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Abstract

This paper makes a series of inter-related points. (1) The main features of a Palestinian-Israeli agreement for a "two-state" solution-if such an agreement is to be achieved-have become very clear. (2) The long-term success of such an agreement in meeting the needs of the two state will depend on the viability of the Palestinian state that is created, which in turn will depend on three features-contiguity of Palestinian territories, permeability of the border with Israel, and normal human security for its citizens. (3) The current political climate does not allow the creation of such a state through standard bilateral negotiations. Indeed, the prospect facing both sides is a second disengagement-this time from the occupied West Bank regions with only small minorities of Israeli settlers-and the ending of negotiations with no immediate prospect for any of the three features stipulated above. (4) The necessary requirements for viability can only be achieved if mutual trust between the sides can be created, trust that provisions will be faithfully enacted and adhered to, and trust that the agreement will truly mark the end of the conflict. (5) To build that trust, we propose a strategy involving unilateral, reciprocal steps in which each side, recognizing the interdependence of the interests of the two sides, acts in a manner that both serves its own interests and signals a willingness to consider the other side's interests as well. (6) Critical to the success of this strategy is the need for both sides to communicate a view of the future that includes the other side in a way that affords its citizens a status and everyday life that they will find tolerable even if it does not satisfy their notions of justice. Indeed, people on both sides (but especially the Palestinians for whom the absence of an agreement or the failure of their state would be especially disastrous) will be called upon to sacrifice some measure of what they deem fair or appropriate to achieve peace.

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