Document Type

Case Summary

Publication Date

Spring 2-25-2016

Case Synopsis

Rippo’s claim, that the ineffective assistance of the counsel who represented him in the first post conviction hearing excused the procedural bars to claims raised in the second petition, was rejected. The Court provided guidance on two issues related to whether an ineffective-assistance-of-postconviction-counsel claim has been raised in a timely fashion: (1) when does a postconviction-counsel claim reasonably become available, and (2) what is a reasonable time thereafter in which the claim must be asserted. They held on (1) that the factual basis for such a claim is not reasonably available until the conclusion of postconviction proceedings in which the ineffective assistance allegedly occurred. They held on (2) that an ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel claim to excuse the procedural default of other claims has been filed within a reasonable time so long as it is filed within one year after entry of the district court’s order or, if a timely appeal was taken from the district court’s order, within one year after this court issues its remittitur. The Court also adopted the two-prong Strickland test to evaluate ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel claims. The Court concluded that Rippo filed his petition within a reasonable time after the postconviction-counsel claims became available but the claims lacked merit. The Court rejected his other allegations of good cause and prejudice and affirmed the district court’s decision to deny the petition as procedurally barred.