remains untested.


In 2000, Congress removed completely the requirement that defendants must consent to have magistrate judges dispose of petty offense cases. Amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 636(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 3401(b) expanded magistrate judges’ authority “to try all petty offense cases without [a] defendant’s consent.” However, the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 2000 left unchanged “the requirement that a defendant must consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction to dispose of a Class A misdemeanor.”

The constitutional argument for eliminating consent in petty offense cases was based primarily on the common law reasoning used to explain why defendants charged with petty offenses do not have a right to a jury trial. It has long been argued that because petty offense cases were not recognized as “crimes” at the common law, fewer constitutional protections, such as trial by jury and adjudication by an Article III judge, were required. Felix Frankfurter and Thomas Corcoran, in a widely cited law review article published in 1926, set forth an exhaustive history of the common law of England and the American colonies prior to the American Revolution and concluded that no right to trial by jury was recognized for minor offenses and therefore federal petty offense cases also did not require jury trials.

---

525 See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
526 But see Brown v. United States, 748 F.3d 1045, 1068 (11th Cir. 2014) (raising in dicta “serious concerns” about the constitutionality of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)); supra Section II.B.2.b.(b).
529 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 95.
preme Court cases followed this reasoning to conclude that petty offense cases in federal courts did not constitute “crimes” under the common law and thus did not mandate jury trials.532

In addition, another law review article published in 1959, co-written by an assistant Attorney General of the United States, suggested that non-Article III magistrate judges should be authorized by Congress specifically to handle minor federal offenses in order to relieve Article III judges from the burden of disposing such cases.533 The authors argued that the disposition of petty offenses by non-Article III judicial officers would not violate Article III:

An analysis of this constitutional objection to the proposed commissioners’ petty offense jurisdiction indicates that it does not constitute a barrier to the accomplishment of this salutary step. The historical background of the “good behavior” provision supports such a distinct treatment of petty offenses, and review upon appeal to the district courts would provide for a sufficient exercise of judicial power to satisfy article III.534

Interestingly, the authors did not discuss any need for the defendant to consent to the jurisdiction of United States commissioners or proposed federal magistrate judges as part of their constitutional analysis. They concluded that the petty offense defendant’s right to appeal the judgment of the non-Article III judge to an Article III judge would be sufficient to ensure the constitutionality of their proposal:

Summary proceedings by subordinate magistrates have traditionally characterized petty offense trials. The provision of life tenure for the judiciary in the regular courts of record, embodied in article III of the Constitution, carries an implicit exception for inferior tribunals which try minor crimes. And any possible demand of article III is satisfied by provision of review. It may be concluded that there are no substantial obstacles to the creation of federal petty offense tribunals or the endowment of United States commissioners with such authority.535

The subsequent legislative history of the 1996 amendment also concluded that there was no constitutional impediment to eliminating defendants’ consent in petty offense cases.536

Until recently, the constitutionality of a magistrate judge’s authority to dispose of petty offense cases without the defendant’s consent had not been seriously questioned or analyzed in the federal courts.537 A 2015 Fifth Circuit case,

534 Id. at 456.
535 Id. at 467.
537 The most thorough analysis of the constitutionality of the amended provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 3401(b) was by a magistrate judge in United States v. McCrickard, 957 F. Supp. 1149 (E.D. Cal. 1996), which provided an in-depth review of the constitutional arguments concerning magistrate judges’ petty offense authority and conclud-
however, raises questions about whether this authority might violate Article III under certain circumstances.

In United States v. Hollingsworth, a panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a petty offense defendant did not have a constitutional right to a trial before an Article III judge where the offense took place on a federal enclave and the magistrate judge acted as an Article I judge pursuant to Congress’ authority to create territorial judges under Clause 17 of Article I of the Constitution.538 In a strongly worded dissent, however, another member of the panel argued that magistrate judges, as adjuncts to Article III judges, do not have the authority to try, convict, or sentence a petty offense defendant without violating Article III of the Constitution, unless the defendant consents to the magistrate judge’s jurisdiction.539

Defendant David Hollingsworth was charged in the Eastern District of Louisiana with a petty offense assault that occurred at a naval facility in Belle Chasse, Louisiana, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(5), a federal criminal statute that applies only “within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”540 While the defendant filed an objection to having the case tried by a magistrate judge, the magistrate judge concluded that she had authority under the Federal Magistrates Act to preside over the trial without Hollingsworth’s consent.541 After a bench trial before the magistrate judge, Hollingsworth was convicted and sentenced to six months imprisonment.542 After being convicted before the magistrate judge, the defendant appealed to the district court, raising a new argument that he had a right to a jury trial in his case.543 The district judge, however, rejected this argument and affirmed the magistrate judge’s conviction and sentence.544 Hollingsworth then appealed to the Fifth Circuit, arguing “for the first time that he ha[d] a constitutional right to trial before an Art. III judge.”545

Writing for a majority of the panel, Judge Clement rejected Hollingsworth’s argument. The court began with the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Palmore v. United States, where the Court held that “Congress was not required to provide an Art. III court for the trial of criminal cases arising under its laws

ed “that 18 U.S.C. § 3401 and 28 U.S.C. § 636(a) are well within constitutional bounds.” McCrickard, 957 F. Supp. at 1155. In two more recent cases where defendants challenged the magistrate judge’s authority to try their petty offense cases with consent, the courts simply held that the magistrate judges had proper authority without providing in-depth constitutional analysis. See United States v. Zenón-Encarnación, 387 F.3d 60, 64 (1st Cir. 2004); United States v. Rivera-Negron, 201 F.R.D. 285, 287 (D.P.R. 2001).

538 United States v. Hollingsworth, 783 F.3d 556, 559–60 (5th Cir. 2015).
539 Id. at 567 (Higginson, J., dissenting).
540 Id. at 558 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 113(a) (2012)).
541 Id.
542 Id. at 557–58.
543 Id. at 558.
544 Id.
545 Id. at 558–59.
applicable only within the District of Columbia.” Noting that the defendant was tried for violating 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(5), which applies only “within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States,” the court concluded that “under Palmore, Hollingsworth has no constitutional right to trial before an Art. III court.” The court further rejected the defendant’s argument that magistrate judges are not members of a territorial court created by Congress under Clause 17 of Article I, noting that Hollingsworth did not cite any section of the Constitution that Congress presumably violated when it authorized federal magistrate judges to conduct trials in misdemeanor cases.

The court further observed that under Clause 17, “Congress could have referred all trials for crimes committed at Belle Chasse to an Article I judge, including felony trials. But Congress chose to refer only trials for petty offenses to federal magistrate judges.” The court finally stated that although it was not certain from the constitutional text that the defendant was guaranteed even the right to appeal to an Article III court, Congress had in fact provided Hollingsworth the right to appeal to two Article III courts under the current statutory scheme.

The court therefore held that “Hollingsworth did not have a right to trial before an Art. III judge, and that his trial, conviction, and sentence before a federal magistrate judge was constitutional.” It applied its holding, however, “only to defendants tried for petty offenses committed on federal enclaves obtained by Congress pursuant to Clause 17.”

Turning to address arguments raised in the dissenting opinion, the majority court further observed that historically Congress had “referred trials for misdemeanors committed on certain federal lands” to United States commissioners without the defendant’s consent. The court further noted that it had found no case where a defendant in a petty offense case before a United States commissioner had ever challenged the constitutionality the commissioner’s authority: “The fact that these statutes survived unchallenged for more than half a century ought to inform our constitutional analysis.”

Further comparing magistrate judges to judges on legislative courts created by Congress under Clause 17 of Article I, the majority concluded,

Magistrate judges have the professional competence and resources found in the legislative courts. We discern no meaningful difference between the federal magistracy and the legislative courts. Indeed, because the federal magistracy’s members are appointed by federal judges instead of the President or the Presi-

547 Hollingsworth, 785 F.3d at 559.
548 Id.
549 Id. (citation omitted).
550 Id. at 559–60.
551 Id. at 560.
552 Id.
553 Id. at 560–61.
554 Id. at 561.
dent’s appointees, we can have greater confidence in federal magistrate judges’ ability to fairly exercise federal judicial power and to avoid diminution of the separation of powers.\footnote{555}{Id. at 563.}

Finally, after further holding that Hollingsworth had no right to a jury trial, the court affirmed the district court’s judgment.

In a strongly worded dissent, Judge Higginson argued that magistrate judges are “adjuncts” to the Article III courts and therefore cannot render final decisions on matters without the parties’ consent:

Finding constitutional birthright in Article I, Section 8, Clause 18’s “other powers” phrase—instead of Clause 17’s Seat of Government Clause or its Enclave Clause enhancement of Article I powers—enhances Article III courts’ discretion to refer matters to the federal magistracy for preliminary review and a recommended decision. Indeed, as Congress has revised and expanded matters that may be so referred, the Supreme Court repeatedly has tested each subsequent delegation, when there is no consent, according to one constant principle, namely, that case-dispositive matters may be handled by magistrate judges provided that Article III district courts retain full and ultimate authority “to make an informed, final determination” of the case.\footnote{556}{Id. at 567 (Higginson, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Radatz, 447 U.S. 667, 682–83 (1980)).}

Judge Higginson ended his dissenting opinion stating,

It is said that a well-built house requires but little repairs. Article III federal district judges are not over-burdened in their most essential judicial function, trying federal criminal cases. Without consent, persons accused of federal offenses should not lose their liberty except after trial in a constitutional court, unless an Article III judge reserves “the ultimate decisionmaking authority.”\footnote{557}{Id. at 570 (quoting N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 79 (1982)).}

Both opinions in Hollingsworth raise several questions. While the majority opinion affirms the authority of magistrate judges to dispose of petty offense cases arising from federal enclaves where the United States has sole territorial jurisdiction under Clause 17 of Article I, the court’s decision explicitly does not address whether magistrate judges have dispositional authority over petty offenses that arise on federal lands where jurisdiction is shared with a state or another entity. The authors of one treatise on public natural resources law estimated that federal enclaves created pursuant to Clause 17 “comprise less than 5 percent of federal land holdings.”\footnote{558}{1 GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES LAW § 3:6 (2d ed. 2015).} The majority opinion would therefore appear to invite constitutional challenges to magistrate judge petty offense authority under 18 U.S.C. § 3401 in most federal lands.

