A jury convicted Wiley Gene Wilson of four counts of use of a minor in the production of pornography and four counts of possession of visual presentations depicting sexual conduct of a person under sixteen years of age. Wilson appealed, arguing that his four convictions for using a child in a sexual performance were redundant convictions. In September of 2001, Wilson and the ten-year-old female victim (M.T.) left M.T.'s father's trailer to attend to errands related to installing a satellite television system. Apparently, while running errands and stuck in traffic, M.T. urinated in her clothing. Subsequently, Wilson took M.T. to Wal-Mart and purchased her new clothes to replace the ones she had urinated in. Wilson also purchased a Polaroid camera and instant film at the same time. Subsequently, while M.T. changed her clothes, Wilson told M.T. to pose in various positions and took four photographs of M.T. unclothed. Based on these facts, a jury convicted Wilson on four counts of using a child in a sexual performance. Wilson appealed, arguing that the four convictions were redundant because they involved the use of a child in a single sexual performance. The court held that the threshold issue to determine whether Wilson’s convictions were redundant is “whether Wilson committed a single act or four individual acts that are punishable as separate violations of NRS 200.710.”2 Based upon the statutory language of NRS 200.710, the court held that “the crux of the prohibited conduct is the use of a minor in sexual performance and not how the performance is otherwise recorded or documented.”3 For example, had Wilson filmed the minor’s performance rather than taken photographs, Wilson would have only been convicted of one violation rather than four. Based on this logic, the court unequivocally held that the focus of the crime must be on the performance and not the way it is documented. As a result, the court reversed three of Wilson's four convictions for the production of child pornography. Wilson was also convicted of possession of child pornography under NRS 200.730.4 Wilson argued that his conviction on four counts of possession of child pornography violated double jeopardy because those counts were lesser-included offenses of the production charges. The court, however, upheld Wilson's convictions under NRS 200.730 because the requisite intent between the two statutes differed. Further, Wilson's right to confront his victim under the Sixth Amendment was not violated. While the child victim was cross-examined at trial with her back to Wilson, Wilson did not produce sufficient evidence to prove his right under the Sixth Amendment had been violated and failed to object until the end of his case. The court also dismissed Wilson’s claim that the State violated Article IV(c) of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) for failure to commence trial within 180 days of Wilson’s detention. The court held that the 180-day time limit is not absolute and can be extended with good cause. Lastly, the court dismissed Wilson’s claim that his due process was violated when the district court failed to compel attendance of out-of-state witnesses. The court held that because of jurisdictional limitations, they may only compel out-of-state witnesses if they are present in the State of Nevada.
Fellows, Kathleen L., "Summary of Wilson v. State, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. 34" (2005). Nevada Supreme Court Summaries. 596.