In addition, Judge Higginson’s dissenting opinion embraces the view that magistrate judges are “adjuncts” to Article III judges, a view explicitly rejected
by the Supreme Court as applied to bankruptcy judges in *Stern*.\(^{559}\) Moreover, Judge Higginson’s opinion repeatedly emphasizes that without consent “case-dispositive matters may be handled by magistrate judges provided that Article III district courts retain full and ultimate authority ’to make an informed, final determination’ of the case.”\(^{560}\) It therefore would appear that, should Judge Higginson’s argument prevail in the future, the restoration of defendant consent in petty offense cases, either by legislation or simply secured by a magistrate judge at trial, might arguably resolve the constitutional problem.

Finally, none of the opinions in *Hollingsworth*, for all their extensive historical analysis, address the fact that Congress specifically amended 18 U.S.C. § 3401 in the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 2000 to remove the defendant’s consent in all petty offense cases.\(^{561}\) Nor do they attempt to analyze the legislative history of this provision.

Along with Judge Higginson’s dissent in *Hollingsworth*, the Eleventh Circuit also questioned in dicta the constitutionality of magistrate judge authority to dispose of petty offense cases in *Brown v. United States*, also discussed above.\(^{562}\) While the panel in *Brown* held that a federal habeas corpus matter arising under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 was not a civil matter and thus could not be disposed of by a magistrate judge with the consent of the parties under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the majority opinion’s lengthy dicta called into question the constitutionality under Article III of a magistrate judge disposing of any case in federal court, including Class A misdemeanor and petty offense cases.\(^{563}\) In particular, the majority stated,

> Magistrate judges (and their predecessors, the commissioners) are not—and have never purported to be—Article III judges. Instead, magistrate judges “draw their authority entirely from an exercise of Congressional power under Article I of the Constitution.” Although Congress considered magistrate judges to be “adjunct[s] of the United States District Court, appointed by the court and subject to the court’s direction and control,” the fact is that when magistrate judges exercise their authority to try petty offenses and to enter final judgment in civil cases, they are exercising the essential attributes of “judicial Power.” They do not function as mere adjuncts. They are puisne judges acting as courts. But Article III is clear:

The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at sta-

---


\(^{560}\) *Hollingsworth*, 783 F.3d at 567 (quoting *Raddatz*, 447 U.S. at 682–83).


\(^{562}\) *See Brown v. United States*, 748 F.3d 1045, 1057–58, 1068 (11th Cir. 2014); *see also supra* Section II.B.2.b.(b).

\(^{563}\) *Brown*, 748 F.3d at 1057–58.
ed Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.

As previously recounted, magistrate judges do not hold life-tenure, nor is their compensation undiminishable. Therefore, these puisne judges cannot exercise “the judicial Power of the United States.”

The views expressed in Judge Higginson’s dissent in Hollingsworth and the majority’s dicta in Brown have so far not been followed by other courts, but serve as a reminder that the constitutionality of magistrate judge authority to dispose of petty offense cases without the consent of the defendant arguably remains unsettled.


a. Congressional Expansion of Magistrate Judge Contempt Authority

The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 2000 greatly expanded magistrate judge contempt authority. Section 636(e) of Title 28 was amended and completely changed by this legislation. Prior to these amendments, magistrate judges had no direct authority to impose contempt sanctions of any kind and could only certify a litigant or attorney’s contumacious behavior to a district judge for further proceedings under § 636(e). These changes are summarized briefly below.

The amended § 636(e)(1) gave magistrate judges “the power to exercise contempt authority as set forth in the other provisions of the amended § 636(e) within the territorial jurisdiction prescribed by their appointments.” Section 636(e)(2) provided magistrate judges with summary criminal contempt authority to punish any misbehavior occurring in their presence “so as to obstruct the administration of justice.” “Summary criminal contempt authority [was] granted to magistrate judges to maintain order and to protect the court’s dignity in response to contumacious behavior by witnesses, parties, counsel, and others present at court proceedings.” Thus, “[w]hen presiding over cases or proceedings as the primary judicial officer for the district court, a magistrate judge is provided appropriate immediate authority to control activity in the court-

---

564 Id. (second alteration in original) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted) (first quoting Thomas v. Whitworth, 136 F.3d 756, 758 (11th Cir. 1998); then quoting H.R. REP. NO. 96-287, at 8 (1979); and then quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1).
566 See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 95–97.
568 Id. § 636(e)(2); see LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 96.
569 Hnatowski, supra note 567.
room. The limited penalties magistrate judges may impose for summary criminal contempts are set forth in § 636(e)(5),” which is summarized below.570

Section 636(e)(3) “gave magistrate judges additional criminal contempt authority in their civil consent cases under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and in misdemeanor cases under 18 U.S.C. § 3401.”571 The section gave magistrate judges “authority to punish misbehavior occurring outside their presence that constitutes disobedience or resistance to the magistrate judge’s lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command in civil consent and misdemeanor cases.”572 This authority permits “a magistrate judge to enforce his or her orders and to vindicate the magistrate judge’s (and the court’s) authority over cases tried by the magistrate judge.”573

Section 636(e)(4) “authorizes magistrate judges to exercise civil contempt authority in civil consent cases under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), and in misdemeanor cases under 18 U.S.C. § 3401.”574 In such cases, this section enables the magistrate judge to “exercise civil contempt authority identical to the civil contempt authority of a district judge.”575

Under § 636(e)(5), the penalties for criminal contempts that magistrate judges may impose are limited:

Imprisonment for a summary criminal contempt committed in the magistrate judge’s presence, or for a criminal contempt occurring in a civil consent or misdemeanor case outside the magistrate judge’s presence, may not exceed [thirty] days incarceration (the maximum term of imprisonment for a Class C misdemeanor, set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3581(b)(8)), and a fine may not exceed $5,000 (the maximum fine that may be imposed upon an individual for a Class C misdemeanor under 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b)(6)).576

These limits on the contempt penalties that magistrate judges could impose were intended to clearly differentiate magistrate judge criminal contempt authority from that exercised by district judges. Moreover, these limits were modeled after the penalty limits in petty offense cases that magistrate judges may dispose of without the defendant’s consent so that magistrate judge contempt authority would better withstand constitutional scrutiny. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 401 “sets no limits upon [either] the fine or imprisonment penalties [a district judge] may impose when punishing contemptuous behavior.”577 By contrast, magistrate judge criminal contempt authority was strictly prescribed.578

570 Id.
571 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 96.
572 Id.
573 Id.; accord Hnatowski, supra note 567.
574 Hnatowski, supra note 567, attach. I, at 2.
575 Id.; see LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 96.
577 Id. attach. II, at 3; see also 18 U.S.C. § 401 (2012).
Summer 2016] “NOTHING LESS THAN INDISPENSABLE” 921

Congress recognized that some “contumacious conduct may be so egregious as to require more severe punishment.” In such situations, 28 U.S.C. § 636(e)(6) retained the certification procedure that existed “before enactment of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 2000”:

If, in the opinion of the magistrate judge, a criminal contempt occurring in the magistrate judge’s presence, or a criminal contempt in a civil consent or misdemeanor case, is sufficiently serious that [thirty] days incarceration or a $5,000 fine would not be an adequate punishment, the magistrate judge has the option of certifying the facts to a district judge for further contempt proceedings.

The section also provides that in any other case or proceeding referred to a magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(a) or (b), or any other statute, criminal contempts that occur outside the magistrate judge’s presence must [continue to] be handled through the certification procedure. Under this provision, the magistrate judge [certifies] the facts constituting the contempt to a district judge to show cause why that person should not be adjudged in contempt of court by the facts so certified.

Finally, the section requires that certification procedures must also be used for civil contempts that occur in any other case or proceedings referred to a magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(a) or (b), or any other statute.

Finally, § 636(e)(7) provides that in civil consent cases under § 636(e), the court of appeals hears appeals from a magistrate judge’s contempt order under 28 U.S.C. § 636(e)(3). “The appeal of any other order of contempt issued under this section shall be made to the district court.”

b. Constitutional Questions

To date, no federal court has analyzed whether the expanded magistrate judge contempt authority set forth in the amended § 636(e) violates Article III of the Constitution. Although one academic commentator suggested that the summary contempt provision in the 2000 amendments to § 636(e) violates separation of powers principles under Article III, no court has yet raised or discussed this issue directly. A review of cases since 2000 where the contempt provisions of § 636(e) have been cited shows that in most cases magistrate judges have used the certification procedure under § 636(e)(6) to recommend that district judges order contempt. At least one magistrate judge, however,

579 Id. § 636(e)(6).
582 Hnatowski, supra note 567, attach. I., at 3.
584 Cf. Kiobel v. Millson, 592 F.3d 78, 91–92 (2d Cir. 2010) (Leval, J., concurring) (arguing that the 2000 amendment of the Federal Magistrates Act granting magistrate judges with limited contempt authority was a justification for considering a motion for sanctions under FED. R. CIV. P. 11 as a non-case-dispositive motion under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A)).
has exercised summary criminal contempt authority and imposed jail time on a contemnor under 28 U.S.C. § 636(e)(2).\(^{586}\)

An examination of cases before 2000 that discuss magistrate judge’s contempt authority is instructive on how courts might approach challenges to the expanded magistrate judge contempt authority. In the Seventh Circuit’s decision on the constitutionality of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), *Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc.*, the majority opinion discussed contempt authority as a clear line demarcating the authority of Article III judges and non-Article III judicial officers. In particular, the majority stated:

Unlike the relatively mechanical entry of judgment, the power to punish for contempt of court is the means by which many court judgments, not including the collection of money judgments, are enforced. Despite the effort of the dissent to trivialize the significance of the contempt power, it remains the primary means of enforcing many court judgments, particularly injunctions. The vesting of this power exclusively in the hands of Article III judicial officers would seem, for present purposes at least, to provide an adequate distinction between such judges and non-Article III officers. This clear line also serves to limit the ultimate exercise of judicial power to persons enjoying the constitutional guarantee of independence.\(^{587}\)

Similarly, the Ninth Circuit’s en banc opinion upholding the constitutionality of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) in *Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of America, Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc.*, noted that the authority of Article III judges was preserved under § 636(c) because “[d]istrict courts retain the power to adjudge a party in contempt.”\(^{588}\)

Four years before the amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 636(e) were enacted, the Ninth Circuit addressed whether a magistrate judge could exercise contempt authority in a civil consent case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). In *Bingman v. Ward*, the court ruled that a magistrate judge erred when he adjudicated a criminal contempt sanction against a litigant in a civil consent case.\(^{589}\) The panel asserted that the exercise of contempt authority was an exclusive power of Article III

\(^{586}\) See United States v. Bryant, No. 2:14-CR-08, 2014 WL 2931051, at *3 (W.D.N.C. June 30, 2014) (holding a defendant in summary contempt under 28 U.S.C. § 636(e)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b) for appearing intoxicated at a felony initial appearance and sentencing the defendant to fourteen days in jail).

\(^{587}\) *Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc.*, 742 F.2d 1037, 1044 (7th Cir. 1984).

\(^{588}\) *Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc.*, 725 F.2d 537, 545 (9th Cir. 1984).

\(^{589}\) *Bingman v. Ward*, 100 F.3d 653, 654 (9th Cir. 1996).
judges absent a specific act of Congress giving magistrate judges contempt authority.\footnote{Id. at 657.}

Plaintiff James Bingman, a state prisoner in Montana, brought suit in the District of Montana against prison officials for alleged inadequate dental care.\footnote{Id. at 654.} The parties consented to have the case heard by a magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).\footnote{Id. at 655.} After receiving evidence, the magistrate judge issued a preliminary injunction ordering the prison officials to provide the plaintiff with necessary dental care and to submit a proposal to eliminate deficiencies in the prison’s dental care system.\footnote{Id.} Dissatisfied with prison officials’ response to the injunction, Bingman moved to have the officials held in contempt.\footnote{Id.} The magistrate judge granted this motion, ordering the prison officials to pay $1,450 to the Clerk of Court because they had not submitted a plan within the time allotted by the court, and $500 to the plaintiff because the officials had not given him the expeditious dental care required by the order.\footnote{Id.} The magistrate judge stated that the sanctions were intended as punishment “for failing to timely and expeditiously comply with the terms . . . of the injunction, and, further, to encourage adherence to this or other orders of [the] Court in the future.”\footnote{Id.\ (alterations in original).}

On appeal, the defendants argued that the magistrate judge had no authority to hold them in contempt.\footnote{Id. at 657.} After finding that the magistrate judge’s ruling was a criminal contempt order that could be reviewed through an interlocutory appeal, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the defendants’ view, holding that magistrate judges have no authority under the Federal Magistrates Act to adjudicate criminal contempts.\footnote{Id. at 656.} Rejecting arguments that the Supreme Court’s decision in \textit{Peretz} somehow by analogy allowed magistrate judges to exercise contempt authority, the court stated,

Moreover, criminal contempt proceedings are not the same as simple misdemeanor prosecutions or the conduct of voir dire in felony trials. Contempt proceedings implicate the authority, the discretion, and the dignity of Article III courts. They constitute “the ultimate exercise of judicial power . . . .” Congress has carefully avoided conferring that power upon magistrate judges. The mere fact that some analogies can be drawn between contempt proceedings and criminal proceedings does not mean that we should guard use of the contempt power any less jealously than Congress did.\footnote{Id. at 658 (citation omitted) (quoting \textit{Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc.}, 742 F.2d 1037, 1044 (7th Cir. 1984)).}
Nevertheless, the court specifically did not rule on whether Congress had authority under the Constitution to provide magistrate judges limited contempt authority, simply stating, “It has not done so.”\footnote{Id.} The court therefore vacated the magistrate judge’s contempt order and remanded the case for further proceedings in which the magistrate judge was required to certify facts constituting contempt to a district judge under the procedures set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 636(e).\footnote{Id.}

Although as yet untested in a federal court, there are cogent arguments for concluding that expanded magistrate judge contempt authority set forth in the 2000 amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 636(e) does not violate Article III of the Constitution. In particular, applying the “structural” interest analysis to Article III issues used by the Supreme Court in Schor, Peretz, and Wellness, it does not appear that Congress provided magistrate judges with expanded contempt authority “in an effort to aggrandize itself or humble the Judiciary.”\footnote{Wellness Int’l. Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct.1932, 1945 (2015).} Moreover, in all other respects, district judges maintain their supervisory control over magistrate judges in the same way that bankruptcy judges remain under the control of Article III judges in a manner approved of by the Supreme Court in Wellness.\footnote{See id. at 1945–46.}

With regards to the “personal” interest prong protected under Article III, at first blush it might be argued that the limited summary contempt provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(e) do not adequately protect individuals’ “personal” interests under Article III because those affected by a magistrate judge’s exercise of summary contempt authority do not consent to the magistrate judge’s actions. Congress, however, has provided magistrate judges with non-consensual dispositional authority in petty offense cases under 18 U.S.C. § 3401 that arguably does not offend the Constitution.\footnote{See supra Section II.C.2 (concluding that while some courts question the constitutionality of the power granted magistrate judges to dispose of petty cases in 18 U.S.C. § 3401, it has not been held to be unconstitutional).} Indeed, the strict limits on the summary and criminal contempt penalties that magistrate judges may impose under § 636(e)(5) were intended to explicitly differentiate magistrate judge contempt authority from that of Article III judges.\footnote{Hnatowski, supra note 567, attach. I, at 2.} It stands to reason that if the non-consensual referral of all petty offense cases to magistrate judges for final disposition does not offend the Constitution, the summary imposition of limited criminal contempt penalties by magistrate judges under § 636(e)(5) would also withstand constitutional scrutiny. The Supreme Court has declared that a “criminal contempt is a petty offense unless the punishment makes it a serious [of-}

\footnote{Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 198 (1968).}
consensual criminal contempt authority with penalties limited to those for Class C misdemeanors arguably does not offend the “personal” interests embodied in Article III of the Constitution.

It remains to be seen, however, how these arguments would fare in the federal courts if the expanded magistrate judge contempt provisions in 28 U.S.C. § 636(e) were challenged on constitutional grounds.

III. THE EXPANSION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE UTILIZATION SINCE 1990

A. Magistrate Judge Utilization: An Introduction

The nation’s federal magistrate judges perform more duties today than they did twenty-five years ago. To confirm this basic fact and to get an idea of how much “more,” one need look no further than the judiciary’s national statistics on magistrate judge workload. From 1990 to 2014, the number of total matters handled by all magistrate judges in the nation increased 146 percent (from 448,107 to 1,102,396).608

Building on the discussion of the expansion of magistrate judge authority in Parts I and II of this article, Part III analyzes the growth in the utilization of magistrate judges from 1990 to 2015 and the causal factors contributing to that growth. It proposes to show that the expansion of utilization resulted not only from larger volumes of cases and duties generally, but also from a broader range of duties assigned to magistrate judges.

The expansion of magistrate judge utilization since 1990 does not appear to have received much scholarly attention, with certain notable exceptions.610 It

607 “Total matters” is virtually every judicial proceeding regardless of type, including all cases terminated in which magistrate judges presided (e.g., civil consent cases and petty offense cases), and all matters referred to magistrate judges in civil and criminal cases for determination or reports and recommendations, including discovery motions, evidentiary hearings, settlement conferences, initial appearances in felony cases, search warrants, etc.


   The court statistics for 1990, unless otherwise indicated, refers to the 12-month period ending June 30, 1990, and court statistics from 1992 onward unless otherwise indicated, refers to 12-month periods ending September 30 (due to a change in the Administrative Office’s statistical reporting year).

609 The “utilization” of magistrate judges is a term of art referring to the various types of judicial duties that district judges, individually, and district courts, collectively, delegate to magistrate judges throughout ninety-four district courts. The concept encompasses two signature qualities of the work of United States magistrate judges: (1) the extensive judicial authority of the office conferred by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 636 (2012), and (2) the broad discretion that Congress gave to district judges to determine which of these authorized duties to delegate to magistrate judges to meet local needs and conditions, 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(A).


610 See, e.g., McCabe, supra note 609; Carroll Seron, The Roles of Magistrates: Nine Case Studies (1985); Tim A. Baker, The Expanding Role of Magistrate Judges in the Fed-
has been the subject of occasional articles in legal periodicals\textsuperscript{611} and the print media.\textsuperscript{612} In Part III of this article, the authors approach the subject using the extensive statistics maintained by the Administrative Office on matters handled by magistrate judges and practical knowledge obtained through their work experience as senior attorneys in the Administrative Office.

Congress and the Judicial Conference have promoted the full utilization of magistrate judges in the interest of responsible stewardship of judicial resources and to fulfill the purposes of the magistrate judges system. In 1983, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) concluded in its report to Congress that the utilization of magistrate judges should be expanded.\textsuperscript{613} In response to that report, the Judicial Conference endorsed actions “to encourage the further use of magistrates” at its March 1984 session.\textsuperscript{614} Nearly twenty-five years ago, the Committee on the Administration of the Magistrate Judges System of the


\textsuperscript{613} U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, \textit{GAO/GGD-83-46, Comptroller General’s Report to the Congress: Potential Benefits of Federal Magistrates System Can Be Better Realized} 18–19 (1983). The GAO found that some district judges did not use magistrate judges as extensively as they could, for various reasons. It recommended, among other things, that the Judicial Conference encourage courts to use magistrate judges “for all types of judicial and administrative duties, whenever possible and practical,” to have a positive impact on the courts’ caseloads. Id.

“NOTHING LESS THAN INDISPENSABLE”

Judicial Conference described the mission of the federal magistrate judges system in these words:

The mission of the magistrate judges system is to provide the federal district courts with supportive and flexible supplemental judicial resources. The magistrate judges system is available to cope with the ever-changing demands made on the federal judiciary, thereby improving public access to the courts, promoting prompt and efficient case resolution, and preserving scarce Article III resources.615

Magistrate judge utilization has expanded greatly over the past quarter century by any measure. For example, the volume of all matters handled by magistrate judges nationally surpassed one million for the first time in the 2000s,616 and from 1990 to 2014, the Judicial Conference authorized over 200 new full-time magistrate judge positions.617 Since 1990, magistrate judges have exercised plenary authority with consent of the parties under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) in more civil cases, including several high-profile cases.618 Also, Congress changed the title of the office from “magistrate” to “magistrate judge” to more accurately reflect the judicial duties of the office.619 Likewise, the Judicial Conference agreed in March 2004 to include a magistrate judge observer at its sessions for the first time.620

At the same time, however, looking back at magistrate judge utilization since 1990 evokes in the observer the familiar saying that “the more things change, the more they stay the same.” There are several reasons for this impression, but four are mentioned here. First, while the utilization of magistrate judges has expanded, the basic mission of the magistrate judges system “to

615 Pro & Hnatowski, supra note 21, at 1526 (quoting MAGISTRATE JUDGES PLAN, supra note 170, at 3-1).
617 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 56.
620 As approved by the Judicial Conference, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist selected a magistrate judge and a bankruptcy judge for two-year terms to attend sessions of the Judicial Conference as non-voting observers, a practice that has been continued by Chief Justice Rehnquist’s successor, Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. See JCUS-MAR 2004, supra note 55, at 22.
provide the federal district courts with supportive and flexible supplemental judicial resources” has not changed.\textsuperscript{621} Second, decisions on how magistrate judges are to be used remain in the hands of district judges at the local district court level. Third, the utilization of magistrate judges varies widely from district to district, and this variation still extends to some degree to disparities in the range of duties given to magistrate judges. Fourth, while this paper concludes that while nationally magistrate judges are generally utilized for a broader range of duties today than in 1990, many courts continue to rely on magistrate judges as “specialists” in particular areas (for example, prisoner cases and social security appeals).

This part of the article has four sections. The first is a review of the national policies that favor flexibility and innovation in magistrate judge utilization. The second section analyzes the global expansion of magistrate judge utilization and its causes from 1990 to 2015. The third section narrows the focus to examine three recent growth areas of magistrate judge utilization: (1) felony guilty plea proceedings, (2) search warrants and investigative orders, and (3) civil cases adjudicated to finality by magistrate judges on consent of the parties. The final section will attempt an initial inquiry into the institutional challenges posed by the ways magistrate judges are actually used compared with advice on best practices for the effective use of magistrate judges. The section will consider, in particular, the practice of referring case-dispositive matters to magistrate judges for reports and recommendations and the role of magistrate judges as “specialists” in certain areas.

B. National Policies Favoring Flexibility and Innovation

“Flexibility has been the hallmark of the magistrate judges system throughout its development.”\textsuperscript{622} As acknowledged by Congress in 1979, the magistrate judges system is designed to “improve access to justice on a district-by-district basis.”\textsuperscript{623} Reporting to Congress in 1981, the Judicial Conference observed that the Federal Magistrates Act “does not contemplate uniformity from district to district in the actual assignment of duties to magistrates,” but rather “[f]lexibility and diversity are a necessary part of the genius of the magistrates system.”\textsuperscript{624}

Since the early years of the magistrate judges system, there have been wide variations in the duties assigned to magistrate judges from court to court and, even, from district judge to district judge within the same court.\textsuperscript{625} These varia-
tions are beneficial, but they result in differences in the range and volume of duties of magistrate judges system-wide.626

Congress has also encouraged courts to be innovative in using magistrate judges. Innovative uses are impliedly authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3), which broadly states, “A magistrate judge may be assigned such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.”627 The House Report to the 1976 jurisdictional amendments to the Federal Magistrates Act commented on the purpose of § 636(b)(3):

This subsection enables the district courts to continue innovative experimentations in the use of this judicial officer. . . .

. . .

If district judges are willing to experiment with the assignment to magistrates of other functions in aid of the business of the courts, there will be increased time available to judges for the careful and unhurried performance of their vital and traditional adjudicatory duties, and a consequent benefit to both efficiency and the quality of justice in the Federal courts.628

Eastern Districts of New York that described individualized utilization of magistrate judges by district judges:

Each judge determines how the magistrates can work most effectively. Since each judge has his own areas of competence and expertise, he can utilize magistrates to assist him in different ways, say, for all pretrial matters or a limited part of the case. The high degree of flexibility in magistrate use depending on the magistrate’s and judge’s expertise is an important element underlying the magistrate system.

Id. (quoting Steven Puro, Roger L. Goldman & Alice M. Padawer-Singer, The Evolving Role of U.S. Magistrates in the District Courts, 64 JUDICATURE 437, 444 (1981) (footnote omitted)).

626 See McCabe, supra note 609, at 23. Peter G. McCabe, the first chief of the Magistrate Judges Division of the Administrative Office, from 1972 to 1982, and Assistant Director for Judges Programs of the Administrative Office, from 1982 to 2013, noted that flexibility has resulted in “substantial disparity in usage” in his 2014 white paper on the magistrate judges system: “This flexibility has been beneficial, and most districts use their Magistrate Judges broadly and imaginatively. But it has also led to substantial disparity in usage of Magistrate Judges among the courts, based on differences in caseloads, local conditions, and the preferences of District Judges.” Id.


C. Expansion of Duties of Magistrate Judges from 1990 to 2014

As noted above, the aggregate number of duties performed by magistrate judges nationally increased dramatically from 1990 to 2014, more than doubling from 448,107 to 1,102,396 matters.\(^{629}\) (See Figure 1). The largest shares of additional matters disposed of were in referred matters in civil cases, referred matters in felony cases, and initial proceedings in felony cases.\(^{630}\) The growth in each of these areas are discussed in more detail below. Civil consent cases increased substantially from 1990 to 2014, growing 222 percent (from 4,958 to 15,959).\(^{631}\) Reports and recommendations in prisoner cases also increased, but by a much smaller margin—27 percent (from 20,583 to 26,140).\(^{632}\) There were exceptions to the growth trend in some categories, however.\(^{633}\)

\(^{629}\) See supra note 608 and accompanying text.


\(^{632}\) Prisoner cases are comprised of prisoner civil rights cases, state habeas corpus cases, federal habeas corpus cases and motions to vacate sentence. Compare Judicial Business 2000, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17, with Judicial Business 2014, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17.

\(^{633}\) The numbers of reports and recommendations in social security appeals rose only slightly, by 15 percent (from 5,112 to 5,881), although filings in these appeals increased overall by almost 160 percent (from 7,439 to 19,146). This discrepancy is attributable, in part, to a
In general, the expansion in duties performed by magistrate judges was caused or enabled by four factors: (1) expansion of magistrate judge authority by statute and case law, (2) growth in case filings and workload in the district courts, (3) increased magistrate judge resources in the district courts, and (4) larger volumes of traditional magistrate judge duties and a broader range of duties assigned to magistrate judges. The first factor, the expansion of magistrate judge authority, was discussed in Parts I and II. Clearly, a precondition to any growth in the duties of magistrate judges is the legal authority they have to conduct their assigned duties. As the expansion of authority has already been discussed, this section will focus on the other three factors.

1. Caseload

The statistics indicate that increases in district court caseload alone were less of a factor in the expansion of magistrate judge utilization than might be expected. From 1960 to 1985, the district courts experienced extraordinary growth in total filings (from 80,891 to 312,556). From 1990 to 2014, case filings continued to rise but at a much less rapid rate (from 284,220 to 376,536). Despite the slower growth in caseload after 1985, however, the numbers of matters disposed of by magistrate judges rose dramatically from 1995 to 2005 (from 512,741 to 1,063,907). In 2005, the rate of increase dropped off considerably, so that, from 2005 to 2014, the numbers increased slightly overall (from 1,063,907 to 1,102,396). As a result, from 1995 to 2014, total matters disposed of by magistrate judges increased 115 percent while total case filings grew 20 percent. Therefore, the widening gap be-

marked increase in social security appeals that were disposed of by magistrate judges on consent of the parties during the relevant period. Dispositions of Class A misdemeanors by magistrate judges decreased by 37 percent during this period (from 13,248 to 8,351). The reduction correlates with a decrease in filings of misdemeanor defendant offenses during that period (from 14,938 to 8,774). Dispositions of petty offense cases by magistrate judges increased marginally from 1990 to 2014 (from 87,682 to 98,303). See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 56, at tbl.4.4. Compare JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2000, supra note 163, at tbls.D-1 & S-17, with JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014, supra note 163, at tbls.D-1 & S-17.


635 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 56, tbls.4.1 & 5.1. From 1990 to 2014, civil filings grew from 217,879 to 295,310 (up 77,000 filings, 36 percent), and criminal defendant filings grew from 66,341 to 81,226 (up almost 15,000 filings, 22 percent). Id.


637 JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014, supra note 163, at tblS-17. From 2010 to 2014, matters disposed of by magistrate judges decreased slightly overall (from 1,103,649 to 1,102,396), after peaking in 2013 (1,181,874). Id. The cause of the overall decrease from 2010 to 2014 appears to have been a decrease in felony filings. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 56, at tbl.5.1.

638 This observation is made realizing that aggregate matters disposed of by magistrate judges will always be greater than cases filed because “matters disposed of” include multiple proceedings arising from each case. Nevertheless, from 1995 to 2014, the ratio of the in-
tween the growth in magistrate judge duties and case filings suggests that, although rising case filings were a contributing factor, they were not decisive but were one of a number of factors leading to the increase in duties performed by magistrate judges after 1990.

A more useful standard for assessing caseloads is the workload of judges, as measured by weighted caseload per district judgeship.639 The national statistics on weighted caseload indicate that, on average, the workload of judges in all district courts increased over the past twenty-five years. From 1990 to 2015, the average number of weighted case filings per district judgeship in all district courts rose from 448 to 522.640 The authors of this paper conclude that the following caseload-related factors contributed to the increase in magistrate judge utilization from 1990 to 2015: (1) more time-consuming cases due to increased legal and evidentiary complexity; (2) the cumulative effects of the previous twenty-five year expansion in caseload; (3) and a continuing, albeit gradual, rise in the caseloads of district courts generally. As a result of these factors, it is hypothesized that district judges delegated more duties to magistrate judges to help them better manage their time and their caseloads.

2. Magistrate Judge Resources

As noted in Part I, the number of full-time magistrate judge positions increased by 56 percent over the past twenty-five years.641 The number of new full-time magistrate judge positions authorized by the Judicial Conference increased considerably in the five-year span from 1990 to 1995 from 329 to 416 positions.642 From 1995 to 2005, the number of new positions continued to in-

639 “Weighted caseload” is an Administrative Office statistic that account[s] for the different amounts of time district judges require to resolve various types of civil and criminal actions. The Federal Judiciary has employed techniques for assigning weights to cases since 1946. . . . Average civil cases or criminal defendants each receive a weight of approximately 1.0; for more time-consuming cases, higher weights are assessed . . . ; and cases demanding relatively little time from judges receive lower weights . . . .

640 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, EXPLANATION OF SELECTED TERMS I (2015). Judge Posner has opined on the utility of weighted caseload statistics thusly: “Without statistics it would be impossible to know when a court should be enlarged. For this purpose, however, raw caseload statistics are inadequate. A case is not a uniform measure, like a dollar. The relevant statistic is not caseload but workload, which is to say, weighted caseload.” See POSNER, supra note 610, at 227–31.

641 See discussion supra Section I.B.1.c and notes 56–57 and accompanying text.

642 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 56. Under the Federal Magistrates Act, the Judicial Conference authorizes new magistrate judge positions, in the light of rec-
crease, but at a lower rate spread over ten years (from 416 to 503 positions). 643 From 2005 to 2010, the growth in new full-time magistrate judge positions abated significantly (increasing by 24 new positions to 527), and from 2010 to 2014 the new positions were authorized at an even lower rate (increasing by 7 new positions to 534). 644

When the trend in creating new full-time magistrate judge positions is compared to the increase in total matters disposed of by magistrate judges, interesting patterns emerge. From 1990 to 1995, during the greatest surge in new magistrate judge positions, the increase that occurred in matters disposed of was relatively moderate. However, from 1995 to 2005, the increase in duties performed “took off” (increasing from 512,741 to 1,063,907 matters). (See Figure 1). The upward trends in positions and matters disposed of did not continue after 2005. From 2005 to 2010, when the number of new magistrate judge positions sharply decreased, there was a parallel drop-off in the rate of increase in matters disposed of by magistrate judges. 645

It is difficult to know what to make of these parallel trends in the statistics on new magistrate judge positions and duties performed by magistrate judges, particularly with respect to the parallel upward trends from 1995 to 2005. There seems to be a correlation, but the real connections between these two variables are not clear without further study. There is a “chicken-or-the-egg” question whether more duties were performed because more positions were created, or whether more positions were created because more duties were performed. 646 There is also a question as to why there was an apparent delay in the steep increase of duties performed until after 1995, especially when the period of the greatest increase in new positions occurred throughout the previous five years, 1990 to 1995. 647 In view of these issues, the question of the causal relationship

644 Id.
645 See supra note 636 and accompanying text.
646 Moreover, it cannot be inferred from the data that the increase in total matters disposed of by magistrate judges was caused solely by the increase in magistrate judge positions. If the increase in total matters disposed of was caused merely by the increase in new positions, it seems logical that the average number of total matters performed per full-time magistrate judge position would remain relatively constant. However, the national average of total matters performed per full-time magistrate judge position increased from 1990 to 2014 (from 1,362 to 2,076), even as the numbers of new full-time magistrate judge positions were increasing significantly (from 329 to 534 at the end of fiscal years 1990 and 2014, respectively). Compare JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2000, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17, with JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17. Therefore, while the increase in positions certainly contributed to the increase in total matters disposed of, the large increase in matters disposed of seemed to be fueled by more than new magistrate judges doing the work.
647 A possible explanation for the delay may be that from 1990 to 1995 the number of part-time magistrate judge positions were decreasing as the number of full-time magistrate judge positions were increasing, therefore increases in duties performed due to the new full-time
between new magistrate judge positions and increased utilization of magistrate judges is beyond the scope of this paper. However, common sense suggests that the probable effect of adding new magistrate judge positions would be an increase in the overall output of magistrate judges, assuming that the increase in capacity (new positions) satisfied an increasing demand for the services of magistrate judges (i.e., matters referred by district judges). Therefore, based on the parallel statistical trends described above, it can be conservatively concluded that, but for the great increase in new full-time magistrate judge positions from 1990 to 2005, the increase in total matters disposed of would not have been as large as it was.

3. More Duties and a Broader Range of Duties

For purposes of this analysis, the expansion of magistrate judge utilization can be divided into at least two different types. The first type, which could be called “intensified utilization,” refers to an increased volume of duties in a type of duty that magistrate judges are already assigned, such as would occur, for example, if social security filings increased, causing an increase in the amount of social security appeals referred to magistrate judges. The second type, which might be called “broadened utilization,” refers to the broadening of assignments into duty categories in which magistrate judges have not been utilized before, such as would occur if a court began referring discovery motions in civil cases to magistrate judges where, previously, the court had only referred settlement conferences. Broadened utilization indicates that magistrate judges are being used more extensively over a range of duties, which has been a national goal. The data from 1990 to 2014 suggests that the expansion of utilization during that period was a combination of both broadened and intensified utilization.

Statistical data indicate that from 1990 to 2014, the largest shares of the expansion in utilization were in three broad categories: (1) pretrial matters and additional duties in civil cases, (2) pretrial matters and additional duties in felony cases, and (3) discovery motions in civil cases. These data suggest that magistrate judges are being used more extensively over a range of duties, which has been a national goal.

Another aspect of judicial resources, or lack thereof, which was discussed supra Section I.B.1.c, is the discrepancy from 1990 onward between the low number of new district judgeships created and the greater number of new magistrate judge positions. The lack of additional district judgeships led courts, particularly the busier courts, to seek additional magistrate judge positions. However, the Judicial Conference authorizes new magistrate judge positions based on the court’s need for magistrate judge resources and not in lieu of additional district judgeships. While there can be overlap between duties performed by district judges and magistrate judges, magistrate judges are non-Article III judges and their authority is not coextensive with the authority of district judges. For example, it is universally recognized that magistrate judges have no authority to try felony cases or conduct sentencings in felony cases. Therefore, the two types of judges are not interchangeable.

648 Another aspect of judicial resources, or lack thereof, which was discussed supra Section I.B.1.c, is the discrepancy from 1990 onward between the low number of new district judgeships created and the greater number of new magistrate judge positions. The lack of additional district judgeships led courts, particularly the busier courts, to seek additional magistrate judge positions. However, the Judicial Conference authorizes new magistrate judge positions based on the court’s need for magistrate judge resources and not in lieu of additional district judgeships. While there can be overlap between duties performed by district judges and magistrate judges, magistrate judges are non-Article III judges and their authority is not coextensive with the authority of district judges. For example, it is universally recognized that magistrate judges have no authority to try felony cases or conduct sentencings in felony cases. Therefore, the two types of judges are not interchangeable.

ny cases,650 and (3) initial proceedings in criminal cases. Each of these categories is discussed below.

a. Civil Cases: Pretrial Matters and Additional Duties

The prime example of broader utilization of magistrate judges is the expansion of pretrial matters and additional duties in civil cases referred to magistrate judges651 from 1990 to 2014. During this period, referred civil matters disposed of by magistrate judges increased from 114,968 to 371,672.652

Using seventy or less as a baseline value denoting a small number of civil pretrial duties referred to magistrate judges (excluding evidentiary hearings) in a given court, the number of courts that reported seventy or less civil pretrial matters handled by magistrate judges decreased from nine courts to one court from 1990 to 2014.653 Therefore, the statistics suggest that in 1990 there were nine courts that were not utilizing magistrate judges to an appreciable extent in general civil cases, but by 2014, virtually all courts were using magistrate judges to handle civil pretrial matters routinely, albeit in varying amounts.

It should be noted that the use of magistrate judges for judicial settlement of cases was an important part of the expansion of magistrate judge utilization in civil cases after 1990. From 1990 to 2014, the numbers of settlement conferences conducted by magistrate judges increased 63 percent (from 12,656 to 20,641).654

There were several causal factors that generated increased referrals of civil matters to magistrate judges. As discussed above, two factors were the gradual rise in civil filings and the increase in the number of authorized magistrate

650 The first and second categories are matters referred to magistrate judges in civil and felony cases that are assigned to district judges, as distinguished from cases assigned to magistrate judges as the presiding judge, such as civil consent cases and petty offense cases.

651 These matters include referred non-case-dispositive pretrial motions, settlement conferences and other pretrial conferences, evidentiary hearings, special masterships, and reports and recommendations on referred case-dispositive motions in non-consent civil cases, including social security appeals but not including prisoner cases. See JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17.

652 The actual increase was not as large as the bare statistics indicate because certain types of matters, including uncontested non-case-dispositive motions, were added to this category for the first time in 2000, causing a large spike in the aggregate number that year. When the statistics are adjusted to take this change into account, the increase in referred civil matters from 1990 to 2014 is still estimated to have been substantial, about 70 percent. The reporting of these data for the first time in 2000 increased the total number of referred civil matters by about 100,000 in 2000. Compare JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2000, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17, with JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17.

653 The one court in 2014 was the District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands, which is the only court in the nation that has one magistrate judge who is in a combination clerk of court/magistrate judge position (receiving no additional salary or staff for judicial duties), and who reports few judicial duties. Compare ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 57, at 283–84 tbl M-4A, with JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014, supra note 163, at tbl.M-4A.

judge positions. But the main impetus in the early part of this period was the civil justice reform legislation of 1990, which is discussed in Part I of this paper.\textsuperscript{655} The Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 “actually enhanced the potential role and status of federal magistrate judges,” and Title I of that legislation, the CJRA of 1990, created an opportunity for each district court to review the role and utilization of its magistrate judges in civil cases.\textsuperscript{656}

The CJRA required all district courts to adopt a civil justice expense and delay reduction plan after considering recommendations of a local advisory group appointed by each chief district judge in consultation with the other judges.\textsuperscript{657} In general, these plans and recommendations recognized the significant role of magistrate judges in civil pretrial management.\textsuperscript{658} The CJRA led to more extensive utilization of magistrate judges in civil cases, although many courts had already established case management practices involving magistrate judges before the CJRA.\textsuperscript{659} These reports and plans made a wide variety of recommendations regarding the use of magistrate judges, including promoting the referral of pretrial conferences and discovery motions to magistrate judges, referral of settlement conferences to magistrate judges, and taking steps to encourage parties to consent to full adjudication of consent cases by magistrate judges.\textsuperscript{660}

\textit{b. Felony Cases: Pretrial Matters and Additional Duties}

Another example of broadened utilization from 1990 to 2014 was referred pretrial and additional matters in felony cases,\textsuperscript{661} dispositions of which increased from 35,576 to 182,230.\textsuperscript{662} To illustrate the effects of broadened utili-

\textsuperscript{655} See supra Part I.B.1.
\textsuperscript{656} Dessem, supra note 101, at 811. The Senate Judiciary Committee’s Report concluded: “[G]iven the increasingly heavy demands of the civil and criminal dockets and the increasingly high quality of the magistrates themselves, . . . magistrates can and should play an important role, particularly in the pretrial and case management process.” \textit{Legislative History}, supra note 10, at 89 (quoting S. REP. NO. 101-416, at 20 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 6823).
\textsuperscript{658} See Dessem, supra note 101, at 811.
\textsuperscript{659} Pro & Hnatowski, supra note 21, at 1521.
\textsuperscript{660} Dessem, supra note 101, at 811–41; see also Pro & Hnatowski, supra note 21, at 1520–22.
\textsuperscript{661} Pretrial and additional duties in felony cases include non-case-dispositive motions, reports and recommendations on case-dispositive motions, pretrial conferences, probation and supervised release revocation hearings, evidentiary hearings, felony guilty plea proceedings, and miscellaneous other matters. This category is distinguished from initial proceedings in felony cases, which refer to such proceedings as search warrants, initial appearances, and pretrial detention hearings. See \textit{Judicial Business} 2014, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17.
\textsuperscript{662} As with the statistics on civil matters, the actual increase in felony duties was not as large as indicated in the statistical data because certain types of matters, including uncontested non-case-dispositive motions and felony guilty plea proceedings, were added to this category for the first time in 2000, causing a large one-year increase in the aggregate number. When
Innovation is a theme in magistrate judge utilization in felony pretrial matters. One of the most significant examples of this is the referral of felony guilty plea proceedings to magistrate judges as an “additional duty” under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3). This was an innovative practice when it began in the 1980s in a few courts and became a routine practice in the southwest border courts and many other districts. The national expansion of referrals of felony guilty pleas is discussed in more detail below. More recently, an innovative duty for magistrate judges that has been adopted in a number of courts is presiding over “reentry court” proceedings. “Reentry courts” themselves are innovative programs in federal district courts, which offer community-based services, such as drug treatment and job skills training, with regularly scheduled appearances before a judge as a beneficial alternative to traditional post-conviction supervised release.

Another innovative use of magistrate judges in felony cases has been supervised release revocation proceedings. In 1992, an amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 3401 allowed district judges to designate a magistrate judge to conduct hearings to modify, revoke, or terminate supervised release, including evidentiary hearings, and to submit proposed findings of fact and recommendations to the district judge. Some courts had referred supervised release proceedings to magistrate judges for reports and recommendations before these amendments. The total number of probation and supervised release revocation proceedings conducted by magistrate judges nationally grew from 1990 to 2014 (from 529 to 2,521). The statistics are adjusted to account for this change, the actual increase in referred felony matters from 1990 to 2014 is still estimated to have been quite large, about 280 percent. Compare Judicial Business 2000, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17, with Judicial Business 2014, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17. Compare Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, supra note 57, at 281–82 tbl.M-4, with Judicial Business 2014, supra note 163.

See Baker, supra note 610, at 679.

See infra Section III.D.1.

See McCabe, supra note 609, at 56–57.


See supra note 663. It is interesting to note that the innovative use that was the subject of a leading case on magistrate judge authority, Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923 (1991), the referral of voir dire in felony cases to magistrate judges, has not become a widespread practice, although there are a number of courts that refer felony voir dire to magistrate judges occasionally on an ad hoc basis. In 2014, only 316 voir dieres were conducted by magistrate judges, in civil and criminal cases. Judicial Business 2014, supra note 163, at tbl.M-3A. Magistrate judges conducted these voir dieres in varying numbers in 40 courts, but conducted none of them in 54 courts that year. Id.
c. Initial Proceedings in Criminal Cases

The third main area of expansion in magistrate judge utilization is initial proceedings in criminal cases.669 This is an example of intensified utilization. There is a long history in the federal courts of assigning felony preliminary duties to subordinate federal officers, going back to the predecessors of magistrate judges, U.S. Commissioners.670 With some exceptions, all these proceedings are assigned to magistrate judges in all district courts, and therefore, the number of such duties performed by magistrate judges is closely related to the levels of felony filings.671

From 1990 to 2014, the number of felony preliminary proceedings conducted by magistrate judges increased 119 percent (from 157,987 to 346,318)672 which coincided with the 22 percent rise in felony defendant filings during the same period (from 66,341 to 81,226).673 A major factor in the increase in felony preliminary proceedings conducted by magistrate judges was search warrants, which increased tremendously from 1990 to 2014 (from 20,672 to 61,758).674

In summary, the primary causes of the large expansion of magistrate judge utilization over the past twenty-five years appear to be the general broadening of magistrate judge utilization in district courts for various duties in civil and criminal cases and intensified utilization in initial proceedings in criminal cases. The incremental increase in the caseload of the district courts during the relevant period was a contributing factor, but not decisive; however, the rising overall national workload of the courts, as measured by weighted caseload and other factors, was an important factor. The significant number of new magistrate judge positions that were added to the system during the first half of the period led to a greater expansion of utilization than would have occurred without the new positions. Therefore, the national trend from 1990 to 2015 was toward full utilization of magistrate judges, consistent with the judiciary’s 1984 endorsement of actions to “encourage the further use of magistrate judges.”675

669 Initial proceedings include search warrants, arrest warrants, initial appearances, preliminary examinations, arraignments, and pretrial detention hearings. As with civil case filings, the matters performed by magistrate judges in felony cases are always greater than the number of filings of cases. JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014, supra note 163, tbl.S-17.
670 Foschio, supra note 610, at ¶¶ [1]–[II.15]; see McCabe, supra note 609, at 8–10.
671 Even with initial proceedings, however, local variations exist that lead to differences in utilization from district to district, including variations in types of felony cases, variations in investigative activities, prosecutorial policies determining the frequency of pretrial detention, and variations in preliminary examinations.
673 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 56, at tbl.5.1.
675 See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10.
D. Growth Trends in Utilization of Magistrate Judges for Specific Types of Proceedings

This section will highlight certain growth trends that contributed to the expansion of magistrate judge utilization since 1990 in felony guilty plea proceedings, search warrants, and civil consent cases.

1. Felony Guilty Pleas

The expansion of the authority of magistrate judges to conduct felony guilty plea proceedings with the consent of the parties was analyzed in Part II of this paper.676 As discussed, the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Peretz v. United States, decided in 1991, clarified the legal basis for the referrals of these proceedings to magistrate judges.677 After Peretz, felony-guilty-plea proceedings became the largest growth area in magistrate judge utilization and are a good example of broader utilization during the period. From 2000, when the Administrative Office began capturing this data, to 2014, the number of felony guilty plea proceedings conducted by magistrate judges almost tripled, increasing from 10,614 to 29,536.678

Historically, most felony guilty plea proceedings conducted by magistrate judges have been in the five district courts along the southwest border—Southern District of California, District of Arizona, District of New Mexico, Western District of Texas, and Southern District of Texas.679 The referrals are necessary in these courts to help the districts cope with extremely large numbers of immigration and drug cases.680 The felony guilty pleas in these courts are in the thousands,681 far more than in other courts. However, since 1990, the practice of referring felony guilty plea proceedings has expanded to many, but not all, district courts throughout the nation. In 2014, magistrate judges conducted felony guilty plea proceedings in widely varying amounts in fifty-seven of ninety-four district courts, not including the southwest border courts.682

The numbers of felony guilty plea proceedings conducted by magistrate judges increased 40 percent nationally from 2005 to 2014.683 From 2005 to 2011, they rose 54 percent, with most of the increase occurring in the southwest

676 See supra Part II.B.1.
678 Compare JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2000, supra note 163, with JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014, supra note 163.
679 In 2014, more than one-half of felony guilty plea proceedings conducted by magistrate judges were in the five southwest border courts. See JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014, supra note 163.
680 For example, the Southern District of Texas had 4,744 immigration defendant filings and 1,082 drug defendant filings in 2014. See id. at tbl.D-3.
681 For example, the magistrate judges in the Southern District of Texas conducted 2,911 felony guilty plea proceedings in 2014. Id. at tbl.M-4.
682 Id.
683 See JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17.
border courts. The numbers peaked in 2011 at 32,682. Since then, the numbers have fluctuated slightly from year to year.

The practice of referring felony guilty plea proceedings to magistrate judges is emblematic of the flexibility of the magistrate judges system. It is important to remember that, despite its growth nationally, acceptance of the practice by district judges is far from unanimous. To illustrate, thirty-two district courts of various sizes throughout all twelve geographic circuits reported no felony guilty plea proceedings conducted by magistrate judges in 2014. In the courts where these proceedings are referred, it is not uncommon for some of the district judges to refer them either routinely or on an ad hoc basis, while other district judges in the court choose not to refer them at all.

2. Search Warrants

One of the largest growth areas in magistrate judge utilization based on statistical data is one that has a relatively low public profile—search warrants, as that category is defined in Administrative Office statistics. In 1990, magistrate judges handled 20,672 search warrants (not an insignificant number then). By 2014, the number of search warrants had risen dramatically to 61,758. Most of the growth occurred after the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001. The number increased 75 percent from 2005 to 2014 (from 35,155 to 61,758) and 42 percent from 2010 to 2014 (from 43,435 to 61,758).

Magistrate judges handle the vast majority of felony preliminary proceedings in the district courts, including search warrants, arrest warrants, criminal complaints, initial appearances, arraignments, and pretrial detention hearings. But while the total number of felony preliminary proceedings conducted by magistrate judges nearly doubled from 1990 to 2014, the number of search warrants alone nearly trebled during that period.

---

684 See id. at tbls.M-4 & S-17.
685 Id.
686 Id.
687 See id. at tbl.M-4.
688 “Search warrants,” as the term is used for statistical purposes in the Administrative Office, is a broad generic category that includes not only traditional search warrants issued under Fed. R. Crim. P. 41, but also numerous other orders authorizing searches and seizures based on probable cause or a lesser standard, including pen registers, trap and trace devices, and newer kinds of searches and surveillance, such as mobile tracking devices, cell phone tracking techniques, and disclosure of stored electronic communications. See McCabe, supra note 609, at 26–28.
689 See JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2000, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17.
690 See JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17.
691 See id.
Magistrate judges have the authority to issue search warrants under the Federal Magistrates Act\textsuperscript{693} and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(b).\textsuperscript{694} United States commissioners had the authority to issue search warrants for specific federal offenses,\textsuperscript{695} and magistrate judges inherited that authority through the Federal Magistrates Act, which, among other things, gave magistrate judges “all powers and duties conferred or imposed on United States commissioners.”\textsuperscript{696}

Several factors have led to the increase in search warrants, the most obvious being the intensified investigations of terrorist activity since September 11, but also the prevalence of electronic and audio communications via the internet and cell phones, continuing advancements in search and surveillance technologies, and the increased use of these technologies in criminal investigations.\textsuperscript{697} Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 and other rules and statutes have also required magistrate judges to grapple with multiple new surveillance technologies when deciding whether to issue search warrants. A review of recent cases reveals numerous examples where magistrate judges have considered applications for warrants or other search and surveillance orders involving cell phones, historic cell site information, electronic data under the Stored Communications Act,\textsuperscript{698} and other investigative technologies.\textsuperscript{699}

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{694} FED. R. CRIM. PROC. 41(b)(1) provides:
\begin{enumerate}
\item[(b)] Authority to Issue a Warrant. At the request of a federal law enforcement officer or an attorney for the government:
\begin{enumerate}
\item[(1)] a magistrate judge with authority in the district—or if none is reasonably available, a judge of a state court of record in the district—has authority to issue a warrant to search for and seize a person or property located within the district . . .
\end{enumerate}
\end{enumerate}
\textsuperscript{696} Foschio, supra note 610, at ¶ II.4.
\textsuperscript{697} 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(1) provides:
\begin{enumerate}
\item[(a)] Each United States magistrate judge serving under this chapter shall have . . .
\begin{enumerate}
\item[(1)] all powers and duties conferred or imposed upon United States commissioners by law or by the Rules of Criminal Procedure for the United States District Courts . . .
\end{enumerate}
\end{enumerate}
\textsuperscript{698} See McCabe, supra note 609, at 26–28.
\end{footnotesize}
3. Civil Consent Cases

The use of magistrate judges to preside in civil cases with the consent of the parties under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) expanded broadly from 1990 to 2014. Civil consent authority was established in 1979 by amendments to the Federal Magistrates Act. By 1990, magistrate judges were handling civil consent cases in the majority of district courts, but in about a quarter of courts, magistrate judges had none or very few civil consent cases.

By 2014, the number of courts reporting no civil consent cases had decreased to four, and the number reporting five or less had decreased to five. Therefore, the percentage of courts in which magistrate judges were utilized for more than a minimum of civil consent cases expanded from about 75 percent of courts to about 90 percent. The size of the expansion of civil consent authority is amply illustrated by the court with the largest number of civil consent cases disposed of in 2014, which was the Northern District of California with 1,623 civil consent cases.

Several factors have contributed to the expansion of civil consent cases. Perhaps the most significant was the statutory amendment to the Federal Magistrates Act that allowed district judges and magistrate judges, after litigants are given initial notification of the consent option at the time of filing, to “again advise the parties of the availability of the magistrate” judge to exercise consent jurisdiction. After this statutory change in 1990, individual district judges and courts began using various methods for facilitating consent in civil cases, including reminding parties of the consent option at scheduling conferences and educating the bar on civil consent authority in speeches at bar association functions. One of the court-wide methods, which has proved effective in a number of courts, has been the inclusion of magistrate judges on the civil case assignment wheel for direct assignment of civil cases to the magistrate judge as the presiding judge, subject to affirmative consent of the parties at a later date.

---

700 The statute authorizes full-time magistrate judges “upon consent of the parties . . . to conduct any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and order the entry of judgment in the case.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (2012).
702 In 1990, there were eight courts that reported no civil consent cases and fourteen courts that reported five or fewer civil consent cases. The seventy other courts reported civil consent cases in widely varying numbers throughout the circuits. The highest number reported was 487 in the District of Oregon. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 57, at 285–86 tbl.M-5.
703 See JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014, supra note 163, at tbl.M-5.
704 See supra notes 702–03.
705 See JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014, supra note 163, at tbl.M-5.
707 See, e.g., Woodward & Penick, supra note 610.
Approximately one-third of district courts have implemented a “direct assignment” system in one form or another.\textsuperscript{708}

An additional causal factor has been the efforts of courts to encourage consents in social security and prisoner cases, which comprise a sizeable portion of civil consent cases. While it is still a common practice for magistrate judges to handle social security appeals on a report and recommendation basis, dispositions on consent of the parties actually outnumbered reports and recommendations in these cases in 2014.\textsuperscript{709}

Parties consent to magistrate judges in various types of cases, from diversity cases such as motor vehicle accidents to more complex commercial litigation, including intellectual property cases. In the vast majority of civil cases in district courts, of course, district judges are the presiding judges, but magistrate judges preside on consent of the parties in a portion of civil cases. Civil consent cases were 6 percent of the total number of terminations of civil cases in district courts in the 12-month period ending September 30, 2013.\textsuperscript{710}

\section*{E. Questions Relating to Effective Utilization of Magistrate Judges}

The advice of the Magistrate Judges Committee to district courts on best practices for the effective and efficient utilization of magistrate judges is offered in a document originally adopted by the Committee in 1999, entitled \textit{Suggestions for Utilization of Magistrate Judges} (Suggestions).\textsuperscript{711}

Two practices that are beneficial to courts but that also raise practical questions about the most effective use of magistrate judges are examined below: (1) the practice of referring case-dispositive motions to magistrate judges for reports and recommendations, and (2) the practice in many courts of using magistrate judges as “specialists” in certain types of cases and proceedings.

There is no single model within the judiciary for the utilization of magistrate judges, but the Judicial Conference resolved many years ago to encourage “the full and effective utilization” of magistrate judges by the district courts.\textsuperscript{712}

The dynamic relationship between the general goal of full and effective utilization and flexibility is adumbrated in the \textit{Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts}, which was adopted by the Judicial Conference in 1995:

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{708} Statistics in possession of authors.
\textsuperscript{709} Reports and recommendations in social security appeals increased 39 percent from 2010 to 2014 (from 4,229 to 5,881), see \textit{Judicial Business} 2014, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17, but the number of social security appeals disposed of on consent rose 53 percent during that period (from 4,324 to 6,630) (statistics in possession of authors).
\textsuperscript{710} See \textit{Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts}, supra note 56, at tbl.6.6.
\end{flushleft}
Magistrate judges should perform judicial duties to the extent constitutionally permissible and consistent with sound judicial policy. Individual districts should retain flexibility, consistent with the national goal of effective utilization of all magistrate judge resources, to have magistrate judges perform judicial services most needed in light of local conditions and changing caseloads.\footnote{Judicial Conference of the U.S., supra note 649.}

1. Reports and Recommendations

The referral of case-dispositive motions by district judges to magistrate judges for proposed findings of fact and recommendations for disposition (i.e., reports and recommendations) is a statutorily authorized procedure.\footnote{28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2012).} In effect, it allows district judges to refer such motions that magistrate judges are not authorized by statute to adjudicate with finality absent consent of the parties. After the magistrate judge’s submission of a report and recommendation, the parties have fourteen days to file objections for “a de novo determination” by the district judge.\footnote{Id. Section 636(b)(1) provides that “[w]ithin fourteen days after being served with a copy” of the report and recommendation, “any party may serve and file written objections . . . as provided by rules of court.” The district judge “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the [report and recommendation] to which objection is made,” and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the [report and recommendation].” Id.} From the perspective of considering the most efficient means of disposing of a motion, the report and recommendation procedure inserts extra procedural steps (and an additional judge) into the process of deciding a motion. To that extent, it tends to make the report and recommendation process a less efficient means of ruling on a motion than if the motion were decided by one judge with authority to make a final determination.

The Magistrate Judges Committee advises in its Suggestions that referrals of case-dispositive motions for reports and recommendations may involve inefficient duplication of judicial work and therefore should be limited.\footnote{See supra note 711.} The Committee acknowledges that real benefits accrue to the court from the reports and recommendations process, such as saving district judges’ time to permit them to attend to other Article III duties, but concludes that the most efficient references are those that do not involve de novo review by a district judge.\footnote{See supra note 711.}

However, the practice of referring case-dispositive matters for reports and recommendations continued much the same in certain types of cases and increased in others during the expansion of utilization after 1990. From 1990 to 2014, the largest segment of reports and recommendations was in prisoner cases (state habeas corpus, federal habeas corpus and prisoner civil rights cases).\footnote{See supra note 632.} The number of reports and recommendations in prisoner cases grew by a
relatively small margin from 1990 to 2014 (from 20,583 to 26,140).\textsuperscript{719} The second largest segment is general civil cases (i.e., all civil cases other than prisoner cases and social security appeals), but the number of reports and recommendations in these cases more than doubled in the past twenty-five years (from 7,388 to 19,081).\textsuperscript{720} The third largest segment of reports and recommendations is in social security appeals. They rose slightly from 1990 to 2014 (from 5,112 to 5,881).\textsuperscript{721} Finally, the numbers of reports and recommendations in felony cases varied annually from 1990 to 2014, but declined overall (from 4,169 to 3,200).\textsuperscript{722}

As the statistics indicate, the practice of referring case-dispositive matters for reports and recommendations continues to be used in virtually all district courts, with a few exceptions. Courts give valid reasons for local referrals for reports and recommendations.\textsuperscript{723} Some courts view reports and recommendations as a “necessary evil” for practical and equitable division of the court’s judicial workload among the court’s judges, often in the context of a heavy overall caseload. Many district judges find referrals of certain case-dispositive motions, especially if they are to require evidentiary hearings (e.g., motions to suppress evidence in felony cases), as extremely valuable time-savers. A substantial number of magistrate judges and district judges note that referral of case-dispositive motions provide magistrate judges with some of the most professionally satisfying judicial work that they have. Finally, courts report that, typically, objections are not filed to reports and recommendations issued in particular types of cases, such as social security appeals, in which case the delay in adjudication of the motion is shortened to some degree.

Interestingly, courts continue to refer motions to magistrate judges for reports and recommendations at the same time that the numbers of civil consent cases have risen since 1990. This suggests that the courts’ continued referrals for reports and recommendations do not imply a lack of confidence in the use of magistrate judges to the fullest extent of their authority. However, in the authors’ opinion, it does suggest that the report and recommendation process will continue to be used for some time to come.

\textsuperscript{723} Although it is not verifiable by citation to any publication available to the public, the content is based on numerous interviews with judges about magistrate judge utilization practices in many district courts, and periodic written reports on individual courts’ practices which are made by the authors and other attorneys in the normal course of their work at the Administrative Office.
2. The Specialist-Generalist Question

Carroll Seron, in her excellent 1985 study for the Federal Judicial Center (FJC) on magistrate judge utilization, identified three models of utilization from her empirical research on the district courts: (1) the “specialist,” (2) the “team player,” and (3) the “additional judge.” The specialist role is of interest here. Using a magistrate judge as a specialist refers to the automatic referral of cases to magistrate judges in certain special areas of the civil docket, most commonly social security appeals and prisoner cases, for reports and recommendations or disposition on consent, to allow magistrate judges to build up a special expertise in an area where there is an ongoing, large caseload. The specialist model is also implicated by the practice of referring all pretrial matters of a certain type, such as discovery motions or settlement conferences, to capitalize on the expertise that magistrate judges have developed.

As Carroll Seron’s study indicates, there is a long history of courts using magistrate judges in specialist roles. Many courts today refer all or most prisoner cases and social security appeals to magistrate judges for reports and recommendations or disposition on consent. Moreover, in many courts, magistrate judges are heavily relied on to conduct settlement conferences in recognition of their mediation skills.

However, with the establishment of the magistrate judges system, Congress sought to avoid creating a lower-tiered federal judicial position with jurisdiction limited to certain types of litigation. The FCSC, likewise, recognized the need to “safeguard against undermining the institutional supplementary role” of magistrate judges, and against the “unintentional creation of a lower-tiered judicial office with separate and distinct responsibilities.” Legislation has been proposed from outside the judiciary from time to time that would carve out certain matters for assignment to magistrate judges. The Judicial Conference has disapproved in principle of legislation that mandates that a district court auto-

---

724 SERON, supra note 610, at 35–46, 59–92.
725 Id. at 35.
726 See id.
727 Magistrate judges issued 26,140 reports and recommendations in prisoner cases in the twelve months ending September 30, 2014. See JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17.
728 Magistrate judges conducted 20,641 settlement conferences in the twelve months ending September 30, 2014. Id.
729 See H.R. REP. NO. 96-287, at 11 (1979). As the House Committee on the Judiciary stated in rejecting jurisdictional limitations on civil consent authority in the committee report on H.R. 1046, the Federal Magistrate Act of 1979:

If a magistrate is competent to handle any case-dispositive jurisdiction, he should be fully competent to handle all case-dispositive jurisdiction. Such a rule preserves the generalist posture of the magistrate, as well as insures that . . . there is [not] an impetus to appoint “specialized” magistrates to handle only narrow types of cases.

Id.
730 FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., supra note 8, at 79.
matically refer particular types of cases to magistrate judges.\footnote{731}{See \textit{REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES} (Mar. 1980).} In addition, the Magistrate Judges Committee advises that courts benefit from using the full array of its magistrate judges’ skills rather than assigning them only specified types of cases that consume most of their time.\footnote{732}{See \textit{supra} note 711, 723.} The generalist nature of magistrate judge positions is, moreover, a recruitment asset, helping to attract top-quality candidates with broad substantive knowledge and skills.

Therefore, the question is, how can the longstanding practice in many courts of using magistrate judges as specialists be reconciled with the preferred policy of not limiting magistrate judge jurisdiction to certain types of cases? This “specialist-generalist question” usually arises with respect to courts that have heavy prisoner or social security caseloads and that find it most effective and efficient to use magistrate judges as specialists to adjudicate these cases. On the other hand, some courts with low overall caseloads appear to emphasize the use of magistrate judges as specialists for prisoner cases or social security appeals in lieu of referrals and consents in general civil cases. In a number of courts, the specialist-generalist roles appear to have been reconciled by using magistrate judges in both roles, that is, as specialists for certain narrow types of cases (e.g., state habeas corpus cases) but also as generalists in a range of other types of cases. This continues to be a complicated issue with no easy solutions.

\textit{CONCLUSION}

It seems certain that the use of magistrate judges in the federal judiciary will continue to evolve and expand in the coming years. Just as district judges have expanded the authority of magistrate judges and courts have explored innovative ways of utilizing magistrate judges in the past twenty-five years, it is likely that these trends will carry over into the future. It is our hope that the analysis of the expansion of magistrate judge authority and utilization described in this paper has increased the readers’ overall awareness of these significant federal judges and convinced them of their indispensable role in the federal judiciary